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BENCH AND BAR

Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the
State Bar Association of North Dakota
The Annual Convenion of the State Bar Association of North
Dakota, was called to order at 9:30 o'clock a.m. of Thursday,
August 5, 1954, in Central High School, Grand Forks, North Dakota, Vernon M. Johnson, President of the North Dakota State
Bar Association, presiding.
The invocation was given by Reverend Woodrow Hughes,
Grand Forks, North Dakota.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Before we start the committee reports I have a letter from J. H. Newton saying he will be unable
to attend this convention.
(Whereupon President Johnson reads the letter.)
We are going to open with committee reports. First we will
have the report of the Mineral Laws Committee by Arley Bjella,
Chairman.
Report

Mineral Laws Committee
State Bar Association
The Mineral Laws Committee of the State Bar Association
held two regularly scheduled meetings during the past year, each
of said meetings being held in the city of Bismarck, the first on
March 6, 1954, and second on July 15, 1954.
At both of the meetings above referred to, the Mineral Laws
Committee spent considerable time discussing the legal question
involved in the Messersmith v. Smith case, that was decided recently by the Supreme Court of North Dakota. After discussion
our Committee feels that amendments to Section 28-0119 NDRC
1943 should be enacted, which amendments will be as follows:
I-Any action, defense or counterclaim for relief on the ground
that a certificate of acknowledgment regular on its face is
false in fact must be commenced or interposed within one year
next following the date of filing for record in the office of the
proper Register of Deeds, the instrument bearing such certificate, if filed for record after this act takes effect. As to any instrument bearing such certificate previously filed for record,
such action, defense of counterclaim must be commenced or
interposed within one year next following the effective date of
this act. After expiration of one year as hereinbefore provided
every certificate of acknowledgment regular on its face shall
be conclusively presumed to be correct and valid for all purposes, and evidence to contradict any such certificate shall be
admissable in any action or proceeding in the courts or elsewhere. This act shall control all cases falling within its provisions nothwithstanding non-residence or legal disability of
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any party who might otherwise have the right to question the
truth of a certificate of acknowledgment regular on its face.
Nothing in this act shall alter liabilities of or remedies against
any acknowledging officer.
!I-Sections 1-0401-2-3-4, NDRC of 1943 should be up-dated
about ten years to January 1, 1953. Likewise with Section
1-0421 NDRC of 1943.
It is the thought of the Committee that said amendments should
be presented by the Legislative Research Committee, at their meeting, with the recommendation that they be presented to the 1955
Legislature for enactment. It is felt that these amendments, above
referred to, will greatly assist attorneys in North Dakota in examining titles involving acknowledgments. Again I might state we
have received information from the Legislative Research Committee
that the next meeting is in progress.
The second matter that was discussed at some length by the
Mineral Laws Committee was the general laws of the State of North
Dakota, relative to conservation and tax laws. It is the opinion of
your Committee that such laws as are now on the statute books in
the State of North Dakota relative to oil and gas are fair and equitable to the land owner, to the state, royalty owner and producer.
It is further the thought of the Committee that these laws shall be
retained in their present form so as to encourage the future development of the oil industry in the State of North Dakota.
Some discussion was held as to the feasibility of creating a separate department of the State of North Dakota to handle oil and gas
resources, with the office to be at Bismarck. It was the concensus
of the Committee that while in the future such a change will be
required, such a recommendation would not be practicable at this
time, and that this matter should be referred to the new Mineral
Laws Committee for discussion and such attention as they feel it
may merit.
The next major item discussed by the Mineral Laws Committee,
and one we feel should have immediate attention, is relative to
procedures to be established in determining mineral ownerships
under oil and gas leases that will expire within the next one or
two years, or new ones of years thereafter. The problem that will
be presented when hundreds of oil and gas leases expire within
the next couple of years is that the mineral ownerships will be divided among a great many owners, many of whom will be out-ofstate owners. It is the thought of the Mineral Laws Committee that
in many cases it may be impossible to secure a lease from the
various and diverse owners, and in some areas this may seriously
impede the development for oil and gas. While the Committee
has discussed this problem at great length, no unanimity has been
reached as to procedures and laws to effectuate a solution. The
problem here presented is so complex that it is the thought of our
Committee that the new Mineral Laws Committee to be appointed
by the State Bar Association be requested to immediately start
work on this problem; and our further recommendation is that the
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State Bar Association be requested to provide an appropriation
so that funds will be available for the necessary research and
study that will have to go into this problem before a practical
soltution can be found.
This matter, if given proper attention, may result in legislation
that can be presented to the next legislative assembly. We deem
this to be of paramount importance.
Respectfully submitted,
William S. Murray
Clifford Jansonius
Robert A. Birdzell
Arthur N. Ohnstad
William R. Pearce
Kenneth G. Pringle
Theodore P. Clifford
Arley R. Bjella, Chairman
MR. BJELLA: Mr. President, I move the adoption of this
report.
JOHN HJELLUM: I second the motion.
(Question put and motion carried.)
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: The motion is carried. At this time
I am going to appoint a Resolutions Committee and the Auditing
Committee.
Resolutions Committee:
John A. Stormon, Chairman
L. H. Oehlert
S. E. Halpern
Harold D. Shaft
Donald C. Holand
I might say that if you have any resolutions please contact these
men as soon as possible.
Auditing Committee:
George A. Soule
August Doerr
Kenneth J. Eckes
The audit is at the desk for the committee for examination and
for anyone who wants to look it over.
The next committee report will be that of Business Corporations Committee. This report will be given by Mr. L. T. Sproul as
Chairman.
Report of Committee on Business Corporations
This association at its 1953 annual meeting instructed this
committee to bring to the 1954 convention a complete report of
our corporation laws and one of the following recommendations:
1. The adoption of a Model Business Corporation Act.
2. The adoption of a Business Corporation Act similar to the
Minnesota Act.
3. Specific changes in our North Dakota corporation laws.
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For reasons hereinafter stated we now unanimously recommend
the adoption of the Model Business Corporation Act prepared by
Committee on Corporate Laws of the American Bar Association,
revised in 1953, with the necessary changes, amendments and
modifications which we set forth in this report, and further unanimously recommend that this Association endorse and approve
the same for passage by the North Dakota Legislative Assembly
meeting in 1955.
It is our finding that during the past 25 years, through both
desire and necessity of change, 21 states have completely revised
their business corporation laws, and Virginia and the District of
Columbia are considering following. Many more, including North
Dakota, now have such complete revision under consideration.
This trend has come about because of a gradual change in thd
attitude of the people toward the corporate form of business
organization. The original system of creating corporations by
special legislative acts gradually gave way to the system of incorporating under general laws. Then as fear of corporations in
the business world disappeared, there followed a period of competition among the states in passing laws to make the state attractive to corporations. That period has also passed and we are now
living in a period of a new trend in business corporation acts.
It is now realized that many corporations have been caused to
leave their home states by unnecessary restrictions in local laws.
Many needless barriers to the corporate form of business exist in
many states, including North Dakota. This period in our business
and industrial development is well described by Mr. Ray Garrett of
Chicago, Vice Chairman of the Corporation Section of the American Bar Association, in his article appearing in the 1952 summer
issue of the Baylor Law Review, as follows:
"It was observed that antiquated statutes and haphazard
amendments no longer sufficed for the complex developments
that had taken place in corporate organizations and practices;
the doctrines of ultra vires and de facto corporations were
becoming obsolete; provisions were required for the new developments in stock without par value; voting rights had to
be restated; and the liabilities of directors needed redefining.
It was observed that the state as such had little interest in
the internal affairs of corporations, which were largely matters
of the relationship between the corporation and its shareholders
and creditors, and that many protective devices were contained
in other new laws, such as blue sky, stock transfer, and antimonopoly laws."
Some years ago, to assist states in the revision of their business
corporations laws, the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, after several years of study, approved a Uniform Act.
However, this Act has not been effective either for uniform adoption or as a model and is now not being used. Consequently we
have the Model Act as drafted after considerable work and study
by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the American Bar Asso-
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ciation. The initial draft of this Model Act was in 1946. It has been
revised in 1950 and again in 1953.
This committee prefers the Model Act over the Minnesota%
Act for the reason that we feel the Model Act has been kept up to
date and because it was drafted many years later than the
Minnesota Act and we would in the Model Act have laws that
would better serve our growing and expanding business and industry in North Dakota. The Minnesota Act was drafted in 1933 and
was at that time based on the old Uniform Act and also on the
statutes of Deleware, Ohio and California as then existing.
We have rejected the idea of trying to bring our present Code
up to date by specific changes in specific sections because the
changes would be too many and we feel it would be impossible
in this way to give us an up-to-date corporation law that would
keep abreast of the industrial and business changes. Following
are a few of the many specific changes in, and amendments to, our
present law which, in our opinion, should be made: (Some of
these suggestions were outlined in the 1953 report of this committee.)
1. The North Dakota statutes should be amended to permit
the directors of a corporation to purchase its own shares
out of surplus after giving certain protection to preferred
stockholders. At present our laws in effect provide that a corporation may purchase its own shares out of surplus provided
that the shareholders authorize such purchase.
2. We have at present no statute with respect to voting trusts.
Our statutes should provide for voting trusts and a reasonable
limitation ought to be placed on their duration.
3. Our statutes do not give the directors the right to remove
an officer. Such right should be incorporated in our law.
4. Section 10-0519 of 1943 Code makes provsion for the removal of a director but the section is obscure and is quite obviously in conflict with our constitutional provision with respect
to cumulative voting.
5. Our statutes should be amended to give greater protection
to minority stockholders where a sale of substantially all of
the assets of a corporation are made, or a merger of one corporation with another is accomplished.
6. Our statutes should be amended to relieve directors of a
corporation from personal liability to corporate creditors where
debts of the corporation are in excess of subscribed capital.
Our statutes relative to dissolution of corporations should be
redrawn so that dissolutions can be accomplished in a much
better and more satisfactory manner than this step can be taken
at the present time.
8. Section 10-0211 should be amended to make it clear that
where "a meeting" is referred to, a meeting of the stockholders
is meant.
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9. Our present laws should be amended to provide for the
use of waivers in connection with meetings in more instances
than exist at the present time, especially a meeting for the increasing or diminishing of capital stock. Likewise, the 60 day
provision in Section 10-0330 is too burdensome and should be
changed. (At our last June primary election the provision in
our constitution, Section 138, in respect to the 60 days was
taken care of.)
10. Section 10-0202 of our 1943 Code should be amended to
provide for a flexible number of directors.
11. Section 10-0204 of our 1943 Code should be clarified to
require signing of the Articles by three only, regardless of the
number of directors and also to eliminate the residence requirements of incorporators.
12. Many sections of our corporation law refer to "meeting"
of the corporation. These sections should be amended to specify
what meeting is meant, whether a stockholders meeting or
directors meeting.
In our opinion, the Model Business Corporation Act, above
referred to and which we are recommending, does incorporate
all the desirable changes that should be made in our present
laws and at the same time would give us a well phrased statuteinstead of one that is clear, well planned and correlated. It would
bring us up to date with modem business trends and give us a law
which appears to us very workable and satisfactory to all parties
concerned. We feel that in every instance it gives the proper protection to shareholders and investors and is fair to all parties concerned with and interested in the corporate business. To date
Texas, Oregon, Maryland and Wisconsin have followed closely,
and the District of Columbia and Virginia are considering the
Model Act in a complete revision of their business corporation
laws. At the present time it is very probable that Alabama will
adopt the Model Act. The new acts of Indiana, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Missouri and Oklahoma are all direct ancestors of the Model
Act in that the new acts of those states were followed closely by
the American Bar Association Committee in drafting the present
Model Act which we recommend.
This Model Act is not a Uniform Act but is to be used and
followed as a model and consequently can be changed and modified in any way we see fit.
We now make the following comments and recommend the
following amendments and modifications to the Model Act as it
appears in Handbook A, of which you all received a copy. In this
discussion the terms "New Act", "Act" and "Model Act" wherever
used refer to the same, namely the Model Act which we are recommending.
1. This New Act is approved by this Association and, if finally
made law by the North Dakota Legislature, will undoubtedly be
incorporated in Title 10 of Code. However, we must keep in mind
that the New Act covers only business corporations, meaning cor-
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porations for profit, both domestic and foreign. It does not in any
way attempt to repeal any of the sections of Title 10 with respect
to sale of securities, corporate farming, benevolent corporations,
orphan homes, cemetery associations, fraternal corporations, mutual
aid corporations, electric cooperatives or cooperative associations.
There are, of course, other sections of our Code relating to corporations which would not have to be repealed by this Model Act.
In effect this new Model Act covers all profit corporations that
may be organized for any lawful purpose, unless from the context
of any statute a different intention plainly appears. For instance,
such intention plainly appears from our statutes on banks and
banking, insurance companies and railroads. It is the opinion of this
committee that this Model Act does not in any way repeal, amend
or modify Chapter 98 of the Session Laws of 1953, relating to
foreign banks or trust companies acting as fiduciaries in North Dakota, for the reason that a bank or trust company serving as permitted in said Chapter 98 is not, in our opinion, "doing business"
in the State of North Dakota within the meaning of Section 99 of
the Model Act.
2. It is our opinion that the New Act must necessarily repeal all
of the sections of Title 10 pertaining to business corporations, meaning corporations for profit, both domestic and foreign, except that
Section 10-0108 and Section 10-0109 shall be added to and become
a part of Section 142 of the Model Act (which sections pertain to
the power of the legislature over corporations).
3. With reference to sections of our Code that refer to parts
of the business corporation law which are being repealed, it is the
thought of this committee that we must first consider the approval
and adoption of this Model Business Corporation Act. After that has
been done, then, if it is necessary to make changes in, for example, the chapter with respect to orphan homes or the chapter with
respect to electric cooperatives, that can be done after the adoption and approval of the Model Act so that these sections referred
to are specifically keyed to the New Act. We think this feature
or detail is the work of the legislative draftsman.
4. Section 3 of the Model Act relating to purposes should be
changed to read as follows:
"Corporations may be organized under this Act for any
lawful purpose or purposes unless from the context of any
statute a different intention plainly appears."
5. The committee has checked the New Model Act and, in our
opinion, there are no provisions thereof that are in conflict with
our North Dakota constitution, as amended.
6. Under Section 90 of the Model Act the Court to have the
power to liquidate the assets and business of a corporation should
be the District Courts of the State of North Dakota.
7. Sections 121, 122, 123, 124, 125 and 126 of the Model Act
relating to franchise taxes and fees should be amended in order
to bring the same in harmony with our existing fees and franchise
taxes as follows:
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Section 121 of the Model Act should provide as follows:
"Section 121. Fees for Filing and Issuing Certificates.
The Secretary of State shall charge and collect for:
(a) Filing articles of incorporation and issuing a certificate of
incorporation, eight dollars.
(b) Filing articles of amendment and issuing a certificate of
amendment, six dollars.
(c) Filing restated articles of incorporation, five dollars.
(d) Filing articles of merger or consolidation and issuing a
certificate of merger or consolidation, five dollars.
(e) Filing an application to reserve a corporate name, five
dollars.
(f) Filing a notice of transfer of a reserved corporate name,
five dollars.
(g) Filing a statement of change of address of registered office
or change of registered agent, or both, one dollar.
(h) Filing a statement of the establishment of a series of shares,
five dollars.
(i) Filing a statement of cancellation of shares, five dollars.
(j) Filing a statement of reduction of stated capital, five dollars.
(k) Filing a statement of intent to dissolve, one dollar.
(1) Filing a statement of revocation of voluntary dissolution,
proceedings, one dollar.
(in) Filing articles of dissolution, one dollar.
(n) Filing an application of a foreign corporation for a certificate of authority to transact business in this State and issuing
a certificate of authority, eight dollars.
(o) Filing an application of a foreign corporation for an amended certificate of authority to transact business in this State and
issuing an amended certificate of authority, eight dollars.
(p) Filing a copy of amendment to the articles of incorporation of a foreign corporation holding a certificate of authority
to transact business in this State, two dollars.
(q) Filing a copy of articles of merger of a foreign corporation
holding a certificate of authority to transact business in this
State, two dollars.
(r) Filing an application for withdrawal of a foreign corporation and issuing a certificate of withdrawal, seven dollars.
(s) Filing any other statement or report, except an annual report, of a domestic or foreign corporation, one dollar."
Section 122 of the Model Act should provide as follows:
"Section 122. Miscellaneous Charges.
The Secretary of State shall charge and collect:
(a) For furnishing a certified copy of any document, instrument, or paper reating to a corporation, twenty-five cents per
one hundred words or folio fraction thereof and one dollar for
the certificate and affixing the seal thereto.
(b) At the time of any service of process on him as resident
agent of a corporation, three dollars, which amount may be
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recovered as taxable costs by the party to the suit or action
causing such service to be made if such party prevails in the
suit or action."
Section 128 of the Model Act should provide as follows:
First unnumbered paragraph should provide as follows:
"The Secretary of State shall charge and collect from each
domestic corporation license fees, based upon the amount of
capital stock which it will have authority to issue or the increase
in the amount of capital stock which it will have authority to issue,
at the time of:
The rest of the section to be the same.
Second unnumbered paragraph should provide as follows:
"The license fees shall be at the rate of $25.00 for the first
$25,000.00 of its authorized capital stock, or fraction thereof, or
the sum of $50.00 for authorized capital stock in excess of $25,000.00
but not exceeding $50,000.00, and the further sum of $5.00 for
every additional $10,000.00 of its authorized capital stock, or
fraction thereof, in excess of $50,000.00."
This wording while leaving the fees the same as at the present time
also clarifies our present section on license fees.
Third paragraph under (c) should provide as follows:
"The license fees payable on an increase in the amount of
authorized capital stock shall be imposed only on the increased
amount of authorized capital stock, and the amount of previously
authorized stock shall be taken into account in determining the
rate applicable to the increased amount of authorized capital stock."
Section 124 of the Model Act should provide as follows:
First paragraph-same change as in first unnumbered paragraph
of Section 128.
Second paragraph-same change as in second unnumbered paragraph of Section 128.
Third paragraph should provide as follows:
"The license fees payable on an increase in the amount of
authorized capital stock shall be imposed only on the increased
amount of such authorized capital stock represented in this
state, and the amount of previously authorized capital stock
represented in this state shall be taken into account in determining the rate applicable to the increased amount of authorized capital stock."
Last paragraph should provide as follows:
"The amount of authorized capital stock represented in this
state shall be that proportion of its total authorized capital
stock which the sum of the value of its property located in this
state and the gross amount of business transacted by it at or
from place of business in this state bears to the sum of the
value of all of its property, wherever located, and the gross
amount of its business, wherever transacted. Such proportion
shall be determined from information contained in the application for a certificate of authority to transact business in this
state until the filing of an annual report and thereafter from in-
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formation contained in the latest annual report filed by the
corporation."
With reference to Sections 125 and 126 of the Model Act-these
sections should be redrafted and the only change would be to provide for an annual franchise tax of $2.50 with a penalty of $1.00
in case of failure to file timely. The draftsman for the legislative
committee can redraft these two sections in harmony with the
foregoing.
8. We now refer to Section 145 of the Model Act which is entitled "Repeal of Prior Acts". In the opinion of this committee
this section for the Model Act must provide for repeal of the following chapters of the 1943 North Dakota Code: Chapters 10-01
(with the exception above noted), 10-02, 10-03, 10-05, 10-14, 10-16,
10-17 and Subdivisions 4, 5, 8 and 9 of Section 54-0904 (these Subdivisions of Section 54-0904 will be superseded by Section 121 of
the Model Act) and all other acts or parts that are inconsistent
with the provsions of this Model Act as finally passed and approved.
It is the turther opinion of this committee that if by repealing some
of the sections contained in any of the above chapters we have
repealed a law that might be necessary in our practice, then such
law properly belongs in some other chapter of our Code and the
sections of such other chapter would necessarily have to be amended accordingly. For instance, if by repealing all of the sections of
Chapter 10-14 we are repealing the requirement of allegation of
incorporation in complaints and such allegation is necessary, then
such requirement should be made in our laws on pleading and not
in our laws on corporations and our laws on pleading should be
amended accordingly.
If this report is adopted as filed, or adopted with amendments
made at this convention, then a committee of the Bar Association
can be appointed to encourage the passage of this Model Act by
the 1955 Legislative Session. If such recommended Model Act
becomes law, then it is the further recommendation of this committe that the North Dakota Bar Association continue a Business Corporation Committee for the purpose of carefully studying all future
amendments that may be proposed to the New Act at future
sessions of the Legislative Assembly with authority to favor or oppose the passage of such proposed amendments.
Respectfully submitted,
Philip B. Vogel
John Hjellum
Franklin J. Van Osdel
Robert E. Fredericks
L. T. Sproul, Chairman
MR. SPROUL: I move the adoption of this report.
PHILIP VOGEL: I second the motion.
(Question put and motion carried.)
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: The motion is carried.
JOHN HJELLUM: He is not only a committee chairman but
he has done twice as much work as the rest of us and I think we

BENCH AND BAR

ought to give Mr. Sproul a big hand for his work on this committee
report.
(Applause.)
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: The next report will be on The
Rules of Civil Procedure. Mr. Ray A. Ilvedson, Chairman of the
Committee, will give this report.

Report of The Rules of Civil Procedure Committee to the
State Bar Association of North Dakota
Your committee was appointed by President Vernon Johnson
of the State Bar Association immediately following the annual
meeting in August, 1953.
As most of you know, there has been a movement and a demand
among many members of our Bar Association for a number years
to model our rules of civil procedure after the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure . Many of you have been suggesting and hoping that the
day would come when the North Dakota lawyer could practice
in both the state and federal courts with the confidence and knowledge that the rules of civil procedure in both courts are the same
for all practical purposes.
Commencing in the late fall of 1953, a study was begun by
your committee of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
new rules of civil procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court
of Minnesota in June, 1951, and comparing these rules with our
own North Dakota rules and statutes relating to civil procedure.
The Minnesota Rules were carefully considered because that
state spent a great deal of time and money in adopting its new rules
and with the express purpose of patterning its state rules upon the
federal rules of civil procedure in order that the procedure in the
state courts of Minnesota would be as near to that of the federal
courts as feasible. Your committee benefited greatly by the
Minnesota tentative draft as prepared by the Minnesota committee
that formulated and worked on the matter. Its detailed explanations
and recommendations regarding every rule was very. helpful and
enlightening.
In January, 1954, your committee commenced to coordinate
its studies with the studies of the committee on rules of civil procedure of the Judicial Council of the State of North Dakota. This
latter committee was composed of the Hon. Eugene A. Burdick
who is also a member of this committee, Frank F. Jestrab, chairman, and Norman Tenneson. It had already commenced its drafting of proposed rules of civil procedure for the State of North
Dakota and accordingly, we coordinate our efforts with the Judicial
Council's Committee by studying the draft upon which they were
working.
We wish to emphasize that the proposed draft of the Judicial
Council's Committee was read and argued section by section,
along with the present rules of our state, the federal rules, the
Minnesota rules, and also from time to time various other authorities. The meetings of your committee now making this report to
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ou were numerous. We would usually meet at one or another's
ome where we sat around card tables with plenty of elbow room for
our North Dakota code, and all the other books and references
to which we constantly referred to in our studies. These meetings
continued until sometime in the middle of June. The attendance
of the committee members was excellent.
There were numerous changes and recommendations that came
out of our committee meetings. After all, when a number of practicing attorneys sit around a table, men who really make their living
practicing law, if there is anything about a proposed rule that
doesn't seem particularly good, beneficial, or practical, you can
bet your life that at least one of these attorneys will speak up and
make his objection. That's the way it was with our committee.
There is no question but that on the whole the recommended rules
conform to the federal rules. The only difference is that we feel that
the proposed draft of the Judicial Council's Committee of rules
of civil procedure are better than either the Minnesota rules or
the federal rules. We have had the benefit of the experience of
others.
We have made it a point to retain features of our North
Dakota practice when we have felt that our state practice was
better than the federal practice. An illustration of this may be
seen in the method of commencing a lawsuit. It has always been
the North Dakota practice that a lawsuit is commenced by the
service of a summons. The summons is always issued by counsel
for the plaintiff. Under the federal practice, an action is commenced by the filing of a complaint, and the summons was issued
by the clerk of court. Your committee felt that the existing North
Dakota practice was far superior to the federal practice in that
it relieves the clerks of court of certain work burden, is simpler
and easier for the attorneys, and promotes and facilitates settlements. For this reason, your committee has recommended that
the North Dakota practice in this regard be retained.
In regard to other recommendations made by your Committee
to the Judicial Council Committee in regard to their proposed draft,
some of the recommendations have already been included in the
proposed draft, and as for the others, the Judicial Council Committee have indicated that they will go along with our recommendations, including the aforesaid suggestions by your committee that
we keep our North Dakota practice in the manner of the issuance
of a summons. At the end of this report, you will find that it is
being recommended that a joint committee be appointed from
both the Judicial Council and the State Bar Association. If this is
done, we will present to the Joint Committee our other recommendations, and we have little doubt but that they will be accepted
in view of the mutual accord on these matters between your
committee and the Judicial Council Committee.
On May 10, 1954, at a meeting of the Judicial Council in
Bismarck, the committee of the Judicial Council presented to the
council membership its report, together with its draft of proposed

BENCH AND BAR

rules of civil procedure for use in the district courts and county
courts of increased jurisdiction in the State of North Dakota. In
connection with this report, certain specific recommendations were
made by that committee; its report was adopted by the membership of the Judicial Council; and its recommendations were unanimously adopted by the Judicial Council.
Your committee is of the opinion that the rules of civil procedure as contained in the proposed draft of the committee of the
Judicial Council should be adopted in the State of North Dakota.
Your committee is of the firm opinion, after observing the use of
the rules in the federal courts and the State of Minnesota, that
the adoption of the rules would expedite litigated matters to the
benefit of the public and the bench and bar. The members of the
profession in the State of North Dakota have had an opportunity
to observe the federal rules in action since their adoption by the
federal courts in 1938. The Minnesota Bar has been utilizing its
new rules of civil procedure since 1951. One of the great advantages is that lawyers will need to learn only one procedural system.
In times past, lawyers in the smaller communities were often at a
decided disadvantage when they had matters in the federal
courts, compared to the lawyer with federal court experience and
practice. It was like learning the practice of law all over again
to find yourself in federal court. However, the most important
advantage in the viewpoint of your committee for the adoption
of rules that conform to the federal rules is the fact that these
federal rules were adopted by the United States Supreme Court
only after years of careful and thoughtful consideration and effort
on the part of eminent jurists, lawyers, and professors of law to
get together a set of rules, as simple as possible in themselves,
discarding technicalities, and facilitating the determination of
each controversy on its merits. It has since been held that federal rules should be liberally construed for the purpose of promoting the easy and speedy disposition of causes of action, the
elimination of surprise to each party, and the quest for substantial
justice. Surely, as practicing lawyers, that's what we want. Furthermore, if the recommended draft is eventually adopted in this state,
we lawyers will have the great advantage and benefit of the
thousands of federal decisions, such as you will find under the
various rules in United States Code Annotated. These decisions
cannot but help you on many occasions, solve your problem, and
save you from paving the way.
Accordingly, your committee joins in and specifically adopts
the report of the committee of the Judicial Council on Rules of
Civil Procedure which was approved by the Judicial Council on
May 10, 1954. Further, your committee specifically joins in the
recommendations of the committee of the Judicial Council as
adopted and followed by the Judicial Council as follows:
1. That the State Bar Association place itself on record as
favoring the adoption of the proposed rules of civil procedure
as promulgated in the proposed draft heretofore submitted to
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such amendments as the Supreme Court and the committee
to be formed may think desirable.
2. That the Judicial Council and the State Bar Association
form a joint committee composed of eleven members, five of
which have already been appointed by the Chief Justice from
the Judicial Council, six to be appointed by the president of the
Judicial Council, six to be appointed by the president of the
State Bar Association, to meet and consider and present to
the Supreme Court of this state for adoption pursuant to
applicable statutes, a draft of rules of civil procedure for the
district courts of the State of North Dakota.
The five members of the proposed committee appointed by
the Chief Justice from the membership of the Judicial Council
are as follows: Hon. A. J. Gronna, Hon. Eugene A. Burdick, Frank
F. Jestrab, Norman Tenneson, and Dean 0. H. Thormodsgard.
In closing, may we say that if you see fit to adopt these
committee recommendations, the joint committee of eleven will
again go over these rules; the rules finally recommended by this
joint committee will be printed and mailed to every member of
the State of North Dakota and sometime thereafter, a hearing will
be set by the Supreme Court to consider and hear any protests
or objections to any rule or rules from any of you.
Dated this 14th day of July, 1954.
Respectfully submitted,
Hon. James Morris
Ralph W. Bekken
Hon. Eugene A. Burdick
E. T. Conmy, Sr.
E. J. Mcllraith
Halvor Halvorson
Richard H. M.cGee
Joseph P. Stevens
Roy A. Ilvedson, Chairman
MR. ILVEDSON: This report has been approved by all
members of the committee. Hon. James Morris is not sure it
should be adopted by the convention but ruled on by the legislature. It is a very far reaching change studied at many meetings.
The time spent going over these rules is not sufficient but as you
can see by the recommendations the procedure we wish to have
followed is to have this joint committee go over them and any or
all of you can make suggestions. We know in the past there has
been a lot of talk and not much has been done because of the
work entailed and as far as our committee is concerned we give
a great deal of credit to the Judicial Council Committee since
without its aid my committee wouldn't have gotten so very far.
Mr. Chairman and members of the State Bar, I move the
adoption of this report and also that we go on record as saying
that under the recommendations I made here that the Bar association is in favor of the adoption of the proposed rules subject to
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amendments made later and that thd President appoint six members to this joint committee of eleven to go at it again.
HON. ALBERT LUNDBERG: I second the motion.
JOHN F. LORD: I would like to know if the Rules of Civil
Procedure Committee provides for costs. Is that included in the
work being done.
MR. ILVEDSON: I couldn't tell you now without looking it
up. Frankly, I came to this matter in regard to costs and being
faced with our statute providing for $5.00 for trial of issue, I
think decidedly something should be done about costs. I dori't
think it is in here. Should it be there? I don't think so. The attorneys and lawyers in the state are going to have time and opportunity to make a protest and I am sure the legislature is going
to rule.
MR. LORD: It is probably the work of the Committee on
Legislation.
MR. ILVEDSON: I would say Legislation.
E. T. CONMY, SR.: Why does Judge Morris feel the legislature should rule on these?
MRS. ILVEDSON: His letter says:
"I find nothing to criticize in the entire report. I will say,
however, in regard to the last paragraph, it seems to pertain
to ruling by the Supreme Court, but whether it is advisable
to proceed through the Supreme Court or through the Legislature has not been definitely determined."
He doesn't say yes or no but that can be ironed out later.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Judge Morris is interested in the
course of action. It might be determined by what we do here.
I feel it is a proper matter for consideration whether we would
rather have the Supreme Court in its rule making power adopt
the rules or whether we would submit it to the legislation. Well,
would you care to express yourselves?
MR. CONMY: I think we went to a lot of trouble to get
power in the Supreme Court and as far as I am concerned the
Supreme Court is by far a better body to pass on rules than the
legislature. It is the most competent body to do it and that's
what we went through way back when the United States Supreme
Court was empowered to pass rules. I think this Bar Association
should go on record as saying the work should be done by the rule
making power in the Supreme Court and having the power there.
ALVIN C. STRUTZ: The Legislative Committees know the
less we appear there as lawyers the better it is. I would second
the motion along the line suggested by Mr. Conmy.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Just so we keep the record straight.
The matter before us is the adoption of the Report of the Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure. Is there anyone who wants to
be heard on that?
All in favor say aye.
(Question put and motion carried.)
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PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Motion carried. Would you care
to make a motion so as we are on record on the adoption of these
rules?
MR. CONMY: I move, Mr. President, that the Bar Association favor the Supreme Court exercising its power given it under
the law in adopting these rules of civil procedure.
ALVIN C. STRUTZ: I second the motion.
(Question put and motion carried.)
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Motion carried. The next report
is the Report of the Committee on Ethics and Internal Affairs by
Philip R. Bangs, Chairman.
Your committee on Ethics and Internal Affairs, consisting of
myself as Chairman, and Cyrus Lyche, George Longmire, Edward
Peterson, Harold Hager, Elton Ringsak and William T. DePuy,
fortunately has not found it necessary to have many meetings
during the past year.
We have acted promptly on all complaints and other matters submitted to us for attention, and we have completed our
investigations and rendered final decisions on all questions except one, namely; is it ethical, or permissable, for a States Attorney
to represent a plaintiff in an action when he knows, or should
know, that the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund will be involved?
The answer to the above question is dependent upon the
meaning attributed to the following provision in Section 39-17041
of the 1953 Supplement, reading as follows: "In the event the
States Attorney of the County in which the casel is to be tried is
not disqualified to appear and defend the Unsatisfied Judgment
Fund, then the Attorney General shall appoint such States Attorney
to defend the Fund, and in such case the States Attorney shall
receive no fee for his services rendered therein."
The members of this Committee, pursuant to written request
of the Chairman, copy of which is attached, without benefit of
discussion at a meeting, informally decided by a vote of five to
one, that it is not ethical for a States Attorney to represent a
plaintiff in an action, when the knows, or should know, that the
Unsatisfied Judgment Fund will be involved.
The above conclusion is not binding on anyone and is merely
reported as an item of possible interest to the Attorney General and
the States Attorneys.
Most of the other matters that came before this Committee
for determination, were of the usual type of complaint, namely:
Failure of attorney to answer letters;
Failure of attorney to make prompt remittance;
Alleged excessive charges;
Unauthorized use of name on summons by collection agency;
Right of a States Attorney, in his private practice to represent
the plaintiff in an action to quiet title when one of the defendants is the County.
However, there were two complaints that came before the
Committee, of a more serious nature, with respect to which we
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issued a reprimand in one case; and in the other case, we took no
action on account of lack of proof. This case is now being further
investigated by the State Bar Board, pursuant to complaint filed
with the Supreme Court.
In conclusion, the Committee expresses its thanks to the
Executive Director, R. N. Davies, for his valuable assistance.
Respectfully submitted,
Cyrus Lyche
George Longmire
Edward Peterson
Harold Hager
Elton Ringsak
William T. DePuy
Philip R. Bangs, Chairman
(Following is a copy of the letter referred to in the above
report: )
TO COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND INTERNAL AFFAIRS.
Gentlemen:
With respect to the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund, 39-17041
of the 1953 Supplement authorizes the Attorney General, at
his discretion, to appoint special counsel to defend the Fund,
and then provides: "In the event the States Attorney of the
County in which the case is to be tried is not disqualified to
appear and defend the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund, then the
Attorney General shall appoint such States Attorney to defend
the Fund, and in such case the States Attorney shall receive
no fee for his services rendered therein."
It has been suggested that under this Section, the States
Attorney of the County where the action is to be, tried, cannot act as attorney for the plaintiff in any proceedings against
the Fund.
The Statute quite clearly states that the Attorney General
shall appoint the States Attorney to defend the Fund, in the
event the States Attorney of the County in which the case is
to be tried is not disqualified to appear and defend the Fund."
Is it ethical, or permissible, for a States Attorney to represent a Plaintiff in an action when he knows, or should know,
that the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund will be involved?
Is it ethical, or permissible, for a law partner of a States
Attorney to represent a Plaintiff in an action, when he knows,
or should know, that the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund will be
involved and that the States Attorney, his law partner, will be
appointed by the Attorney General to defend the Fund?
If it is ethical and permissible for an attorney who has an
a partner a States Attorney, to proceed with such action, even
though the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund will be involved, would
the States Attorney thereby, be disqualified to appear and
defend the Fund?
The Executive Director, R. N. Davies, has asked this
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Committee to render an opinion, which opinion is to be sent
to the entire Bar of North Dakota.
I am sending this letter to each member of the Committee
and would ask you to please send me your opinion, and after
I get your opinions, I may call a meeting of the Committee,
so that we can discuss the matter and arrive, if possible, at an
unanimous opinion.
Yours very, truly,
PHILIP R. BANGS
MR. BANGS: I move the report be adopted.
E. J. WOLFE: I second the motion.
(Question put and motion carried.)
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Motion carried. The next report
will be the Report of the Committee on American Citizenship by
Herman Weiss, Chairman.

American Citizenship Committee Report
Commencing with the 1954 committee assignments of our
North Dakota Bar Association, the Constitutional Awards branch
of the American Citizenship Committee was divided into its own
committee. Since this worthwhile project nearly fully occupied
the time and efforts of the American Citizenship Committee, a new
program, aimed to stimulate an active and useful American Citizenship program in North Dakota, was investigated by the new
committee.
With the thought in mind of finding some workable plan to
endorse by the committee, our committee first met in Jamestown,
North Dakota, on January 14th, 1954, at which time several worthwhile projects were evaluated. Several of the members of the
committee, in studying the Texas plan used in 1953, felt that
North Dakota could benefit from at least the adoption of a portion of their successful venture and conduct a program entitled
"Governmental Open House."
The proposed plan was to have all local Bar Associations in
North Dakota conduct an open house of government offices in
their area, asking assistance of city, county, and state government
offices to set aside one day, or in larger areas a series of days,
at which time any one desiring to see these officers in operation
would be encouraged and given opportunity to tour the respective
offices and learn a little more about them. Civic groups, service
clubs, patriotic organizations, schools, and Parent-Teacher Associations, would be encouraged to aid the program in executing
the plan. It was felt by the Committee that many people would be
impressed with a new insight of government in action, and with
a new understanding of their government be a better citizen.
The Committee again met in March in an effort to iron out
a few of the late details, and still later, when the program was
well thought out and formulated, the committee felt that there
was insufficient time remaining during the school term to conduct
the program in such a manner as to allow schools to make full
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use of the program. Hence it was agreed that the program would
be shelved for the time being and recommended as part of the
program for the next year of this committee.
Therefore, the Committee recommends that early plans be
completed toward this end in 1955, and that the "Governmental
Open House" program be conducted at a time during the year
when the greatest number of people will take advantage thereof,
and in particular that the schools be considered in setting a time
therefor.
It is the further recommendation that standing American Citizenship Committees be appointed by local Bar Associations to
assist judges in conducting naturalization proceedings, keeping in
mind an impressive ceremony, not only for the benefit of those
becoming citizens, but also for the benefit of friends, relatives and
the general public in attendance.
We further recommend that this Committee study the feasibility of organizing a program whereby our American Youth reaching voting age are given a fresh contact with their responsibility
as a voter. The "Montana Plan" as originated by Lester H. Loble,
Chairman of the American Citizenship Committee of that state,
would be of great help, and as a source of studying this program,
see the American Bar Association Citizenship Bulletin for May,
1954, on page 52.
This committee is an important committee and should becontinually working toward better citizenship. We as attorneys
should meet our responsibilities as the leaders in this great state.
toward this end.
Respectfully submitted,
Emanuel Sgutt
James E. Leahy
T. E. George
Leslie R. Burgum
Cytella D. Rittgers
James R. Jungroth
Herman Weiss, Chairman
MR. WEISS: Mr. President, I move the adoption of thi'
report.
ARTHUR W. STOKES: I second the motion.
(Question put and motion carried.)
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: The motion is carried. Now we
will have the Report of the Constitutional Award Committee by
James E. Leahy, Chairman.
As chairman of the Constitution Award Program, I herewith
submit a report concerning that Program for the year 1953-54.
The Program this year was separate from the American Citizenship Committee's Program.
As has been the usual practice in recent years this Program
was started by an announcement poster being sent to all North
Dakota high schools. This poster was sent in November, 1953.
follow up letters were mailed urging participation until we received
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word that 257 schools would participate. Of this number 2
schools actually did not choose an award winner, thus we had 255
actually participating. This figure represents an increase of 23
schools over last year's total.
The response from the schools has been most gratifying in
that this award is now considered an important part of the curriculum of many schools and our files contain many letters of appreciation from various school officials.
Whenever possible, the actual presentation of the awards was
made by a member of the Bar. Approximately 200 attorneys participated in the Program this year, it being necessary of course to
assign more than one school to some attorneys.
When an actual presentation of the award is made by a member of our organization the Bar benefits greatly, as does the individual attorney. It is definitely a step forward in the field of
good public relations. To the best of my knowledge, this year only
two awards were not presented at the time originally arranged for
by the various schools.
This Program was allotted a budget of $750.00 and of that
amount the sum of $657.21 has been expended to date for bronze
keys, postage, stationery and secretarial services. We have on
hand 226 bronze keys for next year.
It is recommended that:
1. The program be continued;
2. That coincident to the presentation of the award at the
various schools in May, 1955, and thereafter, a newspaper
release be given to the local newspaper in the area where
the award is being presented, giving the name of the
winner, the attorney presenting the award, and the name
of the State Bar Association as sponsor. This was done at
Mandan this year and we are grateful for the newspaper
clipping sent us by Attorney J. P. Fleck.
Respectfully submitted,
James E. Leahy, Chairman
MR. LEAHY: Mr. President, I move the adoption of this
report.
FRANKLIN J. VAN OSDEL: I second the motion.
(Question put and motion carried.)
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: The motion is carried. We will
have the report of the Probate Code Committee, by Mr. R. J.
Bloedau.

Report of Probate Code Committee
Throughout the past year your committee has invited suggestions and criticism relative to the probate code. Practically no
suggestions have been submitted, and it appears that in general
there is no great dissatisfaction as to our present probate laws.
Considerable changes and improvements have been accomplished
during recent years.
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However, your committee again suggests that a uniform set
of probate forms be adopted, and that a special committee (possibly of County Judges) be appointed to prepare such set of probate blanks. Also it has been urged that further legislation is
necessary relative to probate of estates of persons not heard of for
seven years, since under present uncertainty, it is difficult to find
anyone willing to take the risk either as administrator or surety
in such cases.
Respectfully submitted,
Everett R. Dawson
E. C. Lebacken
Adrian 0. McLellan
A. J. Pederson
S. E. Halpern
August Doerr
R. J. Bloedau, Chairman
MR. BLOEDAU: Mr. President, we move the filing of this
report.
FLOYD B. SPERRY: I second the motion.
(Question put and motion carried.)
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Motion carried. Now, we will
have the report of the Committee on the Junior Bar Association
by John C. Gunness, Chairman.
There were no meetings held of the Committee on the Junior
Bar because of apparent lack of interest on the part of the younger
members of the bar for a separate Bar Association. Mr. Howard
Mourn is President. He tells me he is planning to have a meeting
of the Junior Bar tomorrow morning and he said to contact George
Longmire as to where it is going to be. At that time the Committee will meet with members who are interested and if there
is sufficient interest we will proceed. If not, we will work with
the older lawyers more than as a separate group. In the meantime the younger lawyers might think about this problem and
tomorrow morning present any ideas they may have. Thank you.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Thank you for the report. Are
any of the men here that are on the Retirement Fund Committee?
Mr. Miller, Mr. Eckes, Mr. Muggli? If not, that report will be
read by our Executive Director, Ronald N. Davies.

Report of Committee
On
Retirement Fund Federal Legislation
The Committee on Retirement Fund Federal Legislation met
at Dickinson, North Dakota, on July 6, 1954. Present at the meeting were: Hon. Harvey J. Miller, W. L. Eckes and Norbert J.
Muggli, who composed the entire Committee in this matter.
The Committee took under consideration the present proposed Retirement Fund legislation now pending in Congress. This
proposed legislation consists of a bill commonly referred to as the
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"Individual Retirement Act" and is also referred to as the KoeghReed Bill.
The substance of the proposed legislation is to permit the
self-employed taxpayer, as well as employed taxpayer not now
covered by pension plans, to defer taxes on certain portions of their
current income which is invested to secure retirement benefits.
The general limitations, however, are that the tax deferment shall
not exceed 101% of the earned income of the tax payer or Seventyfive Hundred Dollars, whichever is less. The bill generally provides for a voluntary pension system for self-employed taxpayers
as well as employed taxpayers not now covered by pension plans
which comply with Section 165 of the Internal Revenue Code.
The main purpose of the bill is to bring about some degree of
equity for taxpayers who are not now covered by pension plans
approved by Section 165 of the Internal Revenue Code.
The Committee in studying the proposed legislation took into
consideration the report made by the Committee on Retirement
Benefits of the American Bar Association. Your Committee was unanimous in its approval of the report of the American Bar Association Committee on Retirement Benefits as submitted at the annual
convention of the American Bar Association. A portion of this
report reads as follows:
"FIRST. That the present high progressive income tax rates
make it most difficult, if not impossible, for recipients of
earned income who are not covered by corporation pension
plans to make adequate provision by savings for their old age
and possible retirement. This is true, not only of lawyers,
doctors, architects, accountants, independent engineers, artists
of all kinds, and other professional men, but generally of all
those who depend on earned income as a source of savings.
"SECOND. Professional men and other self-employed are
discriminated against by the Federal statutes in comparison
with officers and employees of corporations. This results from
tax advantages granted by Section 165 of the 1942 Internal
Revenue Code to assist in the creation of corporation pension
plans. The tax advantages granted by said Act are roughly
as follows: (a) Contributions made by a corporation are not
taxed to the corporation. (b) Even though the officer or employee obtains a vested interest in such contribution when
made, it is not taxed to the officer and employee in the year
the contribution is made. (c) The income of the pension
fund is not taxed as it is earned. Why, when this Act was
under consideration by Congress, no comparable provisions
were made for members or partnerships, or for professional
men or other self employed, is hard to understand. It is this
glaring omission and this discrimination which it is now aimed
to correct.
"THIRD. The principle of the Keogh-Reed Bills ("Individual
Retirement Act of 1953") is to remove the above mentioned
discrimination by permitting the postponement of income tax
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with respect to a limited portion of earned net income paid
into a so-called "Restricted Retirement Fund". The amount
so excluded plus each participant's share of earnings in the
fund would be taxed in later years when the retirement benefits were withdrawn, just as in the case of the corporation pension plans now provided for under Section 165.
"FOURTH. There is need for some such legislation as the
Keogh-Reed Bill (now known as the Individual Retirement Act
of 1958"), irrespective of whether or not lawyers and doctors
are included in the Social Security System. The Social Security
acts are aimed to take care of the low income groups. Corporation pension plans under Sec. 165 of the Code are on top
of, and are meshed in with, the benefits under the Social Security Act. Even though it is decided hereafter to include
lawyers and doctors under the Social Security System, a bill
encouraging voluntary savings on top of, and in addition to,
the Social Security benefits is just as necessary for the selfemployed as in the corporation pension plan for officers and
employees of a corporation who also have social security
coverage now.
The Committe found it unnecessary to go into the matter of
the present Social Security law, as only recently the House of
Representatives passed an amendment to the Social Security Act
extending the coverage under this Act to include attorneys. The
Senate Committee at the present timo has amended this Bill making it optional for attorneys to be included under this Act.
In conclusion, your Committee recommends that the North
Dakota State Bar Association go on record as favoring the passage
of the "Individual Retirement Act" (Keogh-Reed Bill),which is now
pending in Congress.
Respectfully submitted,
Hon. Harvey J. Miller
W. L. Eckes
Norbert J. Muggli, Chairman
RONALD N. DAVIES: On behalf of the committee I move
the report be received and filed.
JOHN A. STORMON: I second the motion.
(Question put and motion carried.)
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Motion carried. We will now have
the Report of the Committee on Uniform Laws by Judge John C.
Pollock, Chairman.

Report of Committee on Uniform Laws of North Dakota
State Bar Association for the Year 1953-1954.
MR. PRESIDENT: Your Committee on UNIFORM LAWS for
the year 1953-1954 begs leave to report:
Inasmuch as there was no session of the State Legislature in
1954 your committee feels that it might be of interest to the members of our Bar Association that at this time we call attention to the
Uniform Laws now included in the codes of our State.
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Commencing in 1899, when our Legislature adopted the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, down through the legislative
session of 1953 our State has adopted and placed in the statute
Thirty-two new Uniform Acts and Amendments to Two previously
adopted Uniform Acts, making a total of Thirty-four. These acts
and the years in which they were adopted are as follows:
Year of
Title of Act:
Adoption:
1899
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act;
Uniform Desertion and Non Support Act;
1911
1913
Uniform Proof of Statutes Act;
1917
Uniform Sales Act;
Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act;
Uniform Declaratory Judgements Act;
1923
Uniform Aeronautics Act;
Uniform Fire Arms Act;
Uniform Illegitimacy Act;
1927
Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways;
Uniform Motor Vehicle Anti-Theft Act;
Uniform Motor Vehicle Registration Act;
1929
Uniform Air Licensing Act;
1931
Uniform Veterans Guardianship Act;
1933
Uniform Act to Secure Attendance of Witnesses from
Without the State in Criminal Cases;
1935
Uniform Motor Vehicle Operators and Chauffers
License Act;
1937
Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act;
Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Laws Act;
Uniform Official Reports as Evidence Act;
1943
Uniform Amendment to Acknowledgment Act;
Uniform Bills of Lading Act;
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act;
Uniform Narcotic Drug Act;
Uniform Pistol Act;
Uniform Simultaneous Death Act;
Uniform Stock Transfer Act;
Uniform Transfer of Dependents Act;
1945
Uniform Trust Receipts Act;
Uniform Divorce Recognition Act;
1951
Uniform Photographic Copies of Business and Public
Records as Evidence Act;
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act;
Uniform Amendment to Narcotic Drug Act;
1953
Uniform Single Publication Act;
Thus it is evident that our State Legislature since 1899 has
recognized the worth and value of uniform laws. For Fifty-five
years the courts and members of the Bar of our State have had the
benefit of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act. That act was
promulgated and offered to the States in 1896 by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws with the
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approval of the American Bar Association with which the National
Conference has always been closely associated.
The other acts, above listed, have a wide diversity of use being
of interest to lawyers, businessmen, peace officers and welfare
personnel.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws was organized in 1892. Its origin dates from action of
American Bar Association in 1889 when a committee of the A.B.A.
on Uniform Laws was appointed. In 1890 the Legislature of New
York adopted an act authorizing the appointment of "commissioners
for the promotion of uniformity of legislation in the United States."
In the same year, 1892, the American Bar Association appointed
a special committee which presented a resolution that the A.B.A.
recommend the passage by each state, and by Congress for the District of Columbia and the territories, for the appointment of Commissioners to confer with commissioners from other states on the
subject of uniformity in legislation on certain subjects. As a result
of such action the first National Conference of Commissioners was
held in August, 1892, for three days immediately preceding the annual meeting of the American Bar Association. At the present time
and for many years past, the Forty-eight States, the District of
Columbia and the territories have been represented by Commissioners to the National Conference.
The object of the National Conference is stated in its constitution to be:
"to promote uniformity in state laws on all subjects where
uniformity is deemed desirable and practicable."
All proposals of subjects for uniform legislation are referred to a
standing committee on Scope and Program. After due investigation, which may include a hearing of persons interested, such
committee reports whether the subject is one upon which it is desirable and feasible to draft a uniform law. If the National Conference decides to take up the subject it is referred to a special
committee with instruction to report a draft of the uniform act.
With respect to some of the important acts, it has been the
practice to employ expert draftsmen. This was done for the preparation of the Uniform Commercial Code upon which the National
Conference in conjunction with the American Law Institute worked for more than ten years. At the annual meetings of the National Conference each act is considered and debated section by
section. When finally approved by the Conference it is sent to the
House of Delegates of the American Bar Association for approval;
following approval there, it is sent to the several states for appropriate legislative action.
In addition to uniform acts, the National Conference also drafts,
in the same manner, Model Acts which any state may adopt with
such alterations as local conditions warrant.
A more complete history of the National Conference and its
work will be found in four excellent articles which have appeared

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

in Bar Briefs, issued by our State Bar Association and North Dakota
Law Review. These articles are found in;
Bar Briefs, April, 1947, page 13;
Bar Briefs, January, 1948, page 8;
Bar Briefs, January, 1949, page 33; and
North Dakota Law Review, July, 1954, page 185.
North Dakota's participation in the National Conference dates
back to the year 1918, just Thirty-six years ago, when former Supreme Court Judge H. A. Bronson, of Grand Forks, was appointed
a Commissioner from this State; in 1928 C. L. Young, of Bismarck,
was appointed and is still acting as Commissioner; in 1946 0. H.
Thormodsgard, Dean of the School of Law was appointed and is
still acting; in 1948 John C. Pollock, Judge of the First Judicial District, was appointed to fill the vacancy caused by the death of
Commissioner Bronson, and is still acting. All of these appointments were made by the Governor.
Our Legislature has never adopted the Unifrom Act for appointment of Commissioners, which act, if adopted, would make
provision for an annual financial contrib'ution by our State for the
support of the National Conference and for the actual expense of
the Commissioners who attend from our State.
However, for a number of years recently our State Bar Association has paid the actual expense of the Commissioners and has
made the annual contribution for the support of the National
Conference. Funds for the support of the National Conference are
made by the American Bar Association, by legislative appropriations of some of the states, or from several state and local bar associations.
Your committee recommends that the following acts be introduced into the 1955 Session of our Legislature:
The Uniform Commercial Code;
The Uniform Rules of Evidence Act; and,
The Uniform Amendments to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.
The Uniform Commercial Code is a modernization of the Negotiable Instruments Law and all other acts dealing with commercial transactions. Consideration of the Code was completed by
the National Conference and the American Law Institute in 1952,
and received approval by the House of Delegates of the American
Bar Association in that year. It was adopted by unanimous vote
of both houses of the Pennsylvania Legislature in 1953. The code
has the approval of the American Bankers Association and many
other interested national organizations. It his also been introduced
into the legislatures of Massachusetts, California, Connecticut, and
Illinois. New York has a special commission studying the advisability of adopting the Code.
Copies of the Uniform Commercial Code together with complete explanations of the action in Pennsylvania and other data
have been furnished to Chas. C. Wattam, Secretary of the North
Dakota Bankers Association. It is hoped that the North Dakota
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State Bankers Association will adopt a resolution approving the
Code.
The School of Law at our State University in the Fall Semester
of 1954 is offering a course in Legislation, to be conducted by
Professor Tisdale, which will use the Uniform Commercial Code
as a text supplementing the case books; the students taking the
course will prepare the repealer clause, necessary to be added to the
bill when it is introduced into the legislature, setting forth all of
the present statutes of this State which will be supplanted by the
Uniform Commercial Code.
Uniform Rules of Evidence Act:
The Model Code of Evidence promulgated by the American
Law Institute in 1942 departed too far from the traditional and
prevailing common law rules of Evidence and was, therefore, unaccepted by the Bench and Bar. In 1949 the National Conference,
by resolution, determined that a new Uniform Rules of Evidence
Act should be prepared. For four years a Special Committee on
Uniform Rules of Evidence has been preparing such rules. The
new act, to a large extent, retains certain portions of the former
Model Code, but has rejected, revised, and modified the remaining portions of the former Model Code. These new Rules of Evidence conform to the policy of clarifying the existing rules of
evidence.
The skilled draftsmen of the Special Committee had as their
objectives, to prepare rules, which would be acceptable to the Bench
and Bar and would be uniform throughout the United States.
Hence the Special Committee limited the number of rules to
Seventy-two basic principles, which would be used frequently by
trial attorneys.
The completed Unifrom Rules of Evidence Act has been approved by the National Conference and the House of Delegates of
the American Bar Association. If adopted by our Legislature this
Act would simplify the work of North Dakota lawyers who practice
in other states or have reason to investigate the rules of evidence in
force in other states. Your Committee recommends the introduction of the Uniform Rules of Evidence Act at the 1955 Session of
our Legislature.
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act:
This act was adopted by our State Legislature in 1951. The
Act is now on the statutes of Forty-eight out of Fifty-two states
and territories. Nineteen of such jurisdictions have adopted the
Uniform Amendments to the Act. Adoption of such amendments
will place North Dakota on an equal basis with those jurisdictions
which have adopted the amendments. The adoption of the amendments will facilitate the administration of the act by our District
Courts.
Your committee recommends that the Amendments to the
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act be introduced at
the 1955 Session of our Legislature and that the passage of such
amendments be urged.
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In closing your committee desires to thank the Legislative
Committee of our Association for its cooperation in past years in
procuring introduction of Uniform Acts at Sessions of our Legislature and wishes to express the hope that the incoming Committee
on Uniform Laws of our Association may continue to have the
same cooperation.
Dated July 27th, 1954.
Respectfully submitted,
COMMITTEE ON UNIFORM LAWS 1953-1954,
C. L. Young
C. Emerson Murry
0. H. Thormodsgard
John C. Pollock, Chairman.
JUDGE POLLOCK: I move the adoption of the report.
JUDGE LUNDBERG: I second the motion.
(Question put and motion carried.)
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Motion carried. Our next order
of business is going to be an address by Brigadier General Albert
M. Kuhfeld, Assistant Judge Advocate General, United States Air
Force, from Washington, D. C.
He hardly needs an introduction. We all know him for his
excellent work as Chairman of our Code Revision Committee. We
are all indebted to him for his work on the 1943 Code and he
stayed almost long enough to complete the job. He went into
the service in 1942.
General Kuhfeld was a very prominent member of the Bar before he entered military service. He is going to talk on the general
subject of procedures and his experiences under the Uniform Code
of Military Justice adopted in 1951.

Brigadier General Kuhfeld:
President Johnson and Members of this North Dakota Bar
Association Convention: I want to begin by thanking you for the
very kind introduction, and I want to say from, the bottom of my
heart, that I appreciate what a few people did in making it possible for me to be here today. They met me down at the airport
and it has been like old home week. I don't know when I have had
such a good time in such a short while, meeting my friends from
my old law practice days in North Dakota. I intend to stay until
the banquet is over, and am looking forward to shaking hands with
a few of the other people I haven't yet met. It is really a pleasure
to me to get back home to North Dakota and meet with you folks.
I don't have the time to outline in detail the various facets of
the law with which we deal in The Judge Advocate General's
Department of the Air Force. I am going to choose one facet of
our work and demonstarte something to you, if I can. At the present time there are in the service a very considerable number of
young men who fit into the age group in which we find our greatest
crime potential. There has been no recent change in the man-
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power requirements of the United States Armed Services and,
hence, practically every young man we see, every one you meet
on the street, is faced with the obligation to do his military tour.
As a result the communities throughout the United States are becoming more and more service-minded. As they become serviceminded they start to wonder more and more just what happens if
the boys get into trouble as a certain number of them are bound to
do. A lot of people are under a misapprehension about that.
They think the so-called brass is bearing down hard on the young
men, and that for nothing at all, this, that and the other thing is
done to them. My purpose today is to try to show you just how
these things are handled in the services -the procedures when a
young man gets into trouble - because as civilian lawyers you are
going to be consulted by your friends in your communities about
the little difficulties sons of people you know have gotten into in
the service. I want to show you if I can - and I am sure I can that there are greater safeguards in the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, the military code now administered in the Armed Services,
than in any code in any state in the United States. If I had time
to trace for you, from the time of the Revolutionary War up to the
present time, the evolution of the administration of military justice,
I would have a better chance of letting you see what I am driving
at, but I won't have sufficient time for that today.
1 am going to try in the time alloted to me to explain the Uniform Code of Military Justice which was adopted in 1951. It was
the result of a study made by very eminent men in the legal field,
Professor Morgan and a group of very eminent individuals on many
committees which held hearings and tried to rectify any difficulty
brought to their attention. There had been, after World War II,
many complaints, just as there were complaints about service
criminal law after every war. The committees studied those complaints and finally formulated the Uniform Code. The Army and
the Air Force for some time had been operating under a system
somewhat similar to the Uniform Code but the Navy was administering justice under the Articles for Government of the Navy
which had been in effect without change for a long, long time. The
Uniform Code was adopted for the government of everyone in the
Armed Services, including the Coast Guard which is part of the
Navy in time of War, and of theTreasury Department in peace time.
The Uniform Code provides in practical effect, every safeguard
that is provided in any constitution or statute in any state, for the
individual who offends against military law in the service. Most
of the major changes we now have first appeared for the Army as a
result of legislation shortly after World War II. They were written
into the Elston Act of 1949 and are carried over, with some additional changes, into the Uniform Code. People like Ron Davies
and a number of others I see here in the audience who served in
the Judge Advocate General's Department of the Army, as I did,
during World War II, would have to relearn everything they knew
about military justice.
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I would like, if time were available, to make a detailed comparison between the procedures which we find in civilian law and
the procedures we have in the military for safeguarding the rights
of the individual, but I am not going to waste your time in talking
about procedures in civilian law. You all know more about that
than do I. I am going to talk, however, about military procedures
and I ask you as I go through our procedural provisions to compare them with procedures as you know them in civilian life. I am
going to ask you, then, individually, to arrive at your own conclusion
as to whether the individual in the service has equal protection of
his rights as does one who is not in military service. An individual
in the service has more protection than does a criminal in civilian
life with regard to protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures and as far as protection against self-incrimination is concerned. I could demonstrate this statement by decisions of Boards
of Review and of the United States Court of Military Appeals and
would be glad to give such decisions to anyone who may ask me
for them. But, to demonstrate my point, let us get right into the
system under which the criminal code of the services is administered. When the Air Force first came into being as a separate branch
of the service, Major General Reginald C. Harmon was appointed
The Judge Advocate General. He has been The Judge Advocate
General ever since and has built an outstanding legal department
in the Air Force. He has always said that it does not make any
difference how good a set of rules is- it is the group of people
administering the rules that determines whether they are going to
be considered good rules or bad ones. A lot of study was given in
the Air Force to what was required to make the 1920 laws work as
they should, to make the Elston Act of 1949 operate, and to insure
the successful accomplishment of what the Congress intended from
the Uniform Code of Military Justice -the real protection of the
rights of every person brought under military law. Here let me
read something - just a little excerpt I got from a book entitled
"Psychiatry and the Law" written by M. S. Cuttmacher and H.
Weihofen and published by the W. W. Norton Company of New
York in 1952: "Although we might expect the Armed Forces to employ in courts-martial a more summary procedure than do the civil
courts, the fact is that the Armed Services today employ a level of
scientific jurisprudence which the civilian courts have not yet attained." I agree, and before I finish what I have to say today, I
believe you will also.
The military system employs three different kinds of courts.
First, we have the summary court-martial. This is analogous to a
police court. It has one officer as the judge. It is used only for
minor offenses and the maximum sentence it may impose is thirty
days confinement and forfeiture of two-thirds of a man's pay for
one month. Second, there is the special court-martial. This court
consists of three or more officers and the punishment it can impose
may not exceed confinement at hard labor for six months and the
forfeiture of two-thirds of pay per month for six months. It may
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impose a bad conduct discharge, a punitive separation, from the
service. Third, and the court of general or unlimited jurisdiction
in the criminal law of the Armed Forces, is the general courtmartial. It consists of not less than five members. On every general
court-martial there is a law officer who compares to the judge in a
civilian court. He rules finally on all questions of law, instructs the
court, and, generally, runs the trial. The general court-martial can
consider or try any kind of offense against the military code. Its
jurisdiction as to punishment is unlimited except by a Table of
Maximum Punishments established by the President, and I won't
go into these maxima now.
The 1951 law makes definite provision with respect to counsel in
setting up of special courts-martial and general courts-martial.
There had been many cases in which lawyers were assigned to
prosecute cases but no lawyer to defend. Therefore, it was contended by many, the lawyer almost always won a conviction and
the accused was not properly represented. To eliminate this contention and the criticism incident thereto, the Code provides that in
every general court-martial the accused must be represented by a
lawyer, and in practical effect in the Air Force, the Code is administered as though the law set out the same requirement as to
special courts-martial. That lawyer must be a graduate of an accredited law school and a member of the bar of the highest court
of a state or of a Federal District or circuit court and in addition,
he must have been certified by The Judge Advocate General as
competent to act as such defense counsel. Lawyers can come out
of law school, go into the service, and be in one of the offices of a
staff judge advocate for years before being considered capable of
defending cases. Generally, however, after six months in the service, they have shown that they are capable of taking over as defense counsel. An accused, as we view it, is entitled to be represented by a lawyer, by a real lawyer, one determined to be competent and capable, and so certified by the highest legal officer in
the Air Force. The bench is represented by a lawyer too. In a
general court-martial, it is the law officer mentioned briefly before. He must be an officer certified by The Judge Advocate General as capable to perform the duties of a law officer, and to act as
judge in a case. He acts the same way as does a civilian judge except
that he does not determine what the sentence should be. The sentence is determined, within established limits, by the officers or airmen on the court-martial. Parenthetically, an airman who so requests is entitled to have on any special or general court-martial
which tries him, at least one-third of the membership enlisted men.
The law officer rules on all questions of law, such as the admission of
evidence, and on all motions or objections which arise during a
trial. With two exceptions, not here material, his rulings are final.
The law officer in a general court-martial, or the president of a
special court-martial, must instruct the members of the courtmartial, in open court, and on the record, as to the elements of any
offense before the court, and of the law applicable in the case.
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The courts hear cases under a system established to rigorously
protect the rights of those brought before them for trial. But, it
is sometimes said, the members of the special court and of the
general courts are appointed by a military officer, by, usually, one
of the general officers in the Air Force. Doesn't this make for
command influence-isn't this some kind of a system to control
the courts? First, let me point out that everyone on the court,
including the law officer, is subject to challenge for cause and
grounds of challenges for cause are more comprehensive in the military than in civilian courts. Then, in addition to being subject to
challenge for cause, each member of the court-martial is subject
to peremptory challenge. The only number who cannot be challenged peremptorily is the law officer. The one on trial can challenge members of the court-martial without giving reasons. The
statute gives him that right.
What happens when we have a case involving an alleged crime?
First, the commander of the person accused is advised of the allegation against the individual. The commander checks into the
allegation to determine if there is anything to it. He usually talks
it over with the man after first advising him of the nature of the
accusation against him and telling him that he does not have to
make any statement at all and that any statement he makes can be
used against him. Such a warning is required by law, and if such
warning is not given, any statement made by an accused or suspected person cannot be used against him no matter how voluntary
it might be otherwise. This protection against self-incrimination
goes much further than does the Fifth Amendment. The commander, if he finds the allegation to be true, must decide what,
if any punishment is merited. He may either talk to the man like a
Dutch uncle or punish him under Article 15, by, for instance, giving him two weeks restriction to the base. If the offense is more
serious, formal charges may be required. In such a case, he arranges for preparation of the charges, and the charges allege specifically exactly what offense, or offenses, according to the Code,
informal investigation indicates have been committed. Those
charges are referred to an investigating officer. We do not have a
hearing before a committing magistrate-that is true-but we do
have a complete formal investigation by and a hearing before a
military impartial officer, generally a Major or above. He interviews all witnesses and examines all documentary evidence in the
presence of the accused. The accused is advised of the evidence
against him, and he is advised of his right to be represented by
counsel at all stages. He or his lawyer can cross-examine every
witness. In other words, the entire case is laid before him and he
is given every opportunity to explain. Isn't this protecting his
rights? You who have been on criminal cases compare the situation with what you know happens sometimes in civilian life where
much of the prosecution's case at the trial comes as a complete
surprise to the defendant. With us, every single story, every single
scrap of evidence, every statement by every witness against the
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accused is laid out before him and his counsel. He knows the
entire case at the time of the pre-trial investigation. A large percentage of charges, too, is thrown out as a result of the care with
which this pre-trial investigation is conducted. We want no charges
referred for trial unless the investigation discloses beyond preadventure that there is evidence in existence to more than establish
a prima facie. Let us assume that we have a case in which the
investigating officer has determined an accused did commit an
offense; and we deal with the whole gamut of offenses, with
murders, rapes, robberies-every kind of crime. There is, as I
said, a situation we must all recognize, a great crime potential in
the age group we have in the service. If, in the case we are assuming a serious crime is involved, murder, rape, willful disobedience, desertion, or some other serious matter and it is concluded
there is a basis upon which that case should go to trial, it would
be referred for trial to a general court-maartial. Before that, however, those charges and the report of that investigation must be
given to the staff judge advocate, himself a lawyer, and a senior
and experienced officer in the Judge Advocate General's Department, to determine whether there is evidence which shows the
probability that the crime has been committed and to determine
whether the charges are properly drawn, and accused's safeguards
have been honored throughout. The officers in that position are
Lieutenant Colonels or Colonels. Practically all of of them have
had civilian experience at the bar as I have and as General Harmon
has had, and came into the service at the beginning of World War
II. The staff judge advocate must examine the case file, must write
a statement to his commander that there is substantial evidence of
a crime committed by the accused and that his rights have been
safeguarded before the charges can be referred for trial. The case
file is then reviewed by the commander who invariably discusses
the entire matter with his staff judge advocate.
If the case goes to trial and the accused is found guilty and
sentenced to one year or more or if the sentence includes a punitive
discharge, bad conduct discharge or dishonorable discharge, the
case is sent to the office of The Judge Advocate General for appellate review. Such cases come into our office in the Pentagon from
all over the world-Germany, France, England, Japan, Korea;
but right here I should say that the case does not come up to us
unless after reading and rereading the verbatim record, the staff
judge advocate is convinced the guilt of the accused has been
proved beyond reasonable doubt in a trial free from any prejudicial error. There are in our office eight Boards of Review, each
consisting of three officers. Each Board is made up of officers
who have been selected personally by General Harmon. They are
men of outstanding capabilities as lawyers in the service. The
Boards of Review are, in effect, the Circuit Courts of Appeals of
the Air Force. They write the opinions in the cases after full consideration of the records of trial and after examining the assignments of errors and briefs and listening to arguments by counsel
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in the cases. The accused pays nothing for this appellate review.
The law provides we will furnish each accused defense counsel
throughout the whole appellate review of his case. If a defendant
wants appellate defense counsel, he simply says so. We have in
our office an Appellate Defense Counsel Division made up of
lawyer officers thoroughly familiar with appellate work. They
represent all accused who request counsel before the appellate
agencies. The defendant never pays them. I don't care what case
they appeal. I don't care what errors they wish to assign. That is
all up to the Appellate Defense Counsel. He studies the record and
makes his assignment of error. Neither General Harmon nor I
control their activities in any way. This assignment of error goes
to the Appellate Government Counsel and he makes a reply and
files it with the Board of Review. In many cases, we have civilian
counsel appearing for accused. Very eminent members of the bar
appear before the Boards of Review and present cases as they do
before the Circuit Courts of Appeals. An outstanding lawyer,
whose name I will not mention but about whom I just read a fine
tribute in a Washington newspaper, came into my office a few
days ago and told me he never got such fine treatment from any
court in the United States as he received from the Board of Review and he emphasized that the members of the Board really
knew their business.
The Board decisions are published and are available to everyone the same as are the decisions of the highest court of every state.
The Vice President of the Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Company came into my office one time and told me he thought I would
be interested in what his attorney-editors had repeatedly stated
to him. I said, "Sure, I'd like to know." He said his law editors
have repeatedly stated that our Board of Review decisions in the
Air Force compare very favorably with the decisions of the highest court of any state in the United States. The United States
Supreme Court, in its decision in the recent Burns and Dennis
habeas corpus appeal, commented on the manner in which appellate review of those cases was conducted. Bear in mind that
each accused has a right to be represented by counsel, by civilian
counsel if he wishes. He must, however, pay civilian counsel; military counsel, and I emphasize again, good military counsel, is furnished free of charge. I mention that again because a lot of you
people may be consulted with regard to a case involving military
justice. Many civilian practitioners have been engaged to represent military people before a Board of Review and in the trial,
itself. And I will say this: our rules of procedure in the trial of
cases by courts-martial are the same rules generally speaking as
those employed in the Federal courts. If you are employed to appear in a court-martial, you will know the rules before any courtmartial in the Air Force. They are run and operated in that fashion.
Law officers in general courts-martial are going to be ruling down
that line the same as any judge in any United States District Court
throughout the country.

BENCH AND BAR

Each Board of Review decision is served upon the accused.
He then has thirty days in which to appeal to the United States
Court of Military Appeals and he is definitely and clearly advised
of that right, and that an appeal will be made without cost to him
unless he wishes to employ civilian counsel. This was provided for
in the 1951 Code. The Court of Military Appeals is made up of
three judges selected from civilian life anad appointed to fifteen
year terms. The present judges were appointed for five, ten, and
fifteen year terms and the judges who succeed them will be appointed for fifteen year terms. One of these judges is a former
Governor, a former member of the bench of Rhode Island. Another member of the Court of Military Appeals was a member
of the Supreme Court of Utah. One has been Dean of a Law
School in Louisiana. This is a very capable group of men and
they are the supreme court as far as the Services are concerned in
military justice matters.
An accused has thirty days within which to appeal. If he
decides to appeal, does he have to hire a lawyer? Let me say
again he needs only to ask for a lawyer to represent him before
the Court of Military Appeals. The Appellate Defense Counsel
will put hard work into these cases and at times the Appellate
Counsel have to be kept from flying at each other's throats. Appellate Government attorney-officers become so interested in their
cases, can see only their sides of them, that personalities come into
the picture. If any of you is retained by an accused to appear
for him in the appellate review of his case, our Appellate Defense
Counsel will be glad to assist you. It is best to go over the case
with our people who have had court-martial experience and have
them assist in arguing the case before a Board of Review or the
Court of Military Appeals.
The accused can appeal to the Court of Military Appeals but
it has a certiorari jurisdiction. Every death case must be reviewed
by the court. Each case involving a flag or general officer is reviewed by it. Other cases may be appealed; and often petitions
for review are prepared by civilian lawyers. The Court examines
the petition and if there is any question of law involved, the Court
of Military Appeals accepts the petition. If a petition is granted,
briefs are filed with the Court, cases are set for argument, and
the Court prepares its decision.
Those are the procedures under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice. Now what of the human side of the matter-the man being
tried for the various military offenses. When we started in this
business of running military justice in the Air Force, it looked to
us that in these courts-martial more attention should be paid to
the appropriateness of the sentence, that it was not enough to be
sure the accused had been proved guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt and that there was no prejudicial error in his trial. We had
a considerably greater responsibility to the public than that. Fine
young fellows were coming into the service with no record against
them, serving six or eight months, and then too many were being
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kicked out with dishonorable discharges or bad conduct discharges
tagged on them. They were infinitely worse off than when they
put on the uniform. That should not happen except as a final
alternative. We visualized our job for the Air Force especially in
the face of the country's need for manpower as that of giving
back good boys, boys better than when we got them. We were
not just dealing with piles of papers or with numbers; we were
considering matters of vital importance to people. General Harmon
told our Air Force judge advocates throughout the world that he
wanted them to do a post trial investigation in every case and give
him a report, full and complete, about the boy involved in that
trial. We have a chaplain talk to him, medics talk to him, and
non-commissioned officers, and other people in his unit are asked
about the accused. The judge advocate, the lawyer, should know
how to evaluate people; that is a part of his training. We insist
that he sit down and have a heart to heart talk with the accused
after the trial is all over. Then the staff judge advocate reports
to us the results of all these conferences. We in Washington want
the whole story. We want to have the impression, when we study
that post trial investigation, that the accused is standing before us.
The judge advocate's report must paint a picture of the individual
and give us his story, what made him commit the offense, what
is his home background, what are his chances in life. By the
word pictures painted by the chaplain, prison officer, doctors,
and accused's friends, and by the accused, himself, we can see
him as a person. These reports of post trial investigation, like a
probation officer's report secured by a judge before passing sentence, have definitely served a purpose since we started the
proposition in the Air Force and that is all I am speaking for.
We have statistics to prove it if anyone is interested. The sentences
as finally approved by the Air Force are considerably smaller than
those imposed for the same offenses in Federal courts generally.
The Air Force approves a comparatively small sentence for a
delinquency in order to get our airmen back to duty or out as
soon as we can. There is no use keeping him in jail unless it is a
very serious matter and public protection is required.
We have an average, just bear in mind, of better than 350
cases a month. Our Boards of Review consider more than 350
convictions per month involving sentences for one year or more
or dishonorable discharge or bad conduct discharge. They are
pretty busy. They are putting in long hours and getting a lot of
work done.
Under what we might call the Air Force philosophy, an average of eighteen per cent of the cases start with a reduction in
sentence. The convening authority, the general out in the field,
reduced the sentence imposed by court-martial in 866 cases out of
4,795 cases handled during the last fiscal year. They have no right
to increase the sentence but can reduce it. Last year in twentyeight per cent of the cases, or 1,360, execution of the discharge
was suspended. The accused were placed on probation in many
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cases out of the Air Force with an honorable discharge and not a
dishonorable one. Boards of Review, let me point out, and this
is different for appellate courts in civilian life generally, have the
statutory right to weigh the evidence, determine controverted issues of fact, and judge the credibility of witnesses, bearing in mind
that the court saw and heard the witnesses. Boards of Review
often disaffirm weak cases even though legally the case is technically good. The Boards of Review have the right to decide the:
appropriations of sentences. In three per cent of the 4,795 cases I
mentioned, or 162 cases, the Boards of Review reduced sentences.
on the basis of appropriateness and in 128 more cases, sentences
were reduced for legal reasons. Sentences were reduced by the
Judge Advocate General when they came in to him under the
clemency powers which the Judge Advocate General has under
the Code and implementing Air Force Regulations in 12 cases, and
under such power, he suspended execution of discharges in an
additional 151 cases. The Code authorizes the Secretary of the*
Air Force to substitute an administrative discharge for a punitive
discharge imposed by the court, and the Secretary made such a,
substitution in 43 cases wherein accused, for cogent reasons, could
not be restored to duty but had a war record which indicated the
inappropriateness of a punitive discharge. When they couldn't:
be kept in and wouldn't be able to make a go of it, became an
alcoholic or something like that, an administrative discharge was
substituted for the punitive one.
You can see from what I have said that the procedure is
detailed and does take time. But the rights of an individual accused of a violation of the law are fully and carefully protected
and the young airman is given painstaking consideration by a
group of officers having his best interests at heart. Compare this
with the procedure in civilian life. Our boys, I believe, are given
every protection and every consideration; more, I submit, than
in any civilian community. A lot of success and good luck was
had with this program in the Air Force. It returned to duty a lot
of fellows who under the old system would have been kicked out
with a dishonorable or bad conduct discharge. Many stay in the
service and do a bang-up job in the Air Force. They are treated as
individual cases, not as just a bunch of papers or numbers, and
as a result my wife-and I am sorry she couldn't come with me
today because of the illness of my Mother-and I know that one
compensation for staying in the United States Air Force is the
opportunity of sitting home and reading some of the letters we
receive from some of these young men. I wouldn't take a thousand
dollars for those letters from these young men whose cases come
up before me in Washington. Some of them don't express themselves so well and their spelling may not be so good, but I will
tell you those letters are the outpouring of hearts from young
men all over the country benefitting from this Air Force system
of the administration of what we believe to be real, true justice.
There is always a gioup of kids we can't do anything with.
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They enlist to avoid the draft and when they get in they want
to get out. They are always crying for their "BCD". We try to
convince them that a bad conduct discharge or dishonorable discharge is going to be held against them all their lives. We should
like the help of you lawyers in trying to impress upon young men
all over America that a period of honorable service to their country, terminated in an honorable manner, is one of the greatest assets
in the world. An honorable discharge from the service as everyone
knows is a valuable thing for any young mana. A dishonorable
discharge is one of the worst liabilities conceivable. We are trying
to keep punitive separations from the Air Force to a minimum.
Now, if any of you have any questions after the meeting I
will be glad to answer them. I appreciate more than words can
tell the opportunity of being here and talking to you and I am
very, very sorry my wife couldn't come along no this trip. Old
familiar faces and old friends are the best friends after all and
that is what you people out of North Dakota are to me.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Thank you, General Kuhfeld. That
was an excellent demonstration. You are in a position which has
rendered a service to all the people of this country. We want you
to know we appreciate the fine message we received and we are
very happy to know you are going to be with us throughout the
balance of the convention. We are looking forward to seeing you
again and having all the others meet you during your stay.
We now stand adjourned.
WHEREUPON, the meeting was adjourned until 1:30 P.M.

FRIDAY MORNING, AUGUST 6, 1954
The convention was called to order at 9:30 a.m. in Central
High School, Grand Forks, North Dakota, President Johnson, presiding, and the following proceedings were had.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: We will have two reports by Dean
0. H. Thormodsgard. First the Report of the Committee on
Judicial Selection.
THE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION
Gratefu acknowledgment is made of the invaluable assistance
rendered The Committee on Judicial Selection by Ronald N. Davies,
Executive Director, Miss Bonnie Jones, Miss Jane Berg and Miss
Ardia Berg, cutting stencils, preparing the ballots, using the addressopragh and mailing out the ballots. The Committee on Judicial Selection could not function with speed and efficiency, unless
the members resided in the same city as that of the Executive
Director.
0. B. Burtness,
Harold D. Shaft,
0. H. Thormodsgard, Chairman.
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The Committee on Judicial Selection Begs Leave to Submit the
Following Report:
From time immemorial the King appointed the judges. This
was also true in England. During the colonial times in this country,
England provides the Colonies with judges under its appointive
system. Following independence, The American government adopted the appointive system. However, with the experiences with
some of the royal judges, the framers of the Constitution adopted a
safeguard by providing for appointment of Federal judges by the
President only with the consent of the Senate.
After the Revolutionary War, the states did not adopt a uniform
system of selecting judges. In Connecticut, Rhode Island, New
Jersey, South Carolina, Virginia, and Vermont judges were selected
by the legislative assembly. In Massachusetts, New Hampshire
and Maryland appointments were made by the governor's council.
In New York a special council of appointment consisting of the
governor and certain members of the legislature made the appointments to the Bench. Georgia was the first state in the Union in 1777
to provide for popular election of judges. In 1832 Mississippi
adopted the election of Judges by popular vote. By 1860, 22 of the
34 states elected their judges.
There have been many modifications in several states as to the
method of selecting judges since the Civil War. The present method
of selecting state judges in several states may be classified under six
broad headings:
FIRST:
In the Commonwealths of Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho,
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming all of the judges are
elected by the electors.
SECOND: In three states, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and
New Jersey, all of the judges are appointed and none
are elected.
THIRD:
In two states, Delaware and Maine, nearly all the
judges are appointed except the register of wills and
probate judges.
FOURTH: In three states, California, Florida and Missouri, the
supreme and appellate judge are appointed subject
to confirmation by a commission.
FIFTH.
In five states, Connecticut, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont and Virginia the legislature selects most
of the judges.
SIXTH:
In fifteen states, Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, New York, North Carolina, Tennessee and Texas, most judges are elected and few
appointed.
Even though in North Dakota all judges are elected, the record
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will disclose that with the increasing age of the judges and the
numerous cases of death and incapacities in office due to age, the
majority of the district court judges are originally appointed by the
governor. To a lesser extent, this is also true as to the supreme
court judges. Therefore, there has been a trend in recent years for
local and state bar associations, especially in those states where
judges are nominally elected but as a matter of fact are customarily
appointed by the governor in the first instance, to take an interest
in sponsoring qualified lawyers for judicial positions. One method
in use is to take a poll of the lawyers to determine who should be
recommended to the governor for appointment.
On October 9, 1953, the Executive Committee of the North
Dakota Bar Association passed the following resolution:
"Mr. E. T. Conmy moved that the President appoint a committee of three to comprise a committee on Judicial Selection
and Tenure whose duty it would be to conduct plebiscites for
all Judicial appointments within the state of North Dakota,
the mechanics to be handled out of the Executive Director's
Office. Mr. Christianson seconded the motion. It was duly
put and unanimously carried. Thereupon, President Johnson
announced the following Committee on Judicial Selection and
Tenure:
0. B. Burtness of Grand Forks; Harold D. Shaft of Grand
Forks and 0. H. Thormodsgard of Grand Forks, Chairman."
President Vernon Johnson through the Executive Director,
Ronald N. Davies, notified the Committee on February 8 that a
poll of the lawyers would be immediately taken for nominees for
recommendation by the Bar for appointment as the second United
States District Judge in North Dakota. On February 12, nominating ballots were mailed out to all licensed attorneys in this state as
certified by J. H. Newton, Secretary of the State Bar Board. All
nominating ballots received up to 2 p. m. on February 20 were
counted that evening. Sixty-seven lawyers were nominated. The
Committee selected the ten names receiving the greatest number
of nominations and placed them on the second. ballot, which was
mailed that same evening to all licensed lawyers. On March 1,
1954, the second ballots were tabulated and the Committee certified the three names having the highest rated votes to President
Vernon Johnson. Those names were: J. F. X. Conmy, Ronald N.
Davies and Mack V. Traynor.
Due to the death of the Hon. A. M. Christianson and the immediate need for filling the resulting vacancy on the Supreme Court
of North Dakota, ballots were also mailed to the lawyers on February 13, 1954. All nominating ballots were due on Thursday,
February 18, 1954, and were counted that evening. Fifty-five lawyers were nominated to the State Supreme Court vacancy. The
Committee selected the ten names receiving the greatest number
of nominations, which were placed upon a second ballot and mailed
out that same evening. On the evening of February 24, 1954, the
received second ballots were counted, 436 in number, and tabu-
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lated. The three nominees receiving the highest rates votes were:
A. J. Gronna, Nels G. Johnson, and Harold B. Nelson. The Committee certified the names of the three nominees to President Vernon Johnson.
On March 26, 1954, the Committee on Judicial Selection mailed
to all members of the State Bar Association residing in the Second
Judicial District a ballot for the purpose of securing nominations
for the vacancy of the District Judge in the Second Judicial District
occasioned by the resignation of the Hon. H. B. Nelson. Thirteen
lawyers were nominated and sixty-one votes received. The seven
nominees having the highest votes were placed on the second ballot,
which was mailed out on April 7, 1954. All the second ballots received by the Committee by April 15, at 5 p. m. were counted
The one receiving the highest rated points "did not choose to run,"
and the next three highest nominees, A. Benson, L. C. Grimson
and John Storman were certified to the President of the State Bar
Association.
Due to the retirement of the Hon. J. J. Kehoe, the Committee
mailed to all members of the State Bar Association residing in the
Second Judicial District on May 17, 1954, nominating ballots. On
May 25, the 62 ballots, which were received for seven nominees,
were counted and the second ballots, with the names of the five
persons receiving the highest number of votes, were mailed on
May 26 to all members of the State Bar Association residing 'in
the Second Judicial District.
On June 3, the Committee again assembled and tabulated the
votes of the 60 ballots cast and certified to President Johnson the
names of the three persons who had the highest rated points, who
were T. I. Dahl, John A. Stormon and Obert C. Teigen.
Your Committee felt that the consensus of the bar would be
best secured by permitting but not requiring the members to indi6ate on the second ballot their first, second and third choice, and
that in the tabulations of the votes, first choice would be rated at
three points, second choice at two points and third choice at one
point. No complaint has been received as to such ratings.
The Committee also decided that in the cases of state wide
plebiscites the ten lawyers receiving the highest votes would be
placed on the final ballot. In the case of district vacancies we felt
that the six highest should be placed on the final ballot. However
on the ballot to fill the Nelson vacancy two tied for sixth place so
we placed seven names on the final ballot. In the case of the one
to fill the Kehoe vacancy only seven were named on the first ballot
and the sixth and seventh were so low that we concluded to place
only five on the final ballot.
One practical difficulty encountered is that sometimes a person
receiving a high enough vote to be placed on the final ballot would
refuse the appointment if tendered. Your Committee tried to contact by telephone all lawyers receiving such a vote and did not include on the final ballot the names of those indicating they would
not.accept appointment. However, in some cases contact was im-
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possible and in other cases the lawyer had not reached a final conclusion, so some lawyers were included on the final ballot who later
decided they were not interested.
The Committee is of the opinion that the lawyers had a real
professional interest in these four plebiscites. From two-thirds to
four-fifths of those eligible to vote did vote. In effect under the
plebiscites, the function of making nominations is turned over to
the State Bar Association as a unit for Supreme Court and Federal
vacancies and to the members of the Association residing in the
separate judicial districts for vacancies on the District Bench.
The question has been asked by some whether it should be the
function of a State Bar Association to take a poll for a federal judgeship. The argument has been made that if such polls become the
general practice, it would not be possible for a Republican Administration to appoint a Republican as a federal judge in the "deep
south" or for a Democratic Administration to appoint a federal judge
in some of the northern jurisdictions. Obviously the plebiscite is
not binding upon any appointing authority.
Bar activities, whether on a national level or through the state
bar associations, have a tendency toward the formation of the guild
system. That is equally true in many vocational groups, whether it
be medicine, law, plumbing, electricians or hair-dressers. The State
is licensing vocational and professional groups. Such groups directly or indirectly by legislation are determining educational standards, professional standards, restricting those who may not practice
and now in the case of the legal profession attempting to limit the
selection of prospective judges to those approved by the Bar Associations.
All members of the Association, probably without exception,
have a desire to keep judicial offices on the highest possible plane.
Presumably with that purpose in mind the membership by a very
large majority voted for the holding of plebiscites for all judicial
appointments within the state. Your Committee has simply adopted
some rules as to the mechanics such as providing for the number
to be deemed nominated and accordingly listed upon the final
ballot, the ratings of first, second and third choice, etc. and then
acted as tellers and advising the President of the Association of the
results.
Whether the method adopted less than a year ago and used in
four cases is serving the purpose intended is for the membership
to determine. Your Committee is no better qualified to judge the
results so far than any other member of the Association.
Respectfully submitted:
0. B. Burtness, Grand Forks, N. D.,
Harold D. Shaft, Grand Forks, N. D.,
0. H. Thormodsgard, Chairman,
Grand Forks, N. D.
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DEAN THORMODSGARD: I move that the report be accepted and filed.
DAVID DREY: I second the motion.
(Question put and motion carried.)
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Motion carried.
Now, we will have the Report of the Committee on Legal
Education and Admission to the Bar by Dean Thormodsgard.
The Committee on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar Begs
Leave to Submit the Following Report:
I. The American Bar Association has adopted certain specific
educational standards and policies. One standard is that it does
not approve of office law study as a method of securing a legal education. There are 25 states, two territories, and the District of
Columbia which do not recognize law office study. To be eligible
to take the bar examination in those 28 jurisdictions, a person must
be a graduate of an "approved" law school.
In 11 states, a person may qualify to take the bar examination
by studying law in a law office for a period of four calendar years.
In 12 states, a period of three years of law office study qualifies a
person to take the bar examination. Minnesota and South Dakota
have adopted the standards of the American Bar Association and
do not give recognition to law office study. The Committee on
Legal Education and Admission to the Bar recommends for legislation in 1955 that law office study, either under a judge or an
attorney, should not qualify the person to take the North Dakota
Bar Examination. The Committee favors the standards and the
policies of the American Bar Association.
II. The Committee recommends that the program of Continuing Legal Education for lawyers carried on by the North Dakota Bar Association should be encouraged and supported by all
lawyers. The Committee feels that the program represents one of
the most valuable and significant developments in the field of legal
education.
Respectfully submitted,
C. L. Foster of Bismarck,
Herbert G. Nilles of Fargo,
Chas. H. Shafer of Hillsboro,
0. H. Thormodsgard of Grand Forks.,
Chairman.
DEAN THORMODSGARD: I move that the report be accepted and filed.
LOWELL O'GRADY: I second the motion.
(Question put and motion carried.)
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Motion carried. We will have the
report of the Committee on Law Office Management by A. I. Johnson, Chairman.
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REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON LAW OFFICE
MANAGEMENT
In attempting to make a study and report on Law Office Management your Committee has held various meetings and conferences
in an effort to determine what subjects should be included in such
a report as well as what subject material should have consideration
and be submitted to the Convention. Needless to say the subject
itself covers a tremendous field and cannot possibly be fully considered in a limited study such as this. Books have been written on
the subject and every lawyer present undoubtedly has his or her
own private opinion as to what constitutes necessary and good
office management.
The committee wishes it clearly understood that most if not
all of its report is not original, that its recommendations and suggestions are not absolute and exclusive, that the committee recognizes a great variety of ideas both applied in practice and dreamily
played with by members of the bar. The committee also recognizes
that a report on a subject of this type will almost unavoidably encroach upon other fields of legal practice.
In approaching the subject it was found that there were so
many avenues for investigation that the committee was broken
down to make separate studies with the result that this consolidated
report, conveivably, is not necessarily a 100 % concensus of opinion.
It is to be hoped that some of the ideas and suggestions will catch
the attention of the members of the bar and be of some benefit to
them.
The practice of law is not a profession which can be made to
conform to set rules. It is highly individualistic and any attempt
to confine its office management phase within hard and fast lines is
ridiculous. It is entirely conceivable that a lawyer could become
a slave to office routine, to the budgeting of his time, living by the
clock and by the rules he himself has laid down to his utter discomfort and a very disagreeable social and professional existence.
On the other hand it must be frankly admitted that too many lawyers operate "by guess and by gosh," without regard to many factors
which in business would be disastrous. The legal profession can be
both interesting and rewarding if a proper balance is maintained.
This study or report is giving no consideration whatsoever
to the .personal conduct of the lawyer, his public relations, his
civic and political activities, though all of these are large factors
in his professional success. The report is confined to the physical
and tangible aspects of managing the practicing lawyer's office. It
is readily understandable that the problems of such management
differ widely in each office, with the nature of the specialties, the
size of the firm, the prominence of the members of the firm, the
location of the office, etc. The office management problems of the
sole practitioner in a one-lawyer city differ widely from those of a
large city firm. The committee recognizes such distinctions.
One of the major problems in-any law office is keeping track
of the great variety of matters which may come to a lawyer's desk.
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At this convention there is a special panel headed by Attorney Norman Tenneson dealing with the subject of check lists and allied
subjects. It is absolutely essential that a lawyer not rely upon his
memory only.
In most types of legal proceedings certain orderly steps are
required. Proper check lists should be used to see that such steps
are properly taken and in proper season. This is true whether the
procedure is a mortgage foreclosure, a bankruptcy proceeding, a
probate or most any other legal work. Books have been written, and
printed forms provided to keep track of these procedures, though
we fear not many are used. There is perhaps more justifiable criticism of members of the bar for failure to take care of matters entrusted to them in proper season than for any other cause. Procrastination is not only the thief of time, but often the nemesis of
the lawyer. In connection with check lists and punctuality special
emphasis should also be placed upon an adequate tickler system.
I am sure we all have at some time or other realized that some matter has been permitted to lie dormant when it should have had attention. No doubt larger firms with divided responsibilities require
constant alertness, but the individual practitioner requires even
greater care in keeping track of his business. As a personal observation I would like to say that these two problems of watching so
that everything is done that must be done, and, that matters are
not permitted to drag, constitute my greatest headache, both in my
office and in dealing with lawyers in almost every corner of the
State of North Dakota. It is a real pleasure to deal with lawyers
who are prompt, accurate and punctilious in their dealings.
It has been calculated that the average lawyer, in order to have
a reasonable annual income must make a minimum charge of $7.00
to $15.00 per hour for his services. The difficulty, of course, is that
services cannot always be calculated on a time basis like that of a
laboring man. However, clients often are critical of charges for
what would appear to be a minor service, but which nevertheless
takes considerable time. To overcome such criticism by clients and
the public generally many lawyers maintain daily logs. There are a
number of daily logs that have been put out by various publishers;
for instance, those published by the Kirsten Publishing Company of
Fort Dodge, Iowa, Charles H. Baker of Jackson, Michigan, and
Colwell Publishing Company of Champaign, Illinois. Some lawyers have devised their own Time Logs. Some such logs can also
be used as appointment books and even as cash books. This would
be entirely unsatisfactory in a larger office. Time Logs should preferably be of the loose leaf type as this simplifies the making of
charges and filing the daily sheets as a permanent record. Bound
volumes become too cumbersome. Such Time Logs are very useful
in arriving at a proper charge, and even in cases where the fee has
been agreed upon in advance it will serve to satisfy the client as to
its reasonableness in many cases. If he is shown the actual amount
,of time spent on a particular matter he can more readily understand
and approve the charge. As I understand it, it is a common prac-
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tice in larger offices to enter client charges from the Time Log.
Whether such Time Logs are used exclusively or not, I am sure that
the average lawyer would be much surprised to find how little he
often was charging on an hour basis to many clients. Lawyers' earnings, according to a recent study, have not increased in proportion
to the other professions such as medicine, dentistry, and others. The
reason no doubt is failure on the part of the lawyer to realize the
inadequacy of his charges when considered on a time basis.
On the subject of how to discuss fees with a client it would
seem the best practice to discuss openly the various contingencies
that may affect the fees. I suppose every young lawyer has at some
time or other arbitrarily quoted a fee for certain work only to find
that entirely unexpected developments have multiplied his work.
The average client will readily understand this if proper preparation
and explanations have been given. Even so-called routine matters
often result in additional work. The generally established fee with a
proviso in case of complications, properly explained in advance,
makes for better public relations. Excessive charges are damaging
to the legal profession as a whole though made by a small minority
of the bar. The honor of the profession and the good will of the
public must be safeguarded. Taking advantage of lush fee opportunities is dishonorable. Contingent fee arrangement, while legal
and proper, should be carefully screened. Grudge suits should be
detected as well as instances of uncollectable judgments from which
the fee is to be paid. A retainer with a percentage would seem to
be the answer.
While the matter of fees is not within the province of this committee, the matter of how to discuss and arrange for them would
seem to be. The committee would urge retainer arrangements
wherever possible, thus assuring the bar of some income regularity
and rendering a service to the client by constant availability of
proper counsel before difficulties arise. Such retainer arrangements
could be on an experimental basis until the amount of work is determined. They would also eliminate or reduce the telephone consultation problem.
Every lawyer has had dealings with "shoppers," either over the
telephone or by office calls. If the members of the bar generally
could be made to realize that fee cutting and inadequate charges
are detrimental to all the members of the profession, including those
who indulge in such practices, the results would be most salutary.
There is no method by which such practices can be terminated
except by all quoting the minimum fee schedule as a minimum.
"Shoppers" ordinarily are not very satisfactory clients in any event.
Something should be said about personnel. A good secretary or
stenographer is a very valuable asset to an office, relieving the lawyer of much detail and routine work. Personality and ability are requirements. Perhaps no trade or profession needs as intelligent and
careful stenographers as the law. Their salaries should reflect these
requirements. Also there are rush periods and slack periods in any
law office. A few days off during slack periods will improve morale
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and will make up for overtime when needed. A stenographer is
human and should be so treated, with careful planning of her work
as well as the lawyers.
Voice writers are coming into increased use. Several excellent
products are available. They have definite limitations in a law
office, but many advantages. The cost is considerable, perhaps
$500.00 to $1,000.00. They make possible dictation at any time,
recording telephone conversations, transcribing without waste of
time in receiving dictation, assignment of work for absences from
office, etc. A surprisingly large proportion of busy up-to-date offices
now have such equipment. In a law firm it may save the salary of
a stenographer. It would be improper to name specific equipment
but the committee would suggest contacting supply firms and lawyers now using such equipment for experience reports.
Law libraries are a headache in all law offices. It is natural that
everyone wants available tools for a complete workshop. However,
the amount of use of each volume is on the average in most offices
rather small. Establishing central libraries has its problems as well
as its limitations. Local bar associations in our larger cities or
counties could properly give considerable study to establishing such
central libraries. I believe it is safe to say that no lawyer or firm in
North Dakota can efficiently maintain a complete law library, not
only from the original cost standpoint but from the standpoint of
rents payable to house such collections. The problem is cumulative
and the end is not yet in sight. The committee suggests considerable sales resistance to book salesmen.
There are, however, certain minimum or basic needs of every
lawyer in the way of books. Here are our suggestions in the order
of their importance:
1. North Dakota Code with supplements.
2. A copy of federal statutes. Inexpensive copies are available from the Government Printing Office at substantial
savings.
3. City ordinances.
4. Dictionaries, both law and English.
5. A good form book, especially for the young practitioner.
6. Some Cydopedia of the law. Two are common, American
Jurisprudence and Corpus Juris.
7. Reporters. Northwestern would seem to be most essential
for a North Dakota lawyer. Appropriate citators such as
Shepards will give much help, supplementing Volume 7 of
our 1943 Code.
8. A Digest such as Dakota or Northwestern Digest is very
helpful.
9. Special publications and services covering Taxes, Wills.
Motor carriers, etc. are good but serve a special purpose and
are not generally needed.
The library problem differs with the type of work engaged in
and the location of the office. Obviously it is not always practical
for a lawyer to travel miles to borrow a book. Also lawyers hesitate
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to loan books because the missing volume may be the very one
needed and all their investment is useless in a given case. Let's
not be too critical of the reluctance of library owners to let out
books.
Indexing and filing are very important in a law office. I suppose all of us, at one time or another, have visited a brother attorney's office and have noted the problem he has of locating a matter. Disorderliness, while perhaps temporarily convenient, can become very inconvenient and expensive. File folders or file envelopes
properly numbered and indexed for all major matters is a must.
Miscellaneous matters may be indexed without folders. Abstract
opinions and briefs should have adequate indexes, properly crossindexed. Card indexes are preferable, especially where the files
are numerous, as they permit shuffling for easier location. The
committe suggests a careful review of the filing and indexing systems
as now in use in every law office and urges amplification and/or
correction now as it will never be easier.
With the problem of filing and indexing goes the problem of
storage or destruction of old files. We have no solution to suggest.
Micro-filming has been proposed and perhaps in certain highly
specialized offices this would be practical. Files simply will have
to be destroyed in time and perhaps we are too squeamish about it.
They could and perhaps should be culled before destruction.
A report such as this is not complete without reference to the
use of prepared and printed forms. The committee feels that after
a form has been prepared and checked and approved by the practitioner it should be used in the future. Recording is simplified and
the possibility of errors or omissions in personally dictated instruments is avoided. Public reaction to the use of printed forms vs.
dictated forms is cited both ways. Needless typing of standard
forms to impress clients would not seem justified even though there
may be parts of forms not as we would want them. In this connection we would urge greater care and thought to the preparation
of forms for printing. Many now in use should be thoroughly
revised and if possible standardized for the state. Building up a
properly indexed collection of forms for various purposes personally
planned, prepared and tested is a very valuable aid to efficient law
office operation.
One more subject should perhaps have some considerationthat of sole practitioners as compared with partnerships. Needless
to say both have distinct advantages. Almost unlimited arrangements are possible for a firm. There are no standards. In building
a firm, preferences and specialties should be carefully considered
similar to that used in building a medical clinic. Preliminary employment on a fixed salary followed, if service is satisfactory, by a
share of the earnings is common. The advantages of consultation,
vacations, substituting appearances in case of conflicts, illness, office
economies, etc. are self-evident. The conflict of personalities is a
natural resultant from joining forces. The sole practitioner is more
his own boss, can charge himself only with errors and omissions,

BENCH AND BAR

engages in a more personal and intimate practice of the law, perhaps, and has more friends (and perhaps enemies) than the more
impersonal firm member.
To conclude may we again observe that law, like business, needs
good management. Theories are fine but must be activized. Your
case may be sound, your proof excellent, but it's the verdict that
counts. Your committee hopes these observations will stimulate:
some thought leading to better law office management.
Respectfully submitted,
Herman Wegner,
Franklin J. Van Osdel,
George A. Soule,
J. Gerald Nilles,
John S. Whittlesey,
Myron H. Bright,
Bessie Olson,
A. I. Johnson, Chairman.
MR. A. I. JOHNSON: I move that the report be accepted.
GEORGE A. SOULE: I second the motion.
(Question put and motion carried.)
PRESIDENT: Motion carried.
We will have the report of the Committee on Public Relations
by Harold W. Bangert, Chairman.
ON
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS -COMMITTEE
PUBLIC RELATIONS - STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
OF NORTH DAKOTA
To the President and Members of the Association:
Your Committee is the first of its kind to be appointed by a,
president of the Bar Association. Because we have had no previous
pattern to guide us, we have felt that we should first carefully
evaluate the work done in the public relations field by other bar
associations before beginning public relations activity in North
Dakota. We have therefore held several meetings devoted to a
general discussion of PR work and have attended the Midwest
Institute on Public Relations for the Bar at Ann Arbor, Michigan.
The Midwest Institute merits particular comment. Prefaced
by preliminary meetings commencing November 3rd, the Institute
proper consisted of a series of lectures and discussions beginning
the morning of November 4th and ending in the evening of that
day. Some 150 attorneys from ten states, ranging from Oregon to
New York and from North Dakota to Texas, attended the meeting.
The Institute leaders included professional public relations men,
psychologists concerned with measuring human behavior, representatives of the press, radio, television, the Director of Civic
Affairs of the Ford Motor Company representing industry, aid
several distinguished lawyers who have concerned themselves with
the problem of public relations. As might be expected, the various
presentations of the lawyers were, in the opinioo of your Cominft-
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tee, the most worth-while part of the meeting, The impression
gained at this Institute has influenced the thinking of your Committee members during their term of office.'
We have assembled many samples of work done by other PR
committees and have studied the most recent publication of the
American Bar Association on the subject. "Public Relations for
Bar Associations."
Analysis of the Problem
It is currently fashionable in bar association circles for lawyers to excoriate themselves as members of a decadent profession
which is rapidly losing, or has already lost, the confidence of the
public. Qualified commentators have reached this conclusion as to
the profession generally in the United States. We do not subscribe
to it as to the profession in North Dakota. We believe that this
Committee's assignment is to relate to the public the over-all excellence of the members of our profession and their contribution
to the public welfare, rather than through means of advertising
aspects of our profession, or through similar means to distract the
public's attention from our shortcomings.
We believe in the positive approach. In North Dakota we
believe that there is no such job of housecleaning to be done as
exists in metropolitan areas where bar associations are particularly
active. Our belief is strengthened by the results of public opinion
polls in Iowa, Texas, and Minnesota, states having substantial agricultural areas, which disclose that the public does in fact have
many favorable attitudes toward lawyers. By this comment we
do not mean to minimize the significance of the very substantial
group who have negative attitudes towards our profession.
By these assertions we do not deny the existence of a PR
"problem" in North Dakota. We believe that lawyers can be
raised immeasurably in the public esteem by this Association, and
the members of it, doing certain things which have been suggested
by the Committee. We have felt it to be the first function of this
Committee to act as PR counselors, guiding the present activity of
the Bar so that the constructive work of the Association may be
brought to public attention.
We hasten to point out that for many years this association has
had standing committees charged incidentally with the responsibility of promoting the public relations of the Bar. The particular
committees which in our opinion function in this, field are Ethics
and Internal Affairs, Legal Education and Admission to the Bar,
Jurisprudence and Law Reform, Judicial Reform, Judiciary, Legal
Service to Armed Forces, Law Office Management, Traffic Safety,
American Citizenship, Constitution Award, Juvenile Problems,
Unauthorized Practice of the Law, and Continuing Legal Education. As the names of these committees suggest, the function of
each one is related to the public's view of our profession as a
whole. We conclude that it is not the function of the PR Committee to inject itself into the operations of the foregoing com-
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mittees, even though the action of these committees bears on a
solution to the "problem."
On these basic premises we have viewed it to be this Committee's function to create a systematic and sustained program
directed to the education and re-education of the Public to the
fact that in North Dakota ours is an honorable profession whose
members are competent and honest and who are leaders in the
furthering of the public welfare.
Foundation for Good Public Relations.
"Neither a committee nor an association can impose or
create the ingredients that make 'relations' satisfactory. It is
an 'inside' job - one that can be done only by the individual
lawyers; not by resolutions or preachments or press releases."
Burton J. Thompson of Iowa, 1951.
While our basic premise is a positive one, we believe that
to have good public relations members of the Bar can be made
more conscious of the part each of them plays in the standing of
the Bar as a whole in the eyes of the public and it is the function
of this Committee to alert members of the Association to the importance of their individual responsibility. This does not in any
manner imply that the Committee has considered itself as the
arbiter of the conduct of the individual lawyers in his relations
with the public. The Committee should, however, attempt to improve this foundation through the creation of an esprit de corps
among the members of the Bar.
Methods
An erroneous assumption that our problem in North Dakota
is comparable to the problem in metropolitan areas might well
lead us to the adoption of many of the methods used in metropolitan areas to improve the Bar's public relations. We think this
would have been a mistake. The Committee has seen many examples of "Bar advertising" in which lawyers "toot their own.
horns". We question the usefulness of such an approach in North
Dakota. On the other hand, the Committee has many examples
of advertising by insurance companies, banks-including one excellent advertisement by the First National Bank of Grand Forksin which the advertising institution explains the importance of
lawyers. This seems to us to offer a dignified method of getting
our story to the public and we recommend that our successors
explore it fully.
Over the years the Association has done a distinguished job
in its newspaper series "Know Your Law" and, under the able direction of Mr. Davies it has completed a similar series for radio
broadcasts, "This Is This Law". Through the cooperation of the
North Dakota Broadcasters Association this series of thirteen fifteen-minute shows has been used by every radio station in the
state. We believe that our successor, should now explore the use
of Television for similar activity.
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Particularly effective work has been done in past years in
the preparation of pamphlets which have been circulated through
members of the Bar, banks, etc. as an aid to the public's general
understanding of common legal problems. The Committee deems
it important that this activity be supported and has assembled the
preliminary data upon which an expansion of this activity may be
based.
In rural communities in Massachusetts there has been developed by the Bar a method of participating in adult education
classes being conducted in the public schools. This field should
be explored in North Dakota.
Various polls have indicated that persons unfamiliar with our
profession hesitate to use lawyers because of a fear of becoming
involved in an unsatisfactory fee transaction and that a very substantial percentage of persons needing legal service get along
without it or attempt to find a substitute in banks, insurance men,
accountants, and others. This situation has been met with great
success in many communities through the use of the "Lawyer
Reference" Plan. At the Committee's suggestion the Cass County
Bar Association has taken the steps necessary to initiate this activity
in Cass County, with the expectation that the lessons learned there
will be of value to other local bar groups throughout the state.
The Committee has prepared and circulated to lawyers two
guides for public relations, "Confidentially for you, Mr. Attorney",
and a law office rating chart first prepared by the Wisconsin Bar
Association.
The Committee believes that it is important that since each
lawyer is an integral part of the public relations activity of the
Bar, so each lawyer must be kept currently advised of that public
relations activity and therefore it has published a monthly News
Letter. The Committee leaves to its successor as an open question
whether the sustained effort required by such a publication is
warranted. The Committee has received no negative comments
on the New Letter, but it has received very few positive ones.
Some committee chairmen have taken advantage of the News
Letter to keep the Bar informed of their activities. Others have
not been heard from. If there are future editors of this publication
we can say from experience that they will greatly appreciate such
an offering of material for publication so that their jobs will consist
of editorial selection rather than digging.
The members of the Committee wish to express their personal
appreciation to President Johnson and Director Davies -for their
continuing willingness to work with the Committee members in
considering and evaluating PR proposals for North Dakota, all
in addition to their own heavy schedules of Association work.
Respectfully submitted,
Norman G. Tenneson
Mart R. Vogel
Harold W. Bangert, Chairman
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MR. BANGERT: I move that the report be accepted and
filed.
ROBERT Q. PRICE: I second the motion.
(Question put and motion carried.)
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Motion carried. We will now have
an announcement by Henry G. Ruemmele.
MR. RUEMMELE: Through the courtesy of various publishing concerns and friends, we have a number of books to give
away. 1 will read the list of them and proceed to give the books
away. The books have been donated to this convention as door
prizes without any charge and we are duly grateful to the people
who have donated them. The books were awarded as follows:
Robert A. Fiedler - Fort Yates
"Military Tribune and Military Crime"
William S. Murray - Bismarck
"Judicial Humorous"
Sam Dolve - Fessenden
"Lawyer Forms"
George Unruh - Petersburg, Fla.
"Trial Tactics and Experiences"
Ray A. Ployhar - Valley City
"Book of Forms"
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: The next order of business is going
to be election of officers. Now, I will entertain nominations for
President.
CHARLES L. FOSTER: I nominate John A. Zuger for
President.
GEORGE- A. SOULE: I second the motion.
CHARLES L. FOSTER: I move that nominations be closed.
JOHN HJELLUM: I second the motion.
(Question put and motion carried.)
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: The Secretary has cast a unanimous
ballot for John A. Zuger for President.
(Applause.)
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: We will now have nominations for
Vice-President.
PHILIP R. BANGS: I nominate Carroll E. Day of Grand
Forks.
ARLEY R. BJELLA: I nominate Roland A. Heringer.
HOWARD MOUM: I second the nomination of Roland A.
Heringer.
LOUIS NOSTDAL: I second the nomination of Roland A.
Heringer.
C. A. WALDRON: It is a great pleasure to second the
nomination of Roland A. Heringer.
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PAUL AGNEBEGR: I second the nomination of Roland A.
Heringer.
GEORGE A. SOULE: I move that the nominations be closed.
PHIL GARBERG: I second the motion.
(Question put and motion carried.)
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Motion carried. While ballots are
being passed out we will have the report of the Committee on
Law Lists by John A. Stormon, Chairman.
REPORT OF LAW LISTS COMMITTEE
To the State Bar Association of North Dakota:
Your committee on Law Lists reports as follows:
1. During the year we have had one inquiry from a member
of the association in regard to Law Lists, which was promptly
answered giving such information as was available.
2. We believe that the standing Committee on Law Lists of
the American Bar Association is doing effective work, and that
the American Bar Association should be commended in its handling of the Law Lists problem.
3. We urge all members of the Association to subscribe only
to Law Lists having the Certificate of Compliance from the Committee on Law Lists of the American Bar Association.
4. We urge all members to carefully investigate before subscribing to Law Lists when solicited, and if information is not
readily available, to contact the Committee on Law Lists of the
State Association, or the Committee on Law Lists of the American
Bar Association, as to the National Regional and Local value of
the List.
5. Only in this manner can we cooperate and make the work
of the State Association and the American Bar Association effective.
6. We recommend that the Law Lists Committee of the
State Association be continued as a safeguard to the members of
the association.
Respectfully submitted,
Mack V. Traynor
F. E. Foughty
A. R. Jongewaard
John A. Stormon, Chairman
MR. JOHN A. STORMON: I move the adoption of the report.
CLYDE DUFFY: I second the motion.
(Question put and motion carried.)
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Motion carried.
HERBERT NILES: I move the committee report be sent to
the Committee on Law Lists of the American Bar Association.
MR. STRUTZ: I second the motion.
(Question put and motion carried.)
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Motion carried. Now we will have
nominations for the office of Secretary-treasurer.
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GEORGE LONGMIRE: I nominate Robert A. Alphson.
WARD M. KIRBY: I nominate John E. Rilling.
MR. NOSTDAL: I second the nomination of Robert Alphson.
HERBERT G. NILLES: I second the nomination of John
E. Rilling. I believe it should be passed around to the younger
members of the Bar. It gives them some motive to interest themselves in Bar activities.
JAMES E. LEAHY: I move the nominations be closed.
HOWARD MAUM: I second the motion.
(Question put and motion carried.)
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Motion carried. I will appoint a
ballot committee to count the ballots for Vice-President: Judge
Wegen, Bob Wentzel and Obert Teigen.
We will have the report of the Committee on Tax Laws
by Ralph W. Bekken, Chairman.
REPORT OF TAX LAWS COMMITTEE
The Tax Laws Committee of the State Bar Association of North
Dakota herewith submits its report on its activities during the
past years and makes it recommendations.
Your Committee gave considerable attention to the matter
of possible revision of Section 57-3711 (2) (b), which is the
provision which prohibits "terminable interest" from qualifying
for the marital deduction to the surviving spouse under the state
estate tax law. It should be pointed out that the 1951 amendment
to the state estate tax law had apparently been made with the
view of bringing the state policies on estate taxation into line with
the federal policy and law. However, in amending the North
Dakota provision, the legislature had not adopted the federal
practice of allowing a basic exemption to each estate in any
amount. It is believed that there has been considerable hardship
resulting to rather small estates in which the surviving spouse received less than twenty thousand dollars in property, none of
which qualified for the marital deduction because it consisted
entirely of terminable interests in-eligible for the deduction.
While the legislature may have intended a basic exemption of
twenty thousand dollars to the surviving spouse, the law does not
presently provide such basic exemption. In considering the suggestion that this Committee recommend an amendment to the
law which would provide that such terminable interests would
qualify for the deduction to the extent of twenty thousand dollars,
with certain limitations, it was pointed out that the terminable
interest rule serves a laudable purpose in that it excludes property
from the marital deduction which could very easily escape taxation in the estate of the surviving spouse if he or she had not found
it necessary to use such property during his or her lifetime, and
further that such a provision could very well make a loophole in
our tax law. It was felt by all members of the Committee that
it would be preferable for the legislature to consider a basic exemption to each estate, without recommendation as to the amount
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of such basic exemption, with a repeal of the present exemptions
provided for children, adopted children or step-children as contained in 57-7312 (1) (a). Thus each small estate, whether composed of terminable interests or otherwise, would have a blanket
exemption up to a specified amount. The basic exemption would
take the place of specified exemptions presently allowed to children, but would not affect the marital deduction made to the surviving spouse as presently written in the law. It was indicated
also that this step would bring the state estate tax law into harmony with the federal law in this respect. Your Committee, therefore, recommends that it would be preferable for the legislature
to consider a basic exemption to each estate, without recommendation by this Association as to the amount of such basic exemption,
with a repeal of the present exemptions provided for children,
adopted children or step-children.
The Attorney General on August 25, 1953, ruled that the estate
tax for the estate of every resident decedent must first be determined by the County Court. This Committee therefore recommends passage of a validating act with respect to estate tax determinations made by the Tax Commissioner before August 25,
1953, for estates of resident decedents all whose property is owned
in joint tenancy.
Your Committee favorably recommends amending sections
40-1304, 40-1904, 57-0233 and 58-0901 to provide for increased
compensation for assessors in order to induce capable and qualified
persons to accept the office.
It is recommended by the Committee that six percent interest
payments be made by the State on refunds of overpayments of
real estate tax and income tax and that the tax pay six percent
on deficiencies of late payments where a return has been filed.
Your Committee recommends that consideration be given to
enactment of a law providing reciprocal enforcement of tax collections between the states.
Your Committee recommends that the members of the Tax
Committee appointed for the coming year take under consideration
the problem of amending appropriate sections of the use tax law,
Chapter 57-40, to require or not a use tax on tangible personal
property not originally purchased for use in this state but thereafter used, stored or consumed in this state, the intentions of
any such amendments being to put users, storers, or consumers
of such property on the same competitive basis as all other users,
storers or consumers.
Respectfully submitted,
TAX LAWS COMMITTEE
Ward Kirby
Paul McCann
Kenneth Jakes
Dudley W. Butts
Kenneth Eckes
Ralph W. Bekken, Chairman
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MR. BEKKEN: I move the adoption of this report.
A. J. PEDERSON: I second the motion.
(Questions put and motion carried.)
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Motion carried. Roland A. Heringer
has been elected Vice-President.
SENATOR DAY: I move the unanimous election of Roland
A. Heringer as Vice-President.
PHILIP R. BANGS: I second the motion.
(Question put and motion carried.)
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Motion carried. The secretary will
cast a unanimous ballot for Roland A. Heringer for Vice- President.
Harvey B..Knudson, Chairman of the Legislative Committee,
will give the report of that Committee.
REPORT OF THE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE
The Legislative Committee has not met since the 1953 convention of the State Bar Association and therefore the committee
will not have any definite recommendations to make the 1954
convention of the State Bar Associaton of proposed legislation to
submit to the 1955 Legislative Session. However, this committee
has for consideration the several matters held over from the previous committee as reported in the report of the Legislative Committee to the 1953 convention of the State Bar Association, which
report will be found in the October, 1953 issue of the North
Dakota Law Review. These matters should be given further study
and consideration by this committee before the convening of the
1955 Session of the Legislature, and where deemed advisable
recommend bills to be presented to the Legislature. In addition
your committee has received from many members of the bar suggestions of matters for the consideration of this committee and
presentmenl to the Legislature. These suggestions include:
A Short Form Probate of Foreign Wills, similar to that adopted
by South Dakota.
A type of validating Act which would be a bar or limitation
on any action brought to challenge the absence or inefficiency of
addresses of grantees of Deeds.
Favoring an increase in the Lawyers License Fee and that
a share of said increase be alloted to the State Bar Board to carry
on its functions.
That the law require a publication of "Notice to Creditors"
and a suitable time be permitted in which the creditors could file
a claim against the one-half interest of which the decedent died
possessed, in joint tenancy property.
Changing the personal liability of Directors of North Dakota
,corporations to that presently used and in effect in the State of
Minnesota.
Requiring Hearing Officers employed by boards or commissions of the State to be a lawyer.
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To alleviate crowded dockets in certain of the District Courts
that either (1) additional judges be secured in those districts, or
(2) redistricting so that the case load would be more equally
distributed.
Amendment of Section 39-1704 to provide for service of the
summons and complaint upon the Attorney General and Highway Commissioner in cases involving the unsatisfied judgment
fund, and provide for the appearance of the Attorney General on
behalf of the unsatisfied judgment fund as party defendant.
To provide by legislation if necessary for the uniform application of Register of Deeds recording fees in the several Counties
throughout the State, because at present the recording fees vary
from County to County.
Provide for a landlord's lien permitting the landlord to hold
the personal property of a tenant until the payment of rent.
To authorize Municipalities and Counties to discontinue the
use of lands for park or recreational purposes which have been
set aside and transferred to such Municipalities or established by
the Board of County Commissioners as a County Park under the
provisions of Section 11-2708 of the North Dakota Revised Code
of 1943, and to authorize the sale by the Municipality or the County
for any purpose. Also to validate the sale of any such lands by
the Municipality or County previously made.
Respectfully submitted,
C. C. Wattam
Carroll E. Day
Alvin C. Strutz
William S. Murray
Ralph G. Beede
Clyde Duffy
Donald H. Crothers
Adam Gefreh
Harvey B. Knudson, Chairman
MR. KNUDSON: I move that the report be accepted.
LINN SHERMAN: I second the motion.
(Question put and motion carried.)
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Motion carried.
(Whereupon, Vice President John Zuger assumed the rostrum
and presented President Vernon M. Johnson, who gave his annual
report. )
(Applause.)
(Whereupon, President Johnson read his annual report, as:
follows: )
ANNUAL REPORT OF VERNON M. JOHNSON, PRESIDENT
This is the joint report of myself and the Executive Director.
During the past two years, it has been my privilege to visit
with Bar Association officers and personnel from a great many
states. Naturally, you exchange ideas and compare operations andaccomplishments.
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I have come to three general conclusions as a result of these
interviews. First, most State Bar Associations and the ABA in particular, have enjoyed a great revival of interest and activity among
their members. Second, our North Dakota Bar Association on its
record of accomplishments, compares favorably with the best in the
nation. Third, much progress has been made in elevating the standing of the Bar but we have made only a good start in this direction.
Until I attended the Presidents' and Secretaries' Council of the
ABA, I never had a proper appreciation of some of the most important achievements of our State Bar and I daresay that that is
true of most of our membership. I would like to mention only a
few of them. We were the first integrated Bar in the United States.
Many Associations are still carrying on a determined fight to accomplish this. Our attendance at our annual meeting is among the
best and this meeting is another indication of that. We have excellent participation by our membership in Association activities.
We have reasonably adequate financing. Our record of cooperation
with the Legislature is the very best on an outstanding program
of service to our individual members and to the public. We have
one of the highest percentage of ABA members of any State Association. We were sixth in the nation to subscribe our quota to the
ABA Bar Center. We have a very able representative on the Board
of Governors of the ABA in the person of H. G. Nilles, and there
are only fifteen members on the Board. In 1951 we received the
ABA Award of Merit based upon our record of service in competition with 24 states. Finally, I am happy to report, we have one
of the best Executive Directors in the business.
In analyzing this record, I attribute our success as an Association to three basic facts. First, and foremost, the great and active
interest and cooperation of our membership; second, we have
reasonably adequate financing and third, because of adequate finances, we were able to employ a part time Executive Director.
In preparing this talk, I reread the reports given by our past
presidents and Executive Director commencing with the 1948 convention, the first convention after the enactment of the fee bill. It
is significant to note how many of the projects suggested in these
earlier reports have been carried forward to fulfillment. The latest
example is the Code Revisor which was recommended in 1949. I
would like to review with you briefly these projects under two general headings, namely, service to the public and service to our
individual members.
As a general proposition, all of our bar activities can be divided
into these two classes of service. I think it is also true to say that
our public relations and standing as an association is based largely
on the quality and extent of these two services. There are several
reasons for going into detail on the scope of these services. First,
as a preliminary to a discussion of our finances; second, to clarify
my recommendations as to a future course of action; third, F covered
much of this material in a speech delivered at the meeting of the
Second District Bar in Devils Lake two weeks ago and a great many

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

lawyers came up to me afterward and said they had no idea of the
number or scope of activities the Bar had sponsored and was sponsoring for the benefit of the public and our membership. It is my
firm opinion that we have faithfully met our obligation of public
service as set forth in Chapter 228 S.L. of 1947. Aside from activities within the Bar Association such as American citizenship and
constitutional awards, etc., there is the "Know Your Law" series and
last but by no means least, the "This Is The Law" series - a thirteen
week series over all the stations in North Dakota who donated their
time and cost some $1,500.00. This has chiefly been accomplished
through cooperation with the Judicial and Legislative branches of
our state government.
We have made and are in the process of making great strides
in improving the administration of justice in our State. Through
the judicial Council, we earmarked $2,500 for a critical analysis of
our Judiciary. Some of the recommendations have been carried out
and others are being pressed for consideration at this convention.
We have helped revive interest and activity in the Judicial Council.
We have materially strengthened our Judiciary at the District and
the Supreme Court level by supporting and securing substantial
increases in salary, disability benefits and a retirement plan.
Through the capable efforts of our Committee on Rules of Civil
Procedure, we have had for consideration at this convention new
rules patterned after the Federal rules. These rules have been approved as indicated after by the Judicial Council. Our Judiciary
Committee report makes recommendations for the creation of the
office of permanent Chief Justice, mandatory retirement of Judges
at the age of seventy, plus liberalization of the Judicial Retirement
Act. This past year, as was indicated by Dean Thormodsgard, we
have conducted several plebiscites for vacancies on the District
bench and one for a vacancy on the Supreme Court and in each
instance, the Governor has filled the vacancy from the list of names
recommended through the poll of members of the Bar. All of
which has resulted in a better understanding and a closer cooperation between Bench and Bar with the resultant improvement in the
administration of justice.
As lawyers, we must maintain a healthy interest and respect
for the Legislature and its offspring, the administrative agency and
it should be remembered always that a free and representative
Legislature is the hallmark of democracy. There were able and
impartial courts in the days of imperial Rome but there has never
been a free and representative Legislature save in a democratic
society.
In my opinion, it is in the legislative branch of our government
that we have made the greatest strides in public service. A great
deal of credit is due the members of the Bar, who have served and
are serving in the Legislature, for many of the reforms and improvements in our Legislative process. Reforms initiated and supported
by lawyer legislators include the creation of the Research Commit-
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tee, Rules of Procedure, Rules on bill drafting, our up to date Cummulative Supplement, etc.
As an association we have worked in close cooperation with the
Research Committee. We have hired and paid for assistants to
work with them. We have hired or paid for bill drafters during the
legislative session. We have contributed toward the compilation
of the Supplement. We have for several years paid the full bill for
Commissioners on Uniform Laws including the state fee for participation in the national organization. Your Executive Committee in
cooperation with the Legislative Research Committee has agreed to
underwrite the salary and expenses of a Code Revisor named by
the Research Committee. We have committed ourselves to support
this project until the legislature can act next session. Furthermore,
if we adopt the excellent report of our Committee on Code Revision,
of which you all received a copy in advance of the convention, we
are committed to press for legislation providing for additional
legislative services and an increase in legislative pay. In addition
to this, we have a long standing record as an association of working
for the improvement of our laws through such standing committees
in special fields of law as Mineral, Taxes, Indian Affairs, Traffic
Safety, Probate, Business Corporations, Criminal Law, etc.
It is the responsibility of lawyers and particularly of the
organized Bar to observe the workings of the law, to study law in
action with its functioning competently and adequately toward
the accomplishment of desired ends. In brief, we are vitally concerned with the proper functioning of the legislative branch of our
government as with the judicial branch.
In the field of service to our members, the number one program is our sectional meetings. They have proven invaluable and
are the principal reason for the success of our annual meetings.
The sectional meeting idea is followed more and more by the ABA
at their annual and regional meetings. Our Committee on Continuing Legal Education has provided institutes of an excellent
quality with more to come. We have this year initiated a public
relations program which has great possibilities. This is also the first
year of our Committee on Law Office Management. From my contacts, I believe there is a real need for this program. Based on the
Minnesota setup, we hope to expand our program on check lists
such as the one presented by Franklyn J. Van Osdel on forming and
dissolving a corporation, presented at one of our sectional meetings.
In Minnesota these check lists cover a great variety of fields. Our
Committee on Title Standards under the able leadership of Bud
Ruemmele has rendered an invaluable service to the organized
Bar. We have many other worthwhile ones rendering similar service to our members such as the Committee on Fee Schedules, Unauthorized Practices, District Bar, AB9 Coordination, Legal Education, Law Lists, Ethics and Internal Affairs, etc.
It was my purpose at the beginning of my year as president to
put together emphasis on projects in the field of service to our individual members. It was for this reason that I created the Coin-
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mittee on Public Relations and Law Office Management. I also
stressed the importance of this phase of work in suggesting projects to some of our standing committees. It is my recommendation
that we expand our activities in this direction in the future.
Last fall in setting up the budgets for this year, your Executive
Committee found that our entire annual income was previously
committed. These committments included such fixed items as salaries, office expenses, Law Review, Executive Committee, Uniform
Laws, Scholarships, Supreme Court clerk hire, etc. This left us no
funds to be used for strictly Bar Association activities unless we
dipped into our reserve. This is precisely what had been happening
for the past two or three years and our reserve was dwindling each
year by five to eight thousand dollars - from some $2,600 to about
$1,400. We further found that our income from the filing fees was
gradually dropping. It has dropped about $1,000 this last year.
We, therefore, made an exhaustive study of all our expenditures
in an effort to ascertain which ones could be cut and which ones
might best be shifted at least in part to other agencies in the case
of purely public functions. I would like to give you a summary of
the decisions made by your Executive Committee to accomplish
this adjustment.
In considering this problem and in interpreting these actions
taken by the Executive Committee, we must bear in mind that we
volunteered as an Association to support these programs at a time
when we labored under the mistaken notion we had more money
than we knew what to do with or how to spend. I can assure you
that that is not the case and we should all bear that fact in mind.
The 'adjustments made by your Executive Committee are as
follows:
(1) That the University be requested to pay $4,000 each year
towards the expenses of publishing the Law Review. Since
the recommendation was taken the Dean has informed us
he has consulted with authorities about their ability to pay
an appropriate share, somewhat in the neighborhood of
half the cost. The Committee is very much sold on the
Law Review for education and pledge our support to the
University to payment of our appropriate share, and preliminary to making a decision we found in almost every
instance the cost was shared by the universities or states
and in very few was the cost paid entirely by the Bar Association;
(2) On August 1, 1954, we discontinued paying the salary of a
part time clerk for the Supreme Court. I might also say
we notified the Supreme Court if they feel it has any need
we have pledged ourselves to any reasonable clerk hire for
the coming session;
(3) That all out of state travel must be approved in advance
by the Executive Committee;
(4) That the allocation for scholarships, etc. be reduced to
$750;
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(5) The salary of the Secretary was reduced from $75 to $50
per month;
(6) That hereafter, allowances for expenses of travel, meals,
etc., of our association members shall be exactly the same
as that provided to state officials with the sole exception
that they may charge up to $6 per day for a hotel room,
within the state;
(7) That we charge a registration fee for our annual convention sufficiently large to cover convention expenses;
(8) That we consider the program of the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws to be purely a state function and that
we would discontinue our financial support of this program
after this year; In making this decision we found the program was one which was purely of a public nature and
should be paid for by the state generally as is the situation
in mose states, and we have advised the Commissioners on
Uniform Laws we would instruct them in making a request
to the National Assembly;
(9) That we join the Bar Board in requesting that the next
legislative session increase our license fees from $10 to $15.
The increase of $5 to be divided or allocated as presently
provided in the law. Under the present law the Bar Association gets $6.50 and the Bar Board gets the balance and
believes before we take action on that particular recommendation we could hear from the Bar Board and stressed
the fact that as a consequence their funds are depleted
they might ask for additional funds.
We believe that these adjustments will balance our budget and
provide for sufficient funds for expanding our program of service
to our individual members without materially curtailing our fine
program of public service.
I conclusion, I want to thank each and everyone of you for the
fine cooperation you have given me. I want to thank the members
of the Executive Committee, and the present setup of the Executive
Committee where the Presidents are elected for two years has
worked out very well. It has been a real pleasure serving as your
president.
(Applause.)
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: John E. Rilling has been elected
Secretary-Treasurer for the coming year.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: John A. Zuger will give the report
of the Committee on Revisor of Statutes.
REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON REVISOR OF STATUTES
Mr. President and members of the North Dakota Bar Association:
Your committee on Revisor of Statutes submits the following
report:
In order to evaluate the action taken by your committee in
cooperation with the Executive Committee, and to pass upon its
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recommendations, it is necessary to set forth the problem, and the
past interest of the North Dakota Bar Association in its solution.
The development of representative government through legislative bodies covers more than three centuries. The establishment
of service agencies to strengthen state legislatures is of quite recent
origin.
The movement to create services to assist the legislature is a
response to a growing need. The legislative function - to determine public policy and establish means for carrying it into effect
and the review of the administration of its laws- has been constantly decreased and impaired. If we pause to think of the reasons,
they come readily to mind. There is the increased complexity and
expanded bulk of the problems requiring governmental consideration. And there is the tradition that the legislature is made up of
part time citizen members close to their constituents, meeting often
once every two years for a limited session of perhaps sixty days,
with no permanent organization, and compensated in such an
amount as means a loss or reliance upon other income. There are
many others.
The purpose of the creation of the service agencies is to permit
the legislature to give more consideration to major questions of
public policy and so safeguard their deliberative character.
The members of the bar, more than, any other group of the
public, are in a position to call attention to the problem and to aid
in its solution. The committee is proud to report that lawyers on a
national, state and local level have interested themselves in the
problem. Oregon won the award of merit last year by organizing
a voluntary group of its members to serve at their own expense
through the legislative session in giving their legal services. Two
members of our Bar, Mr. Vernon Johnson, our president, and Mr.
Ralph Beede, chairman of the Legislative Research Committee, attended a Legislative Service Conference sponsored by the Council
of State Governments.
Now what concretely, are these legislative services? Statutory
and code revision is only one. Others are indexing and summarizing legislative session developments, information and reference services, orientation conferences for legislators, bill drafting, legislative counseling, budgetary and fiscal review and analysis, post-audit,
continuing review of governmental programs, legislative housekeeping services and assistance on policy problems.
North Dakota has begun to strengthen its legislature by creating service agencies. The North Dakota Legislative Research
Committee was established by act of the 1945 session. It has
functioned as a legislative council, serves as a committee on interstate cooperation or North Dakota representative to the Council of
State Governments, provides research and reference facilities and a
bill drafting and checking service prior to and during session, and
is a means of coordinating the legislature with other branches of
government, and the public.
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Prior to the 1947 session, as a Committee project, with the
help of two of our members who are former speakers of the House
(Mr. Ralph Beede and Mrs. A. R. Bergeson), an extensive revision
of the legislative rules was accomplished. The number of standing committees was reduced, and provision for identical House
and Senate committees made possible joint hearings. The work
load was more evenly distributed among committees and a great
deal of congestion eliminated.
A bill drafting and checking service was made available to the
legislature prior to and during the 1947 session. Under a 1947
amendment to Section 46-0311 of the Code, the laws of a general
and permanent nature enacted after the Code are compiled in the
Code system under the supervision of the Legislative Research
committee.
In August of 1948, the Bar Association endorsed the step
taken by the legislature in creating the Research committee and
stepped in and offered its aid. The offer was accepted. It enabled
the committee to employ professional assistance and continue its
bill drafting and checking service. After the session the offer was
renewed and helped the committee to undertake the compilation
of the laws under the Code form.
The interest of the Bar Association and its support have continued. It reached its climax when $3200 of our Bar Association
funds were made available to the Legislative Research Committee
for its assistance prior to, during and after the 1953 legislative session, as reported to you by President Conmy at our last, annual
meeting.
A committee on Revisor of Statutes headed by Professor Ross
C. Tisdale recommended establishment of a statutory revisor at
our 1949 annual meeting. The matter was referred to the legislative committee at that time for further study. The committee was
re-created again this year. And, of course, there have been many
members of the bar, as individuals, who have interested themselves in the problem and worked on it.
At the last annual meeting the Revisor of Statutes of Wisconsin
addressed our annual meeting, explaining the work of such an
office and its advantages.
Further, the committee wishes, as a background, to call attention to the relationship of the members of the Legislature and the
members of the Bar. You are all familiar with the enactment of
the filing fee bill by the Legislature which has enabled the bar
to undertake so many projects to improve the administration of
the law. The Bar has interested itself in the improvement of judicial salaries and retirement, and it has received excellent cooperation from the members. of the Legislature.
With this background, your committee began its work. On
October 23, 1953, the chairman of your committee, together with
Mr. Vernon Johnson, the President of the Bar Association, met
with the Legislative Research committee at Bismarck. There was
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presented to the Research committee the advantages of a system
of continuous statutory revision rather than a bulk periodic revision. The need for further legislative services for the good of "he
legislature and the public was pointed out. The establishment of
a statutory revisor as a first and most important step, to follow
what had already been accomplished, was urged. Not all of the
mentioned legislative services were proposed. A review of the
steps taken in other states was made. An offer that the State Bar
Association would help initiate the project, would support it, and
would give it limited assistance with its means was made to the
Research committee.
On March 18, 1954, the Legislative Research committee, at its
meeting, considered the proposal of the Bar Association and went
on record that the establishment of an office of Statutory Revisor
within its staff was desirable. The Research committee determined
it would introduce a bill to provide this at its next session. Its
director was requested to contact the State Bar Association to determine the framework of such an office and what financial assistance might be available from the Bar Association.
Following the action of the Research committee on March 18th,
your bar association committee met at Bismarck on April 10, 1954,
with Mr. Emerson Murry, director of the Research committee.
Mr. Murry stated that the Research committee felt that bill drafting
and the office of Revisor would, in their opinion, fall properly
within the legislative branch of government, and further that the
office should be located on the staff of the Research committee.
He stated that the work of the Research committee was largely
that of revision, and largely substantive revision which required
legislative approval. There was also some form revision now being
done by the committee. After the legislative session the director
has a period of some three months of fill-in time until the work of
the Research committee begins during which time he could work
with the Revisor. After the session and commencing about July 1,
the Revisor would continue work on revision, and the Director
would work with the committee. A year and three months later,
or some three months before a session, both the Director and the
Revisor would turn their attention to preparing and readying bills
for the legislature, including bills to correct discovered errors. This
would complete the cycle. In other words, placing the Revisor on
the staff of the Research committee with the director will coordinste
the work of the two and so accomplish both a revision and a billdrafting service. The Revisor's office would also serve as a clearing
house for errors discovered in the interim between sessions.
Two ways to create the office of a Statutory Revisor were
considered; one, by formal legislation creating the office; second,
to set the office up under present law creating the Research committee under Chapter 54-35 of the Supplement.
It is the opinion of your committee and of the Research director that this chapter now gives the research committee sufficient
powers as the law now stands to handle the code revisor's work.
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It is this second alternative that is favored by the Legislative Research Committee and your bar committee.
Assuming the establishment of the Revisor under present law
under the Research committee, the matter can be accomplished
by merely adopting an appropriation bill earmarking funds for
the office of Statutory Revisor. The Research committee itself can,
by resolution, appoint a sub-committee on statutory revision of
the Research Committee and name the man to administer it.
It may also desire to name an advisory committee of outsiders
to serve; as example, a member of the Bar, a member of the
Courts, and a possible open membership to be filled from time
to time by that person best informed, depending on the title of
the code under consideration. This manner of accomplishing our
end, (i. e., passing only a separate appropriation bill and setting up
the office by resolution of the Research committee under its powers
under Chapter 54-35), is favored by the Research committee and
your bar committee. The other alternative would be the adoption
of a statute to set the office up formally. This approach is objectionable as it means setting up another office and is deemed politically more difficult.
Your bar committee unanimously went on record and recommended to the Executive committee the establishment Of a
statutory revisor and bill drafting service within the staff of the
Research committee; that the legislature be urged to adopt an
appropriation bill with an emergency clause for the payment of
the operation of the service or office, to be followed by a resolution of the Research committee appointing a sub-committee on
statutory revision, and a possible advisory committee. The bar
committee further agreed to recommend that the bar association
support and work to secure such legislative action.
The Legislative Research committee at its March 18, 1954,
meeting not only asked that the Bar Association be contacted
to determine the framework of such an office, but also what financial
assistance the Bar Association could furnish. The Research committee has no funds for this purpose.
It is the opion of the bar committee that the office should be
be set and running in advance of the session. In its bill-drafting
service and in other ways its value can be demonstrated to the
next session which would consider it. It is expected that any
appropriation bill, even with an emergency clause, could not be
obtained for a month or more after the session convenes. It is further
thought that to be most useful the office should commence September 1st or, at the latest October 1st of this year. A limited financial
commitment of the Bar Association then from those dates to
February 1st is required. Acting on the report of your committee,
the executive committee authorized your committee to work
with the Legislative Research Committee and its Director in the
selection and employment of a man to do this work, within the
limits fixed. As this report is written for filing on July 25, 1954,
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your committee can only report that applicants and prospects
for the position will be interviewed on July 23-24 by the Bar
Association committee and the Research Committee together,
and if a qualified man is found, he will no doubt be elected to
commence on September 1st or October 1st.
The success of the project and the amount of the financial
commitment to be made by the Bar Association, and length of it
(it has been suggested that the Bar Association give financial aid
for a biennium) depends, in plain language, upon the job of
selling the public, and the legislature which represents it, on the
need of this service. There is no reason why the legislature should
not appropriate the full amount needed if the job is properly done.
It is the feeling of the committee that there has not been a
proper understanding by the public of the work of the legislature, nor has there been proper attitude to the legislature. Any
reluctance we see in obtaining an appropriation for a revisor is
only part of the larger problem. It is the opinion of the committee that the Bar Association can make as one of its major
projects of the year, a program of assistance to the legislature.
The Bar Association is the one group that can and should call
attention to the need of improvement of services and public
understanding of this very important coordinate branch of our
government. With this thought in mind, it is the idea of the committee that the Bar Association will undertake, not only to propose to the public and stimulate opinion to demand of the legislature that it set up a Revisor of Statutes, and a bill drafting service, for its use, but that the State Bar Association will urge the
legislature to pass at its next assembly a resolution submitting a
constitutional amendment to increase the pay of the members of
the legislature. It is a disgrace that the matter has been handled
by a small expense allowance to this point.
To carry out such a program it is the thought of the committee that as soon as the November elections are over and the
members of the legislature have been elected that each of the
district bar associations will convene and hold an evening dinner
meeting, inviting to those meetings all the members of the legislature in that judicial district as their guests. The purpose of the
meeting will be to have the members of the bar and the members
of the legislature get acquainted and rub elbows together. The bar
wil then present to the members of the legislature present their
program for improving legislative services, legislative pay, and to
assist the legislature in a general propaganda effort as to the
work and nature of the legislature. It is the thought of the Bar
Association will select two members who will appear at each
of the these district meetings so that the presentation is uniform
and consistent throughout the state. Such two representatives
could be (1) a member of the Bar Association and (2) a member
of the legislature. It is further thought that at these district meetings the members of the legislature who are in attendance could be
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polled and consulted as to whether or not they would be interested
in attending a pre-legislative conference, rather than labeling it
a school, to be held a few days before the convening of the
legislature at the House chambers in Bismarck.
If an interest and demand for such a pre-legislative conference can be developed at the district meetings, we could then
proceed to have the conference at the Capitol a day or two
before the Legislature convenes. At that time the Bar Association
in cooperation with the Legislative Research Committee, would
put on, for the benefit of new and older members of the legislature, a series of talks by veteran members of the legislature covering the operation of the legislature, the rules of the different bodies,
the functioning of the committees and other mechanics. The director
of the research committee believes such a pre-legislative conference could be worked out, and sponsored jointly by the Bar
Association and the Legislative Research committee. It is the further
thought of the committee that after the district meetings held following the November election, and prior to the convening of
the legislature, that a special Bar committee, experienced with the
legislature and familiar with the members of the legislature, would
be set up and could prepare material for speech purposes, and
this material distributed. Members of the Bar throughout the
state can then arrange and secure speaking spots at service clubs
and other organizations, calling the attention of the public to the
functions of the legislature and the need of the legislature for
more tools to accomplish and carry on its work.
The committee appreciates that the whole matter would have
to be handled carefully and by members of the Bar who are experienced with the functioning of the legislature, the thinking of
its members, and its scope, but that if it is properly handled,
that it is a program that will be of assistance to the legislature,
the public and the bar.
Respectfully submitted,
Ralph Beede
Carroll E. Day
Harvey B. Knudson
Paul Agneberg
Roy Holand
Nels G. Johnson
Clifford Jansonius
Mariod Gletne
Joseph A. Donahue
John A. Zuger, Chairman
JOHN A. ZUGER: Since this report was filed there have
been the following developments. The executive committee made
a pledge of $400.00 a month to pay the compensation of the man
to be selected as Code Revisor from September 1, 1954, to February 1, 1955, or a total of $2000.00 to start it and our thinking is
we could not expect action from the legislature until at least 30
days after the legislature convened. We met at Bismarck and
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interviewed applicants and William Danger was selected as Code
Revisor and will go to work on September 1, 1954. He is a graduate
of Notre Dame and admitted to the Bar in North Dakota. There
were two other applicants for the job and we were pleased with the
quality of the applicants and especially when we were offering at
most a five months' commital. The matter has been accomplished
to that point and we are asking that the office be set up and
legislature act upon it. The Research Committee at those meetings
would introduce the necessary legislation to take the mechanical
steps.
JOHN A. ZUGER: I move that the report be accepted and filed.
JUDGE LUNDBERG: I second the motion.
(Question put and motion carried.)
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Motion carried.
(Fred Moulton, of Billings, Montana, President of the Montana State Bar Association, was presented by the president and
spoke briefly to the Convention.)
(Applause.)
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Senator Carroll E. Day will now
give the Report of the Judiciary Committee.
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT
STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
AUGUST 6, 1954
Although your Committee has had various worthwhile projects under consideration, only three are the subject of specific
recommendation to this convention. One, judicial retirement; two,
permanent chief justice and three, publication of North Dakota
Reports.
Judicial Retirement
In order to obtain benefits under our present judicial retirement
law a judge must serve 18 years, as such, and be 70 years of age.
He may then retire on a pension of one-half of his last salary.
Although this is a substantial improvement over what was originally conceived as possible in North Dakota, it is obviously unsatisfactory. The fact that judicial salaries in North Dakota have
doubled in the last few years along with a rather good prospect
of still further increases has induced younger men to accept judicial
responsibility. Nevertheless, we still have judges who have served
their state past the point where they should be entitled to retirement but find themselves trying to continue their work rather than
accept the meager retirement provisions of our law.
No state at present has fixed their retirement age over 70.
Many are using age 65 or 60.
Ten states have acted making retirement compulsory:
CONNECTICUT: At age 70 judges automatically become
state referees for life at 2/3 salary. Judges retire on 3 salary after
5 years, but less than 10 years service; after 10 years of service
may retire on 2/3 salary.
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IDAHO: At age 70 may retire on 2 annual salary at time of
retirement. Judges contribute 3% to retirement fund for at least
10 years preceding retirement. Judges on call from Chief Justice
to perform such services as commissioners of court or advisors
to court.
LOUISIANA: At age 65 if judge of court of record for 20
years immediately preceding date of retirement, may retire on 2/3
pay. At age 70 with 15 years of service, may retire on 2/3 pay.
Regardless of age, after 23 years of continuous service immediately preceding retirement, which is then compulsory, judge is
entitled to full pay.
MARYLAND: At age 60 annuity is $300 for each year of
service up to 20 years. Maximum is $6,000. Retired judges receiving retirement pay cannot hold public office and pay. Retirement
is compulsory at 70 years.
MISSOURI: No retirement pay after compulsory retirement
at 75 years. On retirement for disability, judge receives half pay
for the rest of his term of office.
NEW JERSEY: At age 70 with 10 years of service, may retire
on % annual salary.
NEW YORK: Actuarial system into which 32of benefits are
paid by the state. Included under state employees' retirement
system. Annuity not more than M salary.
SOUTH CAROLINA. At age 65 with 20 years of service;
age 70 with 15 years service; age 72 with 10 years service; having
served for 25 years; or who without regard to age has served 7
years and while in service became totally and permanently disabled, may retire on $3,000 annually for the balance of his life
(The legislature, however, now appropriates $4,500).
VERMONT: At age 70 with 35 years of service, may retire
on 2 average salary for last 10 years. Contributing system according to length of service. Included in state employees' retirement
program.
VIRGINIA: At age 70 with 10 years of continuous service,
may retire on %salary. Judges under 55 contribute 2,1% to retirementInfund; judges over 55 contribute 3%.
some states retirement is not compulsory but retirement
benefits are forfeited if the judge continues active. In others retirement at one age is voluntary but compulsory at a retirement
age.
It is your Committee's recommendation that the laws of North
Dakota be amended to provide for compulsory retirement of all
supreme and district court judges and judges of county courts of
increased jurisdiction at age 70; and that upon retirement a pension for life be provided equivalent to %of the last annual salary
before retirement upon completion of not less than 10 years of
judicial service in North Dakota, and that a pension on retirement
be provided in cases where the judicial service aggregates less
than 10 years equivalent to 10% of the normal retirement pay
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for each year of judicial service prior
judge reached compulsory retirement
years, he would receive retirement pay
50% of the amount that he would be
full 10 years prior to retirement.

to retirement. Thus, if a
age after serving only 5
for the rest of his life to
entitled to had he served

Permanent Chief Justice
Several Judiciary Committees of this Association in their reports have dealt with the problem North Dakota has had because
of the supreme court's failure to decide cases promply. Our old
adage "justice delayed is justice denied" has been proved over and
over again. Many district judges in the state have also acquired
dilatory habits. The contrast in the federal courts is remarkable
and may be due largely to the fact that the judges in the federal
system do have administration supervision.
Under North Dakota procedure our Chief Justice has no supervisory power and holds office only during the last two years of
his term when he needs to be solicitous of support for re-election.
In his book, Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration (1949),
Chief Justice Vanderbilt at page 34 says:
"The term for which the chief justice of a court sitting
en banc holds office is of extreme significance for the exercise
of internal control. In eight states the chief justice of the court
of last resort is the judge having the shortest term left to serve,
and in eleven states the chief justiceship is determined by
seniority, the oldest member of the court in point of service
is the chief justice. While in the majority of the states the
chief justice holds office until the expiration of his term on the
court, in twelve states the term of the chief justiceship is a
special limited term, ranging from six months to four years.
Effective administration of any sort cannot result when the
administrative office is held for short terms and there is rotation of that office."
It is the recommendation of your Committee that the laws
of the state of North Dakota and the Constitution, if necessary,
be amended to provide for the elective office of Chief Justice at a
salary $3,000.00 per year higher than the other Justices of the
supreme court and that the Chief Justice be given supervisory
authority over all district and supreme court judges including the
assignment of cases and terms as far as district court judges are
concerned. This would require approval of all salary vouchers by
the Chief justice who would have no authority of approval for
any judge failing to cooperate or delinquent in the filing of opinions or the making of decisions under the rules to be provided.
Many problems in connection with the establishment of a
Chief Justice with proper authority would have to be considered
jointly with the appropriate legislative committees when the Legislature convenes. Attached hereto is a table giving the manner
of selection and terms of office of the Chief Justice in the several
states. The supreme court itself selects the Chief Justice in 27
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states. In seven of these-Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Nevada, Virginia, Wisconsin-the selection is made according to
seniority. In eight others, the selection is by the court, without
regard to the length of service.
Publication of North Dakota Reports
Section 93 of the Constitution of North Dakota contains the
following provision:
"The legislative assembly shall make provision for the
publication and distribution of the decisions of the supreme
court and for the sale of the published volumes thereof."
The publication of the North Dakota Reports since 1919 has
been a part of the duties of the Supreme Court Reporter under the
direction and control of the Supreme Court. Seventy-seven volumes, all told, of North Dakota Reports have been published and
volume 78 is in the hands of the printer and will be ready for distribution in September of this year.
Thd publication of North Dakota Reports has been a somewhat difficult problem. The cost of publication has become so
great as to become practically prohibitive.
Up to and including Vol. 74 an agreement was made with
tle Lawyers Co-op Publishing Company for the publication of
North Dakota Reports.
The demand for North Dakota Reports has decreased very
noticeably since the publication of Vol. 74.
For some reason only about 10 per cent of North Dakota
lawyers purchase North Dakota Reports.
The North Dakota Reports no longer include reference to
the briefs and publication is necessarily delayed many months
after the published opinions are available in the reporter system.
We are informed that Vol. 78 will cost approximately $7,500.
Under the circumstances this expense in the opinion of the Committee is not justified. It is therefore the recommendation of the
Committee that the Bar Association request the Legislature to
amend the law giving the supreme court much wider discretion in
the publication of the reports or in discontinuing such publication.
Respectfully yours,
George Sorlie
Robert G. Hoghaug
F. S. Snowfield
T. P. McElroy, Jr.
Harold B. Shaft
Robert L. Burke
Roy A. Neste
Vernon W. Forbes
Carroll E. Day, Chairman
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SELECTION, TERMS AND COMPENSATION OF THE CHIEF
JUSTICES OF THE COURTS OF LAST RESORT
State
Alabama
Arizona

Arkansas
California

Colorado
Connecticut

Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Idaho

Illinois

Indiana
Iowa

Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine

How Selected

Term of
Chief Justice

Compensation
of
Chief Justice

By popular election.
Justice having shortest
time to serve and not
holding office by appointment or by election to fill a vacancy.
By popular election.
Appointed by Governor subject to approval
of Commission
on
Qualifications for the
unexpired term of his
predecessor.
Appointed by court in
rotation.
Appointed by the GenAssembly upon nomination by Governor.

6 years
2 years

8 years

15,500.00

Appointed by Governor, confirmed by Senate.
Appointed by court.
Appointed by court.
Justice having shortest term to serve, not
holding office by appointment or election
to fill vacancy.
Appointed by court
from members who
have served 2 years or
more and who have
not previously served
as Chief Justice or
whose last term as
Chief Justice is most
remote.
Appointed by court on
a rotating basis.

12 years

15,500.00

2 years
6 years
1 or 2 years

10,000.00
8,000.00
7,500.00

1 year

18,000.00

6 months

11,000.00

6 months

10,000.00

No specific term
1 year

10,000.002
9,000.00

Until retirement
or death.
7 years

12,000.00

Appointed by court on
a rotating basis every
six months.
Seniority of service.
Judge with oldest commission is selected as
Chief Justice
Seniority of service.
Appointed by Governor.

8 years
12 years

1 or 2 years

$ 9,500.00
8,500.00

9,000.00
17,000.00

7,500.00t

11,000.00
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Maryland

Selected by Governor
from present members
of court.

Undefined

17,500.003

Massachusetts

Appointed b y t h e
Governor.
Appointed by court on
a rotating basis every
year.
Popular election for
specific office.
Seniority in length of
service,
Appointed by court.
Popular election.

"During good
behavior"
1 year

18,000.00

6 years

12,000.00

As long as he
is on the court.
4 years
6 years

10,000.00

Popular election for
specific office.
Position rotates according to seniority.
Appointed by the Govand council.
Appointed by Governor with advice and
consent of Senate.
Justice with shortest
remaining term
Popular election.

6 years

8,500.00

2 years

8,000.00

During tenure
as judge.
7 years, upon
reappointment
for life.
2 years

9,500.00

14 years

28,000.00

Popular election.
Each j u d g e elected
for a full 10 year term
is appointed Chief Justice for the last 2 years
of his term.
Popular election.
Appointed by court.
Appointed by court.
Justice with shortest
period left to serve,

8 years
2 years

14,400.00
6,500.00

6 years
2 years
2 years
Remainder of
term.

12,600.00
12,500.007
9,500.00
23,500.00

Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota

Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina

South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah

Selected by legislature.
Appointed by the legislature. Usually the
senior Associate Judge
is elected.
Appointed by court.
Appointed by court.
Popular election.
Justice with shortest
term to serve is appointed, u n 1 e s s appointed or elected to
fill a vacancy.

10 years

1 year
During pleasof court.
6 years
2 years

15,000.004

12,000.00
7,500.005

25,000.00
6,000.006

14,000.00
10,500.00

7,200.00
12,600.00
12,000.00
7,200.00
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Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

E 1e c t e d by joint
Houses of General Assembly.
Seniority of service.
Appointed by the court
Appointed by court in
rotation.
Seniority of service.
Justice with shortest
term to serve is appointed, u n 1 e s s appointed or elected to
a vacancy.

2 years

8,000.00

Rest of term
2 years
1 year

10,500.00
12,000.00
12,500.00

Rest of term
Generally,
two to four
years.

12,500.008
8,000.009

SOURCE: Council of State Governments Questionnaire (1950).
Judges elected or appointed prior to November, 1948, receive $6,500.
Those elected thereafter, $7,500.
$10,000 after January 9, 1951. Until then, $8,000.
Presumably, however, so long as he sits on the Court.
Present compensation, however, is $12,000.00. For judges with terms
beginning after December 10, 1948, compensation has been increased to
$15,000.00.
Legislature in 1948 increased salary to $9,000.00, but increase is not
effective until end of present terms in 1953.
In addition, each justice receives $3,000.00 per year as a trustee of the
State Law Library.
After January 1 1951. Until then, $7,500.00.
Salary of present Chief Justice, $10,000.00 annually. After expiration of
present term, will rise to $12,500.00.
For new and reelected judges. For the other judges, $7,000.00.

SENATOR DAY: I move the recommendations be approved
and adopted and I shall recommend our committee be commended
for having filed a written report.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: You have heard the motion. Is
there a second?
ROBERT B. GRIFFITH: I second the motion.
(The following members spoke on the report: Duane Nedand,
Senator Duffy, Louis Nostdal.)
0. B. BURTNESS: I suggest the Chairman of the Committee
would change his motion and ask for filing of the report and the
recommendations made therein be left to the Executive Committee. I want to assure you I have no objection to being retired at
this very moment. I happen to be past 70 years of age.
SENATOR DAY: I have no objection to that. I can withdraw that motion and make a motion that would approve the
other two recommendations. We could mimeograph the part you
would like to discuss.
JUDGE BURTNESS: As I understand it the report points
to an absolute elimination of North Dakota Reports so the law-
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yers would have to use the Northwestern system. Is that what
it means?
SENATOR DAY: I might quote: "It is therefore the recommendation of the Committee that the Bar Association request the
Legislature to amend the law giving the supreme court much
wider discretion in the publication of the reports or in discontinuing such publication."
JUDGE BURTNESS: I don't like to see seniles around, but
we ought to be able to buy North Dakota Reports and there are a
lot of lawyers in North Dakota who can't afford to buy the Northwestern system.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: To size up this question the membership should have an explanation of the number of North Dakota Reports and the cost to the state and the number taking
advantage of it is out of all proportion and isn't fair ot the taxpayers to ask the state to continue publishing the reports for the
very few who take advantage of them.
JUDGE BURTNESS: There are three recommendations and
if the Association should vote, il should be split into three votes.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: I would like the Bar Board to
be heard on it. I think we can dispense with mimeographing.
Our Executive Director isn't interested.
SENATOR DAY: I have several copies.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: I am going to entertain a motion
that we continue the discussion of this report or postpone it until
our business session tomorrow morning.
SAMUEL E. PALETZ: It is so moved.
JUDGE LUNDBERG: I second the motion.
(Question put and motion carried.)
ROBERT ALPHSON: I will acquaint Mr. Rilling with the
records, and at this time I move his election be made unanimous.
RONALD N. DAVIES: I second the motion.
(Question put and motion carried.)
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Motion carried. We will have the
report of the Fee Schedule Committee by Mr. Richard V. Boulger.
MR. BOULGER: The recommendation has been made that
an amendment be made concerning the fee to be charged in an
action under our Unsatisfied Judgment Act. There has been some
criticism by the legislators that too high a percentage has been
charged and they look upon it as public money rather than as a
private agreement. We recommend a minimum fee schedule to
include a flat 25% fee of the amount collected under the Unsatisfied Judgment Act, and at this time I so move that amendment.
ROBERT VOGEL: I second the motion. I think it should
be a maximum. I believe it was understood that 25% be considered
a maximum fee to be charged.
mum. 25% be considered a maximum fee to be charged.
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R. J. BLOEDAU: I second the motion.
(Question put on the amended motion and this motion carried.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON:
adjourned until 1:30.

Motion carried. We now stand

Morning Session, Saturday, August 7, 1954
At 9:00 a.m. Saturday, August 7, 1954, the meeting was
called to order, with President Johnson, presiding.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: We will start with the report of
the Traffic Safety Committee by Alvin C. Strutz.
MR. STRUTZ: How much time do I have?
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Take your time.
REPORT OF TRAFFIC SAFETY COMMITTEE
OF THE NORTH DAKOTA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
Your Committee on Traffic Safety begs leave to submit the
following report:
Your Committee is keenly conscious of the vital interest which
the public has in the problem of Traffic Safety. The volume of
of traffic on our highways has increased greatly since the close
of the Second World War, and more traffic has resulted in the
killing of more people. While we realize that a comprehensive
survey of the entire problem would include a discussion of adequate highways, as well as problems of adequate safety laws and
their enforcement, your Traffic Safety Council limited its consideration to the latter phase of the problem. It was agreed by
the members of your Committee that traffic safety would be aided
by the better enforcement of our highway laws; by better driver
control; by more public education on traffic safety, and by better
motor vehicle inspection.
In view of the fact that the North Dakota State Bar Association has a Legislative Committee, it was felt by the members of
your Traffic Safety Committee that the only function of that Committee on matters of improving traffic safety would be to recommend to the Legislative Committee such legislation as we feel
would improve traffic safety. In line with the idea of better enforcement of highway laws and more public education on traffic
safety, your Committee recommends to the North Dakota State
Bar Association that it consider the issuance of a pamphlet on
"Traffic Courts and Procedure", which pamphlet would be distributed to all the Justices of the Peace of the State of North Dakota, the Police Courts and all Peace Officers, including Mayors,
of all of the villages and cities of the State. It is suggested that
such pamphlet could also be sent to all of the Homemakers Clubs
in the State of North Dakota, who could use the subject of Traffic
Safety as a subject for some of their meetings.
The reason why the members of your Committee felt that
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such a pamphlet would fill a vital need in this State is that it has
come to the attention of the members of your Committee that many
of the traffic violations are handled in Justice Court, and that
many of the Justices of the Peace who handle such traffic violations have absolutely no knowledge of the Traffic Laws of the
State of North Dakota, know nothing about Traffic Courts and
Procedure, and do not have any knowledge of what their jurisdiction or authority is. Along that line it was pointed out by one
of the members of your Committee that within recent months
one of the Justices of the Peace in the State of North Dakota levied
an $800 fine for a traffic violation, clearly exceeding his jurisdiction.
The proposed pamphlet, to be prepared and distributed as
suggested, should cover the subjects of preparation of cases, including the use of radar and drunk-o-meter devices; a discussion
of the authority of the Courts, Police and other Peace Officers,
and should also contain certain information on trial procedure.
An outline of the matters to be covered by such suggested
Pamphlet is as follows:
MANUAL FOR TRAFFIC COURTS
INTRODUCTION

(Purpose

few words of judicial wisdom, etc.,
by officer of Bar Association)
-a

CHAPTER I

Section 85,
Section 112,
Section 113,
Section 114,

Historical Review
Constitution of
Constitution of
Constitution of
Constitution of

North
North
North
North

Dakota
Dakota
Dakota
Dakota

CHAPTER II

Qualifications - Duties
Justice
Magistrate
Jurisdiction and Powers
CHAPTER III

1.
2.
3.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Bail -

Trial Procedure
Dignity of Court
Arraignment
Pleas
Trial - With Jury - Without
Witnesses - Examination
Rights of Defendant
Argument
Acquittal or Conviction
Judgment and Sentence
WARRANTS AND COMPLAINTS
Costs and Fees - Appeals

Venue

CHAPTER IV

Dockets -

Forms -

Reports
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CHAPTER V

Questions-

Answers -

Common Problems

CHAPTER VI

Traffic Laws
State
City
Your Committee suggests that the work of compiling such a
Pamphlet be done under the supervision of the Legislative Research
Director and the Safety Director of the State of North Dakota.
While the work would be done under the supervision of these
officers, the actual work could be done either by law students or
by members of the Attorney General's office. No doubt individual
attorneys in private practice would also be willing to handle any
particular phase of the preparation of this Pamphlet, but no private practicing attorney should be asked to prepare the entire
manual and to donate his time for that purpose.
After such Manual has been prepared and published, it is the
recommendation of your Committee that the distribution of the
same be left to the State Director of Public Safety, who has kindly
consented to take charge of this phase of the work.
UNSATISFIED JUDGMENT FUND LAW
Your Committee on Traffic Safety, at the express request of
your President, the Hon. Vernon Johnson, has also considered very
carefully the question of suggested changes in the Unsatisfied
Judgment Fund Law. Your Committee is of the opinion that the
Unsatisfied Judgment Law fills a vital need in the state of North
Dakota, and that recent efforts to repeal such law have been made
without a full undersatnding of the great value of such law in our
economy. We further believe that no owner of a motor vehicle in
the State of North Dakota, if he were fully appraised of the facts,
would ever object to paying the small assessment of one dollar
now required under the law at irregular intervals. It is the cheapest protection that any person can secure for himself and his family
against the negligence of financially irresponsible drivers.
The members of your Committee do realize, however, that
certain changes in the present law would be beneficial and desirable,.
and therefore beg leave to submit to you the following suggestions:
(1) It is the sense of your Committee that the Law be amended so as to specifically provide for giving authority to the Attorney
General to call on the highway patrolman, the Sheriff and the
Police officers to conduct investigations in cases where the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund may be called upon to pay damages. We
realize that the Attorney General has general authority to call on
these officers for assistance under the Law now, but we do believe
that a specific authorization should be provided for such investigations, with specific authority to be given to the Attorney General
to call on these officers in cases where the Unsatisfied Judgment
Fund may be called upon for contribution. Such report as is givent
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by the officers named should be made available to both sides of the
lawsuit.
(2) Your Committee further recommends that specific appropriation be made from the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund for the payment of the salary of one or more Special Assistant Attorneys
General, who would be in charge of the work in administering the
Unsatisfied Judgment Law and for expenses of such Special Assistant Attorneys General. An additional appropriation has been
made to the Attorney General's office to cover the additional work
required by reason of the provisions of this Law, but we believe
that such appropriation for a specific amount for salary for one or
more Assistants, and for the cost of administration of this Law,
should be made from the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund.
(3) Your Committee recommends that the Law be amended
to provide that in all cases where the Fund may be called upon for
contribution, that a thirty (30) day written notice before trial be
given to the Attorney General, and that the Attorney General be
authorized to file an Answer and to enter a defense in such action.
It is the opinion of the members of your Committee that such Law
should provide that the notice be given 30 days before the evidence
is presented, so as to give the Attorney General adequate notice
and time to prepare for trial.
(4) Your Committee recommends that the Statute be amended
to require the Plaintiff to show that remedies against all possible.
parties have been pursued, including the driver and the owner of
the vehicle claimed responsible in the action. It is the thought of
your Committee that a Judgment-creditor must commence and
pursue to completion, in good faith, any action he might have
against all persons against whom he might 'reasonably be considered as having a cause of action arising out of the motor vehicle
accident. It is further the thought of your Committee that an Unsatisfied Judgment against the driver of a vehicle, for example,
could not be collected out of the Fund, if the owner of the offending
vehicle, if he is also liable, has not been joined or sued. For example, a no-good son, but father financially responsible.
(5) Your Committee further recommends that a Judgmentcreditor, before being able to collect from the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund, be required to show that there is no reasonable possibility of any other claims arising out of the same accident. The
purpose of such a provision is to prevent a party who might recover
the first Judgment from collecting all of the money payable under
the Law on any one claim, resulting in subsequent claimants being
barred from participating in the Fund.
(6) Your Committee further recommends that Section 39-1703
Subdivision 4 of such Section, be clarified to require the claimant
to show what steps have been taken which he claims constitutes
"exhaustive search" of the Defendant's resources as required by
that Subsection, and that the Judgment-creditor be required to
make the same "exhaustive search and inquiry to ascertain whether
the Judgment-debtor is 'possessed of property, real or personal,
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liable to be sold or applied in satisfaction of the judgment" as he
would make in attempting to collect a Judgment where the provisions of the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund were not available.
(7) Your Committee recommends that Section 39-1710 be so
amended as to place the responsibility of collecting payments ordered by the Court in the hands of the Attorney General of the State
of North Dakota. Your Committee would further recommend that
such Section be amended to provide that any Order of the Court
for installment payments provided for in such section must be on
such a basis that the total amount of the judgment, plus interest,
at the rate of 2%, be repaid within a period of ten years.
Your Committee further would recommend that some system be
devised whereby it would be impossible for a judgment-debtor who
has not complied with the Statute for repayment to the Fund of his
judgment, to secure a driver's license or a motor vehicle license
until hq has complied with the provisions of such Statute.
(8) Your Committee further recommends that the Research
Commission of the State of North Dakota be required to investigate the original Law of the State of New Jersey which requires
uninsured drivers to pay a higher assessment into an Unsatisfied
Judgment Fund than those drivers who have coverage, and that if
the idea, in the opinion of such Research Committee, has merits,
that the matter be presented to the Legislative Assembly for their
attention.
It is the thought of your Committee that the Research Committee determine from proper authorities in New Jersey whether
this provision in the New Jersey Law would be feasible in the State
of North Dakota under the conditions here existing, and we recommend that if such provisions are believed to be feasible, that appropriate legislation be prepared requiring uninsured drivers to
pay a larger assessment than is required of insured drivers. We
further believe that the uninsured driver should be required to pay
an annual assessment, but that the payments as to the insured driver
be made as now provided by the Law.
(9) Your Committee further recommends that the Unsatisfied
Judgment Fund Law be changed so that the Attorney General be
made the Administrator of the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund, with
power to make appropriate and necessary rules and regulations to
facilitate its operations. We further recommend that the requirement that the Highway Commissioner be served with notice be
eliminated.
Your Committee recommends that these matters be submitted
to the Legislative Research Committee for investigation and action.
Respectfully submitted,
TRAFFIC SAFETY COMMITTEE,
North Dakota State Bar Association,
A. R. Bergesen,
George S. Register,
Daniel Chapman,
Clarence Schauss,
E. Forsythe Engebretson,
Robert L. Vogel,
Richard P. Rausch,
Alvin C. Strutz, Chairman.
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MR. STRUTZ:
report be filed.

I move and Robert Vogel seconds that this

PRESIDENT JOHNSON: You have heard the report.
there any discussion - any comments.
(Question put and motion carried.)

It

PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Motion carried. I am going to ask
Bud Ruemmele to give the report on Title Standards.
REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON TITLE STANDARDS
Your Committee on Title Standards, comprised of Scott T. Rex,
Linn Sherman, Einar Johnson, John F. Lord, Frank F. Jestrab,
Charles L. Crum, and Henry G. Ruemmele wish to report to this
Association its activities since appointment.
Pursuant to the last annual report of this Committee, the
adopted Title Standards have been printed, placed in a binder and
offered to all the lawyers of the State for a charge of $10.00. To
date we have sent out 146 copies, including complimentary copies
to the University of North Dakota Law Library, Minnesota State
Bar Association, State Bar of Texas, State Bar of Pennsylvania, and
the Iowa State Bar Association.
We have collected $1,380 from the sale of the Standards, and
paid $1,201.72 for 500 copies. It is anticipated that revenues from
the sale of the Standards should make the printing and publication
of additions, revisions and corrections self-sustaining.
Your Committee held two meetings during the year, one at
Grand Forks on April 24, 1954, at which meeting members Einar
Johnson, Scott T. Rex, Charles L. Crum, Linn Sherman, and Henry
G. Ruemmele were present, and one at Fargo on June 26, 1954, at
which members Scott T. Rex, Charles L. Crum, Linn Sherman and
Henry G. Ruemmele were present. As a result of these meetings
the proposed additions, revisions, and corrections, copies of which
have been mailed to each member of this Association, were considered and recommended for adoption, and that report is included in
the report of this Committee.
Many other proposals were considered and either found not
suitable for adoption as a Title Standard or were tabled for further
study. The Committee urges members of the Association to aid
them in their work by proposing title standards, and submitting if
possible, the legal foundation for the proposal.
The Committee has also discussed the possibility of the creation
of a Real Property Section so that the adoption of additions, revisions, and corrections might be handled through that Section together with all the problems dealing with Real Property. The
majority of the members of the Committee felt that it was a bit
premature, but it is recommended that the Execuive Committei
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be empowered to create such a Section and designate its scope of
activity and powers.
Respectfully submitted,
Scott T. Rex,
Linn Sherman,
Einar Johnson,
Charles L. Crum,
John F. Lord,
Frank'F. Jestrab,
H. G. Ruemmele, Chairman.
TITLE STANDARDS COMMITTEE PROPOSED ADDITIONS,
REVISIONS AND CORRECTIONS
Pursuant to action taken by the 1953 annual meeting of the
State Bar Association of North Dakota, there is herewith published
the proposed additions, revisions and corrections to the Title Standards, together with the action taken by the Title Standards Committee.
RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN EXISTING STANDARDS
I. Title Standard 1.10 reads:
"In the absence of notice of renewal from possession, record,
or otherwise, an examiner may omit from his opinion reference
to a recorded lease when the term as expressed in said lease
has expired."
The Legal Committee of the North Dakota Oil and Gas Association, requested a revision to remove any implication that the Standard applied to an oil and gas lease. The Title Standards Committee
felt it should be broadened to take in any lease containing similar
provisions.
It is recommended that Title Standard 1.10 be revised to
read:
"In the absence of notice of renewal from possession, record
or otherwise, an examiner may omit from his opinion reference
to a recorded lease when the term as expressed in said lease
has expired. However; reference shall be made to the lease
when its continuation or renewal is dependent upon a contingency which may have occurred, such as the occurrence of
production on lands covered by an oil, gas or mineral lease."
*

*

0

*

a

*

II. Title Standard 1.08 reads:
"Attention shall be called to the possibilities of reverter and
of rights of re-entry for breach of condition subsequent, duly
executed by the party who reserved the same or by his heirs if
he dies intestate, or if he dies testate by the party to whom the
same were devised, or in the absence of a specific devise by his
residuary legatee."
Upon a reading of the Standard it seems to create confusion rather
than certainty.
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It is recommended that Title Standard 1.08 be revised to
read:
"Attention should be called to possibilities of reverter, of
rights for re-entry for breach of condition subsequent, and
restrictive covenants."
(See Section 47-0902 N.D.R.C. of 1943)
The reference to Section 47-0902 is to call attention to the apparent
limitations upon alienation of such interests. In this connection the
Title Standards Committee felt that the Marketable Record Title
Act should be amended to reduce the period provided therein to
20 years and that Exception (d) which provides:
"This Act shall not be:
1. Applied to bar:
d. Conditions subsequent contained in any deed;"
should be repealed.
III. Title Standard 2.03 reads:
"As to names no objection shall be made between the use of
a full given name or the common abbreviation thereof or the
generally accepted derivatives. 'The addition or omission of
'Jr.' or 'Sr.' following the names should be disregarded."
It appears that as a matter of fact there have been several instances
where the chain of title appears to be complete on the basis of the
Standard where the title was vested in "Sr." and an oil and gas
lease was executed without the addition of the designation. Under
the Standard the "Sr." could be disregarded and the oil and gas
lease accepted. However, the fact of the matter is that the oil and
gas lease was actually executed by "Jr.". Anticipating that this
situation could arise in other instruments the Committee felt that
a change was necessary.
It is recommended that Title Standard 2.03 be revised to read:
"As to names no objection shall be made between the use of
a full given name or the common abbreviation thereof or the
generally accepted derivatives."
This recommendation eliminates the words:
"The addition or omission of 'Jr.' or 'Sr.' following the name
should be disregarded.
*

0

*

*

0

*

RECOMMENDED ADDITIONS
I The North Dakota Oil and Gas Association recommended
the following Standards:
"Where the landowner is deceased the title examiner should
require the administration of the estate or probate of the will as
the case may be, and that the lease be properly executed by
the proper personal representative and be duly approved by
the County Court."
Chapter 230, Session Laws of 1953
Patton on Titles
Bancrofts Probate Practices, 2nd Ed. Vol. 1, Sec. 8.
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The Committee recommends the adoption of the following
Standard:
"Where the landowner is deceased an oil and gas lease must
be executed by the personal representative as provided by
staute."
See Chapter 230, Laws of North Dakota, 1953
(Sec. 38-1003, 1953 Supp. N.D.R.C. of 1943)
Patton on Titles
Bancrofts Probate Practices, 2nd Ed. Vol. 1, Sec. 8.
*

*

*

0

0

*

II The North Dakota Oil & Gas Association recommended
the following Standard:
"Where an oil and gas lease covers lands subject to a contingent future interest the oil and gas lease must be executed
by the statutory trustee."
See Chapter 231, Laws of North Dakota, 1953
(38-1012, 1953 Supp. N.D.R.C. of 1943)
The Committee recommends the adoption of the above Standard.
a

*

*

*

*

*

III The Committee recommends the adoption of the following
Standard:
"When an oil and gas lease has been executed and no spouse
has joined therein, a separate lease or ratification of the existing
lease from or by the nonjoining spouse, does not meet the requirements of section 47-1805, N.D.R.C. 1943."
See: Fore v. Fore, 2 N.D. 267, 50 NW 715
Helgebye v. Damen, 13 N.D. 172, 100 NW 246
Garr, Scott & Co. v. Collin etal, 15 N.D. 622, 110 NW 81
Severtson v. Peoples, 28 N.D. 372, 148 NW 1055
Acklin v. First National Bank, 64 N.D. 577, 254, NW 769
Dixon v. Kaufman, 58 NW 2d 797
Mandan Mercantile Company v. Sexton, 29 ND 602,
151 NW 780
Larson v. Cole, 76, N.D. 32, 33 NW 2d 325.
*

*

0

*

*

*

IV The Committee recommends the adoption of the following
Standard:
"A contract for the sale of property is within the restrictions
of Section 47-1805, N.D.R.C. 1943, providing for the execution
and acknowledgment of the same instrument by both husband
and wife."
See Silander v. Gronna, 15 N.D. 522, 108 NW 545
Larson v. Cole, 33 NW 2d 325
Engholm v. Ekrem etal, 18 N. D. 185, 119 NW 38
0

0

0

0

*

0

V The Committee recommends the adoption of the following
Standard:
"A deed from the husband to the wife or the wife to the husband is not within the restrictions of Section 47-1805, N.D.R.C.
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1943, requiring both the execution and acknowledgment of the
same instrument by the husband and wife to convey or encumber the homestead."
See Wehe v. Wehe, 44 N.D. 280, 175 NW 366.
0

0

*

0

0

0

VI The Committee recommends the adoption of the following Standard:
"Where a conveyance has been recorded and no spouse has
joined therein, a separate deed from the nonjoining spouse does
not meet the requirements of Section 47-1805, N.D.R.C. 1943."
(No opinion is expressed as to the validity of Section 1-0412,
N.D.R.C. 1943)
The Committee had a long discussion of this Standard and especially in view of Section 1-0412, N.D.R.C. 1943, which provides:
"In any case where a married man or woman, prior to January 1, 1954, conveyed real property which may have been
the homestead of the husband, or the wife, or the family, by a
deed duly signed and acknowledged by the husband or wife
only, but not signed by the other, and the husband or wife, did
not join the other in executing the deed, either before or after,
by a deed duly signed and acknowledged, conveys the same
real estate to the same grantee or a subsequent grantee from
him, the conveyance by such separate deed, is declared to be
valid and effectual to pass the title to such grantee or subsequent grantee the same as if the conveyance ,had been made
by a single instrument duly executed and acknowledged by
both husband and wife."
Several members of the Committee on the authority of
Finlayson v. Peterson, 5 N.D. 587, 67 NW 953
Dever v. Cornwell, 10 N.D. 123, 86 NW 227
Acklin v. First National Bank, 64 N.D. 577, 254 NW 769
felt that the Section was unconstitutional, while others did not feel
the Committee should propose a Standard in reliance thereon.
All agreed that separate deeds after January 1, 1943, are not valid,
with the dissent being as to those prior to January 1, 1943.
VII The Committee recommends the adoption of the following Standard:
"No title shall be considered unmarketable by reason of any
claim or defect over 31 years old, if the record title holder has
an unbroken chain of title through his immediate or remote
grantors by a deed of conveyance which has been recorded 31
years or more, and if the record title holder is in possession of
the property, and records an affidavit to that effect.
This Standard shall not apply to:
a. claims of which notices have been filed in accordance
with Chapter 47-19A, 1953 Supp. N.D.R.C. 1943.
b. claims which are specifically excepted by Section 4719A11, 1953 Supp. N.D.R.C. 1943.
Authority: Chapter 47-19A, 1953 Supp. N.D.R.C. 1943.
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See: How to Examine an Abstract and Implications of the
Marketable Titles Act-Sectional Assemblies Booklet,
Annual Meeting of State Bar Association of North Dakota,
1952.
North Dakota Marketable Record Title Act, by James Leahy,
North Dakota Law Review, July, 1952, Volume 29,
Page 265."
VIII The Committee recommends the adoption of the following Standard:
"When all the joint tenants contract for the sale of real
property, any future conveyance by a surviving joint tenant
or tenants will not create a marketable title."
NOTE: Two cases, In re Sprague's Estate, (Iowa, 1953) 57
NW 2d 212 and Buford v. Dahlke, (Nebraska, 1954) 62 NW 2d
252, have held that the making of a contract for sale by joint
tenants operates to sever the joint tenancy. Wisconsin in Simon v.
Chartier, 27 NW 2d, 752, has held to the contrary. See Swenson
and Degnan, Severance of Joint Tenancies, 38 Minnesota Law Review 466, 476-82 (1954). Until such time as a decision on the
point is rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court, the Committee has concluded that a title tendered by a surviving joint
tenant in the situation outlined is subject to reasonable doubt and
hence unmarketable."
IX The Committee recommends the adoption of the following
Standard:
"The use of the word 'grant' in a deed which releases and
quitclaims all the grantor's right, title and interest, or other
words to that effect, does not make such a deed one by which
an after-acquired title will pass."
See State v. Kemmerrer (South Dakota) 84 NW 771."
The Committee had long discussions on this point, which was
brought about by a consideration of Section 47-1015, N.D.R.C.
1943 which provides:
"Where a person purports by proper instrument to grant
real property in fee simple and subsequently acquires any
title or claim of title thereof, the same passes by operation of
law to the grantee or his successors."
Section 47-1019 N.D.R.C. 1943 provides for the implication of
certain covenants by the use of the word "grant," and on the basis
of the two sections some have claimed that a deed which included
the word "grant" but released and quitclaimed all of the grantor's
right, title and interest, would carry with it an after-acquired title.
The South Dakota case cited is exactly in point on the matter and
considered identical statutes. It was the Committee's feeling that
the limited Standard was well within the authority of the South
Dakota case.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGISLATION
Mortgages
Because of the unsatisfactory solution of Section 35-0313 N.D.
R.C. of 1943 as interpreted by Magnuson v. Breher, 69 N.D. 197,
284 N.W. 843, providing for the discharge of old mortgages by an
ex parte petition, the Committee recommends that Section 28-0115
N.D.R.C. 1943 which provides that
"The following actions must be commenced within ten years
after the cause of action has accrued.
3. Any proceeding for the foreclosure of a mortgage upon
real estate."
be amended to eliminate the tolling of the statute. It is suggested
that the Minnesota Statute MSA 5541.03 be adopted. This section
reads:
"541.03 Foreclosure of real estate mortgage
Subdivision 1. Limitation. No action or proceeding to foreclose a real estate mortgage, whether by action or advertisement or otherwise, shall be maintained unless commenced
within 10 years from the maturity of the debt secured by the
mortgage, and this limitation shall not be extended by the nonresidence of any plaintiff or defendant or any party interested
in the land upon which the mortgage is a lien in any action
commenced to foreclose such mortgage, nor by reason of any
payment made after such maturity, nor by reason of any extension of the time of payment of the mortgage or the debt or
obligation thereby secured or any portion thereof, unless such
extension shall be in writing and shall have been recorded in
the same office in which the original mortgage is recorded, within the limitation herein provided, or prior to the expiration of
any previously recorded extension of such mortgage or debt,
nor by reason of any disability of any party interested in the
mortgage.
Subdivision 2. When time begins to run; commencement of
proceedings
The time within which any such action or proceeding may
be commenced shall begin to run from the date of such mortgage, unless the time of the maturity of the debt or obligation
secured by such mortgage shall be clearly stated in such mortgage. Any action or proceeding to foreclose a real estate
mortgage, whether by action, by advertisement or otherwise,
commenced within the period of the limitation herein provided
may be prosecuted to completion notwithstanding the expiration of the period of limitation, and proceedings to foreclose a
real estate mortgage by advertisement shall be deemed commenced on the date of the first publication of the notice of sale."
The Minnesota Statute provides for a 15 year period, but the
Committee recommends a 10 year period.
It will be noted that the Section will make it possible for an
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examiner to disregard a mortgage which falls within the Statute.
To further make the matter of record it would seem advisable to
repeal Section 28-0509, N.D.R.C. 1943, which provides:
"No notice of the pendency of an action in a district court
shall be required if the action is for the foreclosure of a mortgage or for the enforcement of a mechanic's lien or miner's
lien."
Lis Pendens
The matter of a recorded Lis Pendens of ancient vintage has
also been troublesome, and the Committee recommends legislation
to cure that trouble.
Section 28-0507, N.D.R.C. of 1943 could be amended to provide that
"On and after January 1, 1956, no lis pendens now of record
or hereafter recorded shall be notice, either actual or constructive, of the pendency of any action or of any of the matters referred to in the court files and records pertaining to the action
noticed by such lis pendens, after such lis pendens has been of
record for six years unless a new notice of lis pendens in the
same action is recorded within said six years. Any lis pendens
which has been of record for six years on the effective date of
this act, may be preserved by the recording of a new notice of
lis pendens in the same action on or before December 31, 1955.
Nothing in this Act shall increase the effect or lengthen the term
for which a lis pendens is notice under any existing law, nor
create a right to renew the operation of a lis pendens already
barred.by some other law."
This proposed enactment is borrowed from Chapter 326, of
the 1947 Laws of Minnesota, as codified under Sections 557.021-2-3.
Contracts for Deed
The matter of contracts for deed of ancient vintage where it
appears that they have been abandoned on the part of the vendee
have often caused a good deal of expense and trouble in an effort
to clear the record.
Section 28-0116, N.D.R.C. 1943 could be amended to provide:
"The following actions must be commenced within six years
after the cause of action has accrued:
1. An action upon a contract, obligation, or liability, express
or implied, subject to the provisions of section 28-0115,
provided, however, that from and after January 1, 1956, no
action, suit or proceeding shall be maintained by the vendee in any contract for the sale of real property, unless it
is commenced within six years from the date when the final
payment provided by said contract shall become due, and
this limitation shall not be extended by the non-residence
of any plaintiff or defendant, nor by reason of any payment
made after the date of said final payment, nor by reason of
any extension of time of payment unless such extension
shall be in writing and shall have been recorded in the
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same office in which the said contract for deed is recorded,
within the limitation period herein provided, or prior to
the expiration of any previously recorded extension of such
contract, nor by reason of any disability of any party interested in the contract. The time within which any such
action or suit or proceeding may be commenced shall begin
to run from the date of such contract, unless the time for
final payment or performance be clearly stated in said contract.
MR. RUEMMELE: I recommend the adoption of the report
and the recommendations and revisions contained therein.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: You have heard the motion. Is
there a second?
FRANK F. JESTRAB: I second the motion.
(Question put and motion carried.)
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Motion carried. I will now ask
Judge W. H. Hutchinson to give the report of the Committee on
Judicial Reform.
REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL REFORM
This committee was appointed by the President of the State
Bar Association in the wake of the report of Professor Ralph Blinn
who made an extensive survey of the judicial system in North
Dakota and a number of alternate recommendations for improvement of our judicial system.
Your committee not only carefully considered the Blinn Report, but also conferred with Judge A. Besancon of Butte, Montana,
a former practitioner of the State of North Dakota, who is familiar
with the unified court practice in the State of Montana.
Your committee adheres to the conclusions reached early in
this study that provision should be made for the unified court
system in the State of North Dakota by consolidating the county
court with the district court and at the same time revamping the
justice court system. To accomplish this integration it is necessary
that certain changes in the constitution be drafted and submitted
to the electorate of North Dakota.
Your committee has prepared what they consider to be an
appropriate concurrent resolution to be introduced in the next
session of the legislature for the submission of the necessary
changes to a vote of the people. (See exhibit annexed.)
This resolution in its essential form was submitted to the last
session of the legislature in February, 1953. The resolution passed
the Senate but met defeat at the hands of the House Judiciary
Committee where a number of county judges voiced their opposition to the resolution. While individual committee members of the
House Judiciary Committee voiced individual approval of the resolution it was felt that the measure should be given further consideration and reintroduced in the next session.
Essentially the proposed resolution is enabling in character
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and does not in and of itself contemplate any changes in the judicial
structure of our judicial system. In the event the constitutional
amendments are approved the legislature would then be required
to pass the legislation necessary to accomplish the integration of the
inferior courts.
It is the recommendation of your committee that the committee
be continued to the end that the necessary judicial reforms can
be accomplished as soon as the legislature and the people of North
Dakota perceive the merit of the proposed unification of the courts.
Respectfully submitted,
Eugene A. Burdick,
Win. H. Hutchinson,
Roland A. Heringer,
John 0. Thorson,
W. L. Nuessle, Chairman.
SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
A concurrent resolution providing for the amendment of the
Constitution of the State of North Dakota, relating to the judicial
system of the State of North Dakota.
Be it Resolved by the Senate of the State of North Dakota,
the House of Representatives concurring therein:
The following amendment to the Constitution of the State of
North Dakota is agreed to and shall be submitted to the'qualified
electors of North Dakota for approval or rejection at the primary
election in June 1956, in accordance with the provisions of Section
202 of the North Dakota Constitution, as amended:
SECTION 1.) Section 85 of Article IV of the Constitution of
the State of North Dakota is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 85. The judicial power of the State of North Dakota
shall be vested in a Supreme Court, District Courts, and such other
courts as may be created by law.
SECTION 2.) Section 103 of Article IV of the Constitution
of the State of North Dakota is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 103. Except as otherwise provided in this constitution,.
the District Courts shall have original jurisdiction of all causes and
proceedings, in law and equity, the probate of wills, the administration of estates of decedents, and the guardianship of the persons
and estates of minors and incompetent persons, and such appellate
jurisdiction as may be conferred by law. They and the judges
thereof shall also have jurisdiction and power to issue writs of
habeas corpus, quo warranto, certiorari, injunction, and other
original and remedial writs, with authority to hear and determine
the same.
SECTION 3.) Section 108 of Article IV of the Constitution
of the State of North Dakota is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 108. There shall be a Clerk of the District Court in
each organized county of the state, whose term of office, manner of
selection, powers, duties and compensation shall be prescribed by
law.
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SECTION 4.) Section 112 of Article IV of the Constitution
of the State of North Dakota is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 112. The legislative assembly may provide by law for
the election of justices of the peace in each organized county within
the state. The number of such justices shall be limited by law to
the number necessary for the proper administration of justice. The
justices of the peace herein provided for shall have concurrent
jurisdiction with the district court in all civil actions when the
amount in controversy, exclusive of costs does not exceed three
hundred dollars, and they shall have such jurisdiction to hear and
determine cases of misdemeanor as may be provided by law, but in
no case shall justice of the peace have jurisdiction when the
boundaries of or title to real estate shall come in question. The
legislative assembly shall have power to abolish the office of justice
of the peace and confer that jurisdiction elsewhere.
SECTION 5.) Section 113 of Article IV of the Constitution of
the State of North Dakota is hereby amended to read as follows:
. Section 113. The legislative assembly shall provide by law for
the election of police magistrates in cities, incorporated towns and
villages, who shall have jurisdiction of all cases arising under the
ordinances of said cities, towns and villages.
SECTION 6.) Section 14 of Article IV of the Constitution of
the State of North Dakota is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 114. Appeals shall lie from final decisions of justices
of the peace and police magistrates in such cases and pursuant to
such regulations as may be prescribed by law.
SECTION 7.) Section 117 of Article IV of the Constitution of
the State of North Dakota is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 117. No judge or clerk of the Supreme or District
Courts shall act as attorney of counselor at law.
SECTION 8.) Section 173 of Article X of the Constitution of
the State of North Dakota, as amended, is hereby amended to read
as follows:
Section 173. There shall be elected in each organized county
in the state, at each general election, A Register of Deeds, County
Auditor, Treasurer, Sheriff and State's Attorney, who shall be
electors of the county in which they are elected and who shall hold
office until their successors are elected and qualified. The legislature shall provide by law for such other county, township and district officers as may be deemed necessary, and shall prescribe the
powers, duties and compensation of all county, township and district
officers. The Treasurer of any county shall not hold such office
for more than four year sin succession.
SECTION 9) Section 196 of Article XIV of the Constitution
of the State of North Dakota is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 196. The governor and other elective state officers and
judges of the Supreme and District Courts shall be liable to impeachment for habitual drunkenness, crimes, corrupt conduct, or
malfeasance or misdemeanor in office, but judgment in such cases
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will not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office of trust or profit under the state. The person
accused, whether convicted or acquitted shall nevertheless be
liable to indictment, trial, judgment and punishment according to
law.
SECTION 10.)
Sections 110 and 111 of Article IV of the
Constitution of the State of North Dakota are hereby repealed.
SECTION 11.) The judicial system of the State of North
Dakota as now constituted and such courts and offices of the
judicial system as are now established under the Constitution and
the laws of North Dakota shall continue notwithstanding the adoption of this amendment until otherwise provided by Law. Vacancies occurring in any such existing courts and offices in the present
judicial system, until otherwise provided by law, shall be filled by
election or appointment as now provided by the Constitution and
laws of North Dakota.
JUDGE HUTCHINSON: Judge Nuessle, who is the chairman
of our Committee was unable to be here and asked me to present
the report. I have here also the proposed Concurrent Resolution
which should be sent to the Legislature. I don't know if it is
necessary to read that.
I therefore move that this report be approved.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: You have heard the motion. Is
there a second?
JUDGE BURTNESS: I second the motion.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Mr. Ego of Lisbon.
MR. EGO: Mr. President and Members of the Association, I
didn't come here with the idea of taking part in it, but I have given
the, matter some study and I have some very fixed and pronounced
opinions. I think this thing has been studied carefully by the
people who are on the committee. I believe their opinions are
entitled to careful consideration but you know we all sometimes
get the idea we get started on something and follow it until it becomes an obsession, so I think as far as the Julicial Council has
been concerned this court reform has got to be more or less an
obsession that for over sixty years we've had a judicial system to
which people have become accustomed. It has weaknesses and
certain reforms are necessary but 1 question whether the flouting
of the entire system and revamping it into what some other state
has pronounced to be ideal will fit our tradition and history. I am
particularly opposed to the part which deals with the proposal to
abolish the county court. I am in favor of abolishing the county
courts as they now stand but not complete consolidation with the
district court.
My main objection is after all the people who have probate
matters and pay expenses would have to wait for the district judge
to create an action. We have in this state seven counties that have
increased jurisdiction. They're presided over by law trained per-
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sonnel. The judge is a lawyer and has the same qualifications as
a district judge and is in every way competent to handle probate
matters. Other counties are not so situated but I question flouting
the entire system since instead of doing that we could have the
legislature pass a constitutional amendment making every county
court in this state a county court of increased jurisdiction, or if
they don't want to pass an amendment, make the qualifications of
a county judge so they will all have a law trained judge.
So far as county courts of increased jurisdiction are concerned,
and I am talking praticularly to you younger men, before you vote
your approval of this committee recommendation I suggest that
you take time to reflect what is in store for you in case that is
adopted and the legislature carries out the recommendation. You
have fifteen district judges. Now, they have plenty to do as it is.
Now they suggest an additional district judge be awarded to some
districts. Every county who has a county court of increased jurisdiction relieves the court of misdemeanors. Those who do not
have increased jurisdiction, run misdemeanors through justice court.
For crimes calling for more than 30 days in jail and they plead
guilty; they don't want him laying around waiting for the district
judge, the states attorney, the sheriff and the clerk of court. Or
the district judge must so arrange his matters that he can circumvent the entire district every day or so, and that is out of the
question.
Our experience with the county court in Ransom County extends from practically statehood to the present time and I will say
from personal experience that in every instance we have had men
presiding over that court who were as competent and capable as the
men occupying the district bench. They have to have the same legal
education and the same experience and by and large the lawyers
who live in a county where there is increased jurisdiction make
use of that court. And I suggest this, before you put your blanket
endorsement on a system that is going to re-vamp the entire judicial
system of the state, take your time. I don't cast any criticism on
the committee that thinks that is the best thing; I don't think so and
I am satisfied lawyers of counties of increased jurisdiction feel the
same. There may be one or two examples where that doesn't work
out - one or two examples of inefficiency. I have not reviewed the
court system all over the state. Now there has been, as Judge
Hutchinson says, several attempts to put this system into operation
in the state. I have been opposed to it and not because of the personnel who recommend it. I don't think like they do and don't see
the way they do. I have practiced for more than fifty years such as
it is and it is my candid judgment that instead of abolishing county
courts where they have increased jurisdiction we should see to it
that. every county court has a law trained judge. There are some
other things I would like to talk about but I don't want to take up
your time. I want a record that I am opposed to that part of the
committee report which seeks to have the legislature re-vamp the
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entire court system we have gotten along with I think fairly well for
more than sixty years.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Any one else.
JUDGE HUTCHINSON: I might state that this recommendation provides of course for some changes in the constitution. It
will be then up to the legislature to re-vamp the system under that
constitutional change. No doubt it would take several years to
make the changes that the legislature might desire to make. During
those years of course the system will continue as it is now so that
this committee isn't providing for any particular system. They are
providing for constitutional change that will give the legislature
a right to make some of these changes if they see fit.
JUDGE BURTNESS: I seconded your motion. I did so with
the understanding that a constitutional amendment was required
even if not for the purpose of what Mr. Ego has recommended. If
this motion contemplates that this is an instruction to the association
to carry out precisely the setup as has been proposed I would want
to withdraw my second. I simply seconded your motion to approve
the concurrent resolution. A proposed constitutional amendment
which is required to accomplish any judicial reform in the state.
JUDGE HUTCHINSON: That's right. An amendment is
necessary in order to carry out any reform.
JUDGE BURTNESS: If you want to eliminate county courts
a constitutional amendment is necessary.
JUDGE HUTCHINSON: The constitution provides the legislature to abolish them.
JUDGE BURTNESS: I will let my second stand on the
assumption that the details will come before the association and
legislature at a later date.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Any further discussion?
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Motion carried.
We will have the report of the Criminal Law Committee by
Mr. Lee F. Brooks.
REPORT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW COMMITTEE
NORTH DAKOTA BAR ASSOCIATION
Your Committee on Criminal Law, being informed that this
is the first committee appointed to deal with this phase of the law,
is stricken with the usual stage fright of the beginner. Not only
have we no precedent, without which lawyers are lost, but we
have no backlog of files, correspondence, complaints, or what have
you! To further complicate the situation, your chairman and one
member, both prosecutors, have found themselves associated with
four defense attorneys, and the result has been a modern Tower
of Babel. However, we are able to agree on the following:
First: Your committee believes that there should be enacted
a modern "Manslaughter by Automobile" statute in this state. With
the highway death toll continuing or mounting as it has been in
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recent years, more and more manslaughter cases have resulted from
traffic accidents. Our present manslaughter statute is a relic of the
days prior to the automobile, and is more appropriate to deal with
oxen traffic. Other states have recognized this, and have enacted
modern "Manslaughter by Automobile" statutes to cover these
offenses. We strongly urge the adoption of such a statute in this
state.
Second: We are. concerned over the confusion relative to the
handling of juvenile traffic offenders. Under present law such
offenders cannot be tried in the criminal courts unless a waiver
of jurisdiction has been obtained from the juvenile court. This
procedure is not being followed in many parts of the state, and
juvenile offenders are either being tried in the criminal -courts, or
they are being turned loose rather than being taken into juvenile
court. We believe that either of these methods of handling is
wrong, and that these youths should be taken into juvenile court
to the end that their errors may be corrected; or, if this involves
too great a burden on the juvenile commissioners, that other corrective measures be devised.
Third: The attention of your committee has been directed to
a situation involving the sentences meted out by the judges of -the
criminal courts of this state. We refer to the fact that widely divergent sentences are being imposed for the same offense, where
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the cases do not
justify the divergence in sentence. We believe that this is a serious
matter, in that it may cause the layman who notices these discripancies to have a diminishing regard for our system of justice. We
recommend that the Supreme Court bold a conference of the judges
of the criminal courts, to the end that more uniform penalties, considering the circumstances, may be imposed in the various courts.
Your committee has given consideration to other matters involving the criminal law, but is not at this time prepared to make
a report or recommendation in connection therewith. These matters
will be turned over to the committee for the succeeding year.
Respectfully submitted,
J. E. Hendrickson,
Roy K. Redetzke,
Pat Milloy,
Lyle E. Huseby,
Frank Knox,
Lee F. Brooks, Chairman.
MR. BROOKS: I move the adoption of this report.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: You have heard the motion. Is
there a second?
CARROLL E. DAY: I second the motion.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Motion carried. I will entertain
a motion that the report of the Committee on Juvenile Problems be
filed.

-
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SENATOR DAY: I make the motion.
JUDGE LUNDBERG: I second the motion.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Motion carried.
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON JUVENILE PROBLEMS
The Committee on Juvenile Problems renders a report which
is in the main negative, meaning that no flaws of a serious nature
have developed to date in the Juvenile Code of this state which
require the attention of the Bar Association at the present time.
It is true that comparison with the Juvenile court machinery in
existence in other more populous states where funds for personnel
and facilities are available to a greater extent than in our own
thinly populated area is not favorable. The Committee is also
aware of criticism emanating from various sources, notably from
city police of some communities and others directly concerned with
law enforcement, to the general effect that juvenile courts tend to
ermlate the proverbial dog in the manger doing much to thwart
the enforcement of criminal laws and the maintenance of order as
related to juveniles. The Committee believes that these criticisms
arise more from a failure on the part of such law enforcement
authorities and perhaps on the part of juvenile commissioners to
understand and appreciate each others' functions and the necessity
of close cooperation between them than from any inherent weakness in the system.
The attitude of young people who are inclined to be slightly
indifferent to the law, and perhaps of their parents, exists in some
quarters that because a wrong-doer is under the age of 18 years he
may violate the law in comparative freedom, and the police and
other law enforcement agencies are powerless to interfere. Our
Juvenile Court Code lends no support to any such attitude. The
juvenile has no more right to commit a criminal act than an adult.
The only difference between the juvenile and the adult in this
respect is that the adult is taken before the regular courts of the
state for punishment as a criminal while the juvenile is, in the
language of the statute, taken before a juvenile commissioner or a
juvenile court. There is nothing in the code, as read properly,
which prevents a peace officer or police officer from arresting a
criminal who is under the age of 18. The Committee thinks that
this has not been made sufficiently clear to the law enforcement
officers of the state and it may be that the members of the bar can
assist materially in straightening out this situation by giving advice
to those concerned upon this point even though a juvenile court
judge or juvenile commissioner may not be immediately available.
The Committee feels that with a few minor exceptions the
authority vested by the law in the office of judge of the juvenile
court, who is a judge of the district court, and in the juvenile commissioner appointed by and responsible to such judge, is ample at
the present time and it is neither feasible nor desirable at the present
time to modify this.
There are two or three respects in which developments in
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recent years have left apparent lacks in the juvenile court setup.
This is especially true in relation to the handling of cases arising
from infractions of the traffic laws and the operation of motor
vehicles. There is apparently no authority anywhere at the present time for a juvenile court or a juvenile commissioner, or anyone
else, to revoke or suspend the operation of a motor vehicle operator's license, which has been issued to a juvenile. The suspension
or revocation of an operator's license for infractions of traffic laws is
directly authorized only upon a conviction. Since there can be no
conviction in a juvenile court it seems to follow that such suspension or revocation is not authorized. This has been a frequent
source of difficulty in handling cases of wilful and persistent juvenile offenders in this connection. However, the law does give the
juvenile court, which includes both the judge of the juvenile court
and the juvenile commissioner acting under him, very wide powers
for the control of young persons who are in the court, and these
powers if fully exercised tend very greatly to take the place of any
such power of absolute revocation. What is meant is that the law
expressly gives to juvenile commissioners the power to make any
temporary order for the control and restraint of a juvenile which
such juvenile commissioner may consider necessary and proper in
the particular case. He therefore has the power to forbid the
youngster to operate an automobile or motor vehicle of any kind
and it seems to follow that he may, as a necessary auxiliary power,
require the juvenile to surrender to the custody of the juvenile
commissioner or court his driver's license for such period as he
may deem necessary and appropriate.
One other apparent weakness is in connection with the power
to waive juvenile court jurisdiction in appropriate cases and refer
the whole matter back into criminal channels. The present law
appears to give this power only to the judge himself after an investigation of each particular case. Some judges have adopted as
a general policy the rule that a juvenile who is over a certain age
but still under the age of 18 who commits a violation of the traffic
laws and other laws relating to motor vehicles is automatically
subjected to waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction and may be tried
in the regular courts as if he were older, and some judges have
expressly authorized one of the juvenile commissioners to act for
them in issuing orders waiving juvenile court jurisdiction where
the judge, himself, is not immediately available. This eliminates
considerable difficulty and delay in some cases. The Committee
believes that this provision of the code should be modified so as
expressly to grant to juvenile court judges the authority to empower
one of his juvenile commissioners to act for him in his absence in
this connection.
One other source of difficulty is that the commission of a
serious traffic violation such for example as driving while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor or aggravated reckless driving
and with respect to which the facts are not in dispute, cannot be
reported to the State Highway Department or the State Highway
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Patrol for the purpose of record in connection with the issuance
of future motor vehicle operator's licenses. The law apparently
does not now permit the action of a juvenile court to be made the
basis for denying to any juvenile any of the usual rights of a
citizen. The Committee believes that this situation should be
clarified by authorizing or requiring a report to the State Highway
Department similar to the certificate of conviction which is now
required in the case of action under the laws applying to adults.
The Committee believes however that these difficulties should
be made the subject of further study and is not prepared to make
definite recommendations for amendments of or additions to the
present juvenile court code in this connection. On the whole the
Committee does not believe the situation is sufficiently urgent to
require any such action at the present time.
Respectfully submitted,
For the Committee:
Ingomar M. Oseth, Chairman.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Mr. J. H. Newton will give the
report of the Committee on Memorials.
REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON MEMORIALS
To the Bar Association of the State of North Dakota:
Your Committee on Memorials has to report that since our last
annual session Memorials have been prepared for nineteen members of the Bench and Bar of North Dakota. These memorials
have been prepared for inclusion in the Dakota Law Review.
The great majority of our departed brothers had reached or
passed the allotted age of three score and ten, which serves to
remind us that those who guided the destinies of our Association
in its infancy are fast disappearing and their places have been
taken by younger men.
Among those called was Hon. A. M. Christianson, Judge of
the Supreme Court--one who had graced the Bench for a greater
period than any other judge. Another who answered the final
summons was Hon. Aloys Wartner, a Past President of our Association.
On June 3rd of this year Memorial Services under the direction of your Committee were held at a Supreme Court Session
for Judges Christianson and Burr with a Memorial by the Bar
Association in each instance, and an eulogy for Judge Burr by
Hon. C. L. Young and for Judge Christianson by Hon. Benj. H.
Bradford.
A list of the departed members of our profession and their
North Dakota address follows:
Edward Conrad Boostrom, Lakota
E. C. Carney, Williston
A. M. Christianson, Towner
Charles Coventry, Linton
Edward B. Cox, Bismarck
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Frederick J. Graham, Ellendale
A. F. Greffenius, Valley City
Alexander Leslie, Forman
Fred E. McCurdy, Bismarck
D. Bruce McDonald, Devils Lake
Clarence E. Merrell, Fargo
Ralph C. Morton, Bismarck
Scott Rex, Grand Forks
Henry B. Senn, Rugby
Marie K. E. Stiening, Fargo
Theodore Swenseid, Marmarth
T. A. Thompson, Bismarck
Aloys Wertner, Sr., Harvey
Leon Halvorson, Minot
Respectfully submitted,
Committee on Memorials:
A. W. Aylmer
A. W. Cupler
T. I. Dahl
J. A. Hyland
Thomas C. Johnson
Joseph G. Forbes
L. R. Nostdal
J. H. Newton, Chairman
MR. NEWTON: I move that the report be adopted.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: You have heard the motion. Is
there a second?
EDGAR P. MATTSON: I second the motion.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Motion carried.
We will stand for half a minute in a tribute to these men.
(The convention stands in silence for half a minute.)
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: You recall last night there was no
objection to changing the time of the Debate on Comparative
Negligence.
SENATOR DAY: We were going to clear up our Committee
report first.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: The only reason is we have three
or four other reports, but we would be glad to take it.
SENATOR DAY: I move we clear it up right now. Mr.
President, yesterday in making this report I made a motion in
three or four parts, really 4 blanket motion. I made the motion
that the committee report be adopted by the association recommending compulsory retirement of judges, recommending a permanent chief justice and recommending the changing of the law
with respect to North Dakota Reports and added in the motion
that the Committee be commended for doing a fine job. I want
to withdraw that motion. In the conversations I have had there
seemes to be no dissent with respect to the last part so I won't
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renew that. I make a separate motion that the Committee Report
on North Dakota Reports be adopted. The Committee report
recommends that the Bar Association request the Legislature to
amend the law giving the supreme court much wider discretion
in the publication of the reports or in discontinuing such publication. I make that motion, Mr. President, and for the benefit
of those who were not here yesterday, the current issue of Volume
78 is expected to cost the state between $7500 and $7800. Recently
they have been ordering about 500 copies, making the cost about
$50 a copy. The numbers of lawyers who have been buying the
Reports have been decreased so that less than 10% buy these
North Dakota Reports. As you know a good many of those volumes are used in exchange with other parts of the country but
it is the committee's belief that it would be much cheaper to buy
all other copies than pay $50 a copy with which to make an exexchange. Actually the 500 copies that are bought are never used.
About 60 are bought by lawyers and a few are used for exchange.
This report does not recommend that publication be discontinued.
It simply suggests that the law be amended so that the supreme
court will have discretion in the matter of publishing or discontinuation.
SENATOR DUFFY: May I suggest that according to arithmetic as it was taught in law school if 500 copies cost $7,500 it
would be $15 a copy rather than $50.
SENATOR DAY: When you take into account the number
that are used it amounts to about $50-I think $49.75.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Motion carried.
SENATOR DAY: At this time I move that the part of the
Committee report bearing on the question of a permanent chief
justice be approved.
Is there any part of the report that anyone would like to have
read again?
MR. HIGGINS: I would like to have it read again. I didn't .
hear it and I don't know anything about it.
(Senator Day reads that part of the report.)
JUDGE HUTCHINSON: I second the motion.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Motion carried.
SENATOR DAY: I move that portion of the report on compulsory retirement of judges be adopted.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: You have heard the motion. Is
there a second?
PHILIP BANGS: I second the motion.
JUDGE HUTCHINSON: I would like to amend that to the
effect that voluntary retirement could be had at age 70 and 75
placed as the involuntary age.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Is there a second to that motion?
SENATOR DAY: I second the motion.
SENATOR DAY: There is some misunderstanding on the
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part of the members on whether this would affect judges already
sitting.
SENATOR DAY: It wasn't contemplated. Probably it would
not be considered by the legislature as applying to judges now in
office. I might say while I am here that business in this country
has recognized the need of compulsory retirement. Sears Roebuck
has recognized this for a long time. Many have it at 65. Of
Of course there are exceptions but in business it is recognized that
65 or 70 is a fair point for retirement.
JUDGE BURTNESS: If it is a good thing why wouldn't it
apply to those sitting. I think by making that statement you are
weakening your position. If retirement at 70 is a good thing certainly it should apply as soon as legislation is enacted. Surely if
I were a member of the legislature I certainly would construe that
as applying.
SENATOR DAY: I agree. As far as I am concerned I think
it should apply immediately. However, from a practical standpoint
it is difficult to keep personalities out and the thinking on an
abstract basis. Many people are loyal to some good judge in
their community and take a personal interest in some good friend
who is probably very well qualified. I doubt if we can persuade
the legislature to adopt the law without that exclusion.
JUDGE BURTNESS: It is then the intent of the recommendation that it be applied immediately.
SENATOR DAY: No, it is not. We have gone on record
here. This report says nothing about it applying to judges now
in office. Considered here are some amendments in the retirement
law.
(He then reads from the report.)
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Now, the question is upon the
amendment offered by Judge Hutchinson that retirement be voluntary at 70 and mandatory at 75. Is there any question on that
amendment?
The chair is in doubt. All in favor please rise. The amendment is lost. Now, the question is on the original report. Does
anyone care to be heard?
MR. HIGGINS: I move that this does not apply to judges now
sitting. I concede the logic of Judge Burtness.
JOHN HJELLUM: I second the motion.
JOHN LORD: Does that amendment mean that it does
not apply to judges now sitting and they can run for another term?
MR. HIGGINS: I will change that-it shall not apply to
terms of judges now sitting. Present terms.
MR. HJELLUM: I second that motion.
LYNN SHERMAN: Is that intended for both retirement
provisions and benefits or just retirement?
SENATOR DAY: Retirement.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Motion carried.
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SENATOR DUFFY: I just want to notify you at this time
that since I shall be sitting at least for one session of the legislature I shall bitterly oppose the motion as it is now before this
assembly. I just want to tell you I recognize the fact that industry does not have its limitations. I happen to be a director of
one organization where retirement for their executive officers is
65 but permits the directors to continue until 70 on the assumption
that brains do not deteriorate quite as fast as the arms and legs
do. Due to the fact that judges only need their brain they do
continue longer. Baseball players' legs give out at about 35. Early
retirement is for someone engaged in physical exertion and any
limitation on the future judges would imply judges who are going
to succeed those now on the Bench are going to be of a less vigorous mental caliber than those now on the bench. Judges appointed
during the next period will have; the same mental vigor at 75 as
those now have and I think they have discovered that in industry
and are trying to make use of those people.
PESIDENT JOHNSON: Any further discussion.
JUDGE BURTNESS: Of course I would be tickled if I could
retire on a very, very nice retirement pension. Arbitrarily I am
inclined to think the association should try to be as practical as
possible and I want to discuss my views on one other feature, the
retirement feature. I don't believe there is a possibility in the
world to get the legislature to pass a law that will give a judge
75% for only 10 years or 50% for only 5 years and in order to
hold to security the request should be more modest. I think too
that a formula should be established so that there is a substantial
difference between retirement pay to a judge who gave 30 years
of service as compared to one who gave 10 years. You can readily
see these remarkes are not selfish-they are opposed to my own
interests. I don't expect to have more than eight years service
but if a retirement plan should be provided for me I think it
would be ridiculous to expect 8/10ths of 75% of a salary. I think
it is going to have to be practical and I want to say to the Legislative Committee that if they want to be practical, put something
over on the legislature and public interests to try to adopt a more
reasonable formula and one that would appeal to members of
the legislature and the people of the state.
PESIDENT JOHNSON: Anyone else.
T. H. THORSON: A point of order. I was wondering if they
had considered the permanent retirement of members of the bench
who were permanently disabled.
SENATOR DAY: That is already in the law at least for the
balance of the term they are elected for. Continue to draw full
pay.
MR. THORSON: Would be in the new law.
SENATOR DAY: If after that term they qualify.
MR. LORD: I probably missed some of the discussion but
I wonder if consideration had been given to the fact that under
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the federal system retired judges are still reserve judges and when
need arises they can be called for service and as I see it they have
a good point for the program. In many parts of the state reserve
judges would be of great benefit and while we might feel that
steady service on the bench day after day was too rigorous, if
those judges were callable they could in a great many cases assist
in disposition of congested dockets and this might be an added
selling point. It might be considered that when they were called
some pay arrangements could be made. That is only a suggestion
but I suggest it as a point in the program.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Any further discussion?,
MR. HJELLUM: The reasoning of Judge Burtness appeals
to me as being rather sound. Has the committee considered this
and I would like to hear what the committee has to spy about this.
SENATOR DAY: Mr. President, I am of the opinion that the
committee's suggestion is not impractical. Those of you who have
followed the course of legislation on the matter of retirement and
salaries must be aware of the fact that the legislative attitude has
changed a great deal. I can recall the first time I sat on the judiciary committee and retirement was mentioned. If you could have
heard the reactions in the next five minutes you would have
thought we would have no retirement in North Dakota. The attitude has changed. Now when you review the states who do have
compulsory retirement as listed in the report you will find that
10 years is not uncommon and 3/4 pay is not unusual. In fact,
New Jersey has in force exactly what we are proposing. Some
have 65. South Carolina has 65; Vermont has 70; Connecticut has
70; Idaho has 70; Louisiana has 65; Maryland has 60; Missouri 65;
3/4 is not un-common. Some have 2/3 and 1/2 and 3/4 is in effect
in several.
MR. NILLES: No one has seen this report. The entire assembly is not here. I don't think sufficient thought or reflection
has been given to it. I move it be recommended to the committee
for further study and report at the next annual meeting.
SENATOR DAY: I second the motion.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: The motion is lost. All in favor
of adopting the report say aye.
(Question put and motion carried.)
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Motion carried.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: I now present to you Mr. Ralph
Beede, who will preside at the discussion on Comparative Negligence.
MR. BEEDE: We will take a little time and say that this
part of the program in large measure is due to a motion that
was made by Judge Burtness at our last convention. At that time,
as you will remember, the question had come up on the recommendation to adopt the doctrine of comparative negligence in the
state, and Judge Burtness moved that at the next convention a

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

full session should be devoted to a debate on comparatve negligence. And I think his motion, if it was not directly contained in
the motion, suggested that some speakers from outside the state
who are experts on comparative negligence be invited into the
state to address the members of our convention. Now for various
reasons of expense it was suggested that that would not be practical. Our full session has now dropped down to hardly an hour
and a half.
We are going to do the best we can. Inasmuch as the proponents of the rule more or less have the burden we are going
to allow the main speaker for the rule the privilege of opening
and closing. Before going further I would like to introduce the
members on our panel. They are:
Lewis H. Oehlert
P. W. Lanier, Jr.

J. F. X. Conmy
Philip B. Vogel
Mr. Lanier has consented to take the burden of being the main
speaker for the rule or doctrine, and Mr. Oehlert will assume
the burden of being the main speaker against it or in favor of
the status quo. I am going to-I would like to give them more
time-I am going to give them at least 30 minutes each because
we want to hear from the other two members of the committee
and we will like to have some discussion from the floor, and we
will give Mr. Lanier as much of that 30 minutes for his opening
talk as he wishes and then after Mr. Oehlert has spoken, allow
Mr. Lanier the balance of his 30 minutes after his concluding
remarks.
MR. LANIER: Mr. President, members of the Bar, I was
originally contemplating taking more time and going into a more
complete discussion of the pros and cons of Comparative Negligence than I will take. In fact, I will be very brief.
To be entirely frank and honest, I am not angry but must
point out the undeniable fact that this meeting has died. It is
late Saturday morning at the very tail end of all possible business
of the State Bar Association. Members of the Bar have had a long
week and have justifiably become tired and left for home. This
meeting has reached the position that we don't even have a quorum of the Bar present.
I am sure that by now Judge Burtness does not even recognize as vaguely familiar the motion he made at the last annual
Bar meeting which was passed unanimously. That motion was
that Comparative Negligence be the major order of business and
topic at the 1954 Bar Associaton Convention, and that outside
speakers be imported to present both sides of the case. The entire
question now being relegated to the position of something that
must be gotten over with, I will only discuss the general theory
of the Doctrine of Comparative Negligence.
If the rest of you are unfamiliar with the general theory as I
when I started my research, then I do feel it is necessary to at least
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state what it is that the proponents of Comparative Negligence are
in favor of or against.
The Doctrine of Contributory Negligence is a hold-over from
horse and buggy days before the automobile and before the cases
that arose out of the use of automobiles. It is a hold-over which
has been tried and proved wanting. Comparative Negligence is
only the putting into actual form the practical application which
you, as lawyers, have already discovered that juries really apply.
Juries apply this doctrine almost every time you try a lawsuit to
a jury. If you have a client who is 40% at fault in the accident,
and 'the Defendant is 60% at fault, you and I know by practical
experience, instructions to the contrary, the jury applies the Doctrine of Comparative Negligence and gives you about 60% of what
your damages are actually worth.
Before trial, every lawyer knows that when dealing with insurance company lawyers in the attempted settlement of claims,
opposing counsel sit down and settle the claims on the Doctrine
of Comparatve Negligence. One side takes into consideration the
fact that his client has a possibility of losing the lawsuit. The
Defendant may be more negligent by a large degree, but in some
way your client has been contributorily negligent. Defense counsel knows that he might get a dismissal of the case at the hands
of the jury; on the other hand he might get a much larger verdict
sustained than the figure at which he could settle. Every single
time we, as lawyers, settle a lawsuit we are applying the Doctrine
of Comparative Negligence.
Six states have adopted the Comparative Negligence Doctrine.
It means only this-that a jury will get an instruction from the
Court, which it can follow, that this plaintiff who now presents
his case to this jury may or may not be negligent and that this
defendant may or may not be negligent. The jury will be instructed
that it may find as a matter of fact from all the evidence that both
plaintiff and defendant are a certain per cent at fault, that they may
evaluate the damages totally caused by the accident and apportion
to the defendant by money judgment the percentages of those
damages he must pay through his per cent of liability.
Various states such as Wisconsin, Missssippi, Louisiana, and
Nebraska have adopted the Doctrine, and the Bar Associations of
California and New York have recommended its adopton.
You and I may decide what our particular statutes should be.
I am not now making any recommendations as to the particular
type or form of statute to follow. The need for the statute to
injured parties in this day of high speed, congested traffic, is what
is important, not how it affects the compensation of you and me
as lawyers. It is a question of whether or not society as a whole
and injured litigants themselves are entitled to a doctrine of Comparative Negligence.
I think we need go no further than the law of our own state
to see the crying need for the Doctrine of Comparative Negligence
and the harshness of the Doctrine of Contributory Negligence.
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I personally have seen an instruction on Contributory Negligence
be affirmed three times in this state, which rather conclusively
proves my contention.
The instruction is as follows: "You are instructed that the
plaintiff cannot recover if you find that the plaintiff is guilty of
any negligence, even the slightest contributing to the accident in
the smallest degree."
As lawyers, you and I know that if juries applied this instruction to the facts before them, it would eliminate any possibility
of recovery in 99% of all personal injury cases and a grossly and
wantonly negligent defendant, operating an automobile in total
disregard of the rights and safeties of others, would be free from
the consequences of his act.
I might also add here that I do not believe that the average
good defense attorney, representing liability insurance companies,
are themselves opposed to the Doctrine of Comparative Negligence
because they recognize, as a practical matter, that juries are applying the Doctrine anyway. You know and I know that the strongest
voice raised in opposition to the Doctrine is that of the railroads.
Let's face it-they have built up a doctrine of Contributory Negligence to the point where I will challenge a lawyer to bring a case
today in North Dakota, where we practice, of a crossing accident,
representing the driver of the automobile for his injuries or death,
reach a verdict for the plaintiff, and have it stand up on appeal.
It can't be done. Railroad crossing law has built up such a series
of "Stop, Look and Listen" decisions that they would have to
deliberately and premeditatedly camouflage a crossing to free a
driving plaintiff from the application of the legal Doctrine of Contributory Negligence.
This is not a question of where we as individuals stand in our
past thinking; it is only a question of bringing your law up to date
with the times so that your client, your society, can have a commonsense, practical doctrine that will penalize the most guilty and,
at the same time, not allow the partially guilty plaintiff to recover
all of his damages at the expense of a partially guilty defendant.
I am going no further into detail. This Convention has been relegated to a point where the Convention is' over and the majority
of the lawyers have gone home. I note that all members of the
railroad firms of this state and most members of the firms that
represent large insurance companies are still present. Nevertheless, I now move that this Bar Convention of the North Dakota
State Bar Association recommend to the North Dakota State Legislature the adoption of a sound Comparative Negligence Statute.
Thank you.
MR. BEEDE: I believe, Mr. Lanier, that motion could be
made after the debate is over.
MR. LANIER: As long as it stays on the record that is all
I want.
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MR. BEEDE: We will next hear from Mr. Oehlert, who has
30 minutes to present the con side of the argument.
MR. OEHLERT: Mr. President, members of the North Dakota Bar Association,, ladies and gentlemen:
From some statements that I have heard, I have detected a
feeling of licentiousness with some members of the Bar as it relates to Mr. Lanier's and my statements to be made this morning.
Figuratively speaking, I think some of the fellows here assembled,
particularly Mr. Bangs, would like to see some blood splattered
around this platform this morning. I might say in favor of Mr.
Lanier and myself that we are at least here giving our own blood,
and I trust that many others will make themselves beard on the
subject of "Comparative Negligence."
After having heard Mr. Lanier in his discussion of comparative negligence, I am reminded of a little story concerning the
Devils Lake Indian Reservation. It seems that a young Indian
lad had become enamored over an Indian maid, and on his various
visits with her, he had noticed a very sweet aroma of perfume
about her person. The Indian lad wasn't very familiar with the
English language or American words or customs, but he did know
that drug stores usually sold the sweet aroma that he had detected
about the person of the Indian maid. He, therefore, betook himself to a drug store in Devils Lake and attempted to make his
wants known in the procurement of some of the sweet aroma
to be given to his Indian friend. After some efforts to make his'
wants known to the drugstore clerk, he was without success.
Finally he blurted out: "Me want heap sweet wind." I submit
that such statement could well apply to Mr. Lanier's sort of argument made here this morning. Is that enough blood?
To be serious and as professional people, I am sure that in
our quiet thinking we want to do what is best for the people and
our profession, and thus I am sure that both Mr. Lanier and I
expect you to consider the matter pertaining to comparative negligence and this discussion on its merits.
You will observe that I have about a seventeen page paper
here. The little time granted will not permit me to go into all
of the problem resulting from the application of the doctrine of
comparative negligence. I shall, therefore, try to restrict this
statement to fit the time allotted.
1.

INTRODUCTORY

It is submitted at the outset that if a statute is to be enacted
in North Dakota introducing some phase of the doctrine of comparative negligence, it ought to come into being because it will
be good for the people and because they want it after they are
fully enlightened on the general subject.
We have heard much in recent years about the doctrine of
comparative negligence which is regarded by those who sponsor
it for the most part as a device to correct certain alleged evils, but
in looking behind the scene, it is significant to note that the advocates for the doctrine, in almost every case, have a self-serving
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interest. Virtually every negligence case is handled by plaintiff's
attorney on a contingent fee basis. The most common contract
gives to the lawyer at least a 331/3 per cent share of the amount
of the recovery. This contingency fee practice is, in a way, a
benevolent one and often reflects a good deal of sporting blood
and a charitable impulse on the part of lawyers. Thus, it is
obvious that to the lawyer it would be a boon of no mean proportions if, although his client bore ninety per cent of the blame
for an accident, yet recovery on a ten per cent basis at the sole
discretion of the jury could still be had. Moreover, if by legislation
much of the hazard could be taken out of the negligence case
business for the lawyer, and if he could be reasonably sure of
some recovery every time he went into court for a plaintiff in such
case, the proposed doctrine would be significantly lucrative for
lawyers. Thus, we find many of the proponents of the doctrine
generally to be those to benefit by the recovery of damages in
civil actions, and of course, the attorneys whose practice is substantially confined to the prosecution of such cases. It is at least
interesting to note that those lawyers who are so associated with
the National Association of Claimants' Compensation Attorneys,
commonly called the NACCA, are most actively engaged in
furthering the adoption of such a doctrine throughout the United
States. Such Association is carrying on a vigorous, intelligent and
effective propaganda campaign on a national scale, the purpose of
which is to obtain higher awards to injured claimants by means
of favorable legislation. The conclusion seems inescapable that
those proposing this form of legislation expect to benefit by it, and
thus, it is equally inescapable that the ultimate cost to society
will be increased.
I am sure that most all lawyers Will agree that the legal profession is in serious need for informative and good will publicity
with the public. I am wondering whether the adoption of a comparative negligence law in the State of North Dakota would lend
further suspicion of lawyers in view of the prevalent practice of
contingent fees in the handling of negligence cases. Thus, it is
in a way very unfortunate that the legal profession, to which
laymen ought to be able to look for impartial guidance in the
matter, has a big stake in the project and a self-serving pecuniary
motive in advocating it. It is, therefore, submitted that this fact
of private interest of lawyers ought frankly to be disclosed to the
public and to the legislature.
II. HISTORY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
To have a reasonable understanding of the general doctrine
of comparative negligence, it is necessary to have some understanding of the common law doctrine of contributory negligence
and the manner in which it functions. Of course, it is trite to say
to a group of learned and distinguished lawyers that at common
law, contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff was a
complete bar to his cause of action based on the negligence of the
defendant. My reading indicates that contributory negligence,
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as it is known to the common law of England and the United
States, dates back to the Thirteenth Century. It proceeds upon
the theory that a man cannot profit from his own negligence. Thus,
where a plaintiff, who sustains injury as a result of the accident,
contributed in any way proximately to his own injury-whether
by malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance-he is barred under
this doctrine from recovering from a defendant whose negligence
also contributed to the plaintiff's injury. The doctrine of contributory negligence was specifically laid down in England in the case
of Butterfield v. Forester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926.
The proponents of comparative negligence in effect argue that
the high-sounding moral principle furnished by the rule of contributory negligence, while it can be readily accepted on the face,
gives rise to certain inequities in its practical application in certain
circumstances. Thus, the advocates of comparative negligence argue
that a plaintiff who sustains injury because of the negligence of a
defendant, who may have contributed as much as 99 percent of
the cause of the injury to the plaintiff, is precluded from recovering for his injuries because of his slight contribution of one percent to his own injury. It is submitted that such contention is
more honored in the technical approach than in the practical
operation of the doctrines, for from a practical standpoint one
seldom sees a plaintiff defeated in Court where the circumstances
are as aggravated as those indicated above. It is my observation
that from a practical standpoint, juries do not deal in trifles. As
a matter of fact, if the negligence of the defendant is substantially
greater than that of the plaintiff, there is seldom a finding of any
negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and thus the plaintiff is
permitted to recover and usually without any reduction in the
amount of his damages.
III. TYPES OF - STATUTES INVOLVING COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
Along the legislative line, in addition to campaigns for increased benefits of all kinds and favorable procedural changes and
increased fees for claimants' attorneys before various boards and
commissions, one of the principal organized efforts of the NACCA
is to eliminate the defense of contributory negligence and substitute something in the nature of the so-called comparative negligence law in its place. Five states, namely WISCONSIN,
NEBRASKA, SOUTH DAKOTA, GEORGIA and MISSISSIPPI,'
now have varying forms of comparative negligence laws. My reading also indicates that in 1951 eighteen states had comparative
negligence laws introduced in the State Legislature. I understand
none have been adopted as yet, and I make particular reference
to the State of California where a very great amount of work was
done by the advocates of comparative negligence, and to date
they have been unsuccessful in persuading the California Legislature to adopt such a law. I am indirectly advised that two very
thoughtful articles written by The Honorable William J. Palmer,
Judge of the Supreme Court of Los Angeles, California, largely
thwarted the attempt to stampede the State of California in adopt-
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ing a comparative negligence law. In other words, it apparently
was his well reasoned literary effort that put the "STOP - LOOK AND LISTEN" sign on the advocates of comparative negligence
ir California which comprised principally the lawyers associated
in the NACCA.
It would be impossible, within the scope of my allotted time
to discuss in detail the decisions of the five states named which
have adopted some phase of a comparative negligence law. However, it might be well to take a brief look at the statutes themselves and briefly consider the results which they have produced
in the respective states.
Thus, the comparative negligence law of GEORGIA provides:
"If the plaintiff by ordinary care could have avoided the
consequences to himself caused by the defendant's negligence
he is not entitled to recover. In other cases the defendant
is not relieved, although the plaintiff may in some way have
contributed to the injury sustained."
It will be noted that the statute itself prescribes a rule for
determination of the issue of liability but says nothing about the
apportionment of damages based on a comparison of the negligence of the plaintiff with that of the defendant. However, the
Supreme Court of Georgia has taken care of this omission by
construction. The early Georgia cases held that recovery is defeated only when the contributory negligence of the plaintiff
amounts to a failure to exercise ordinary care and that "in other
cases" there must be a comparison of the negligence of the respective parties and a diminution of recovery as the facts may warrant.
Rollerstone v. T. Cassirer and Company, 3 Ga. App. 161, 59 S.E.
442 (1907).) At first blush these general statements seemed
incomprehensible to me because, at least under our law, unless
some act or omission on the part of the plaintiff amounted to a
failure to exercise ordinary care he would not be considered negligent at all. Other cases, however, clear this point up. The plaintiff's duty to exercise care did not arise until he knew, or in the
exercise of ordinary care ought to have known, of the negligence
of the defendant, or until such negligence was apparent or by -the
exercise of ordinary care should have been apparent. Wilson v.
Pollard, 4 NEGLIGENCE CASES 225, 63 Ga. App. 23, 10 S.E.
(2d) 407 (1940).)
In NEBRASKA, we find the following statute relating to comparative negligence:
"In all actions brought to recover damages for injuries to
a person or to his property caused by the negligence of another, the fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery when the contributory negligence of the plaintiff was slight and the negligence of defendant was gross in comparison, but the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall be considered by the
jury in the mitigation of damages in proportion to the amount
of contributory negligence attributable to the plaintiff; and all

BENCH AND BAR

questions of negligence and contributory negligence shall be
for the jury."
One of the leading, and more recent cases construing the
Nebraska statute is Pierson v. Jensen et al., 29 AUTOMOBILE
CASES 1055, 150 Neb. 86, 33 N.W. (2d) 462 (1948).
The SOUTH DAKOTA law of comparative negligence is
modeled on the Nebraska statute, and the construction of the
various aspects of the statute by the Supreme Court of South
Dakota is substantially in line with the Nebraska decisions. But
compare Friese v. Gulbrandson, 17 AUTOMOBILE CASES 1156,
69 S.D. 179, 8 N.W. (2d) 438 (1943).
In WISCONSIN, the law relative to comparative negligence
provides:
"Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action
by any person or his legal representative to recover damages
for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or
property, if such negligence was not as great as the negligence
of the person against whom recovery is sought, but damages
allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount
of negligence attributable to the person recovering."
There is nothing remarkable, by way of novel, strained or
unusual construction of the statute by the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin, in the decisions we have reviewed. The court simply
takes this unambiguous statute as it finds it and enforces it according to its terms. Although it adheres to the rule that the
comparison of the negligence of plaintiff with that of the defendant is peculiarly written within the province of the jury, it
has not hesitated to direct verdicts where the proof is such that
the minds of reasonable men could not differ as to the correct
conclusions. Dinger v. McCoy Transportation Company, et al.,
251 Wis. 265, 29 N.W. (2d) 60, 37 N.W. (2d) 26 (1947); Crawley
v. Hill et al., 30 AUTOMOBILE CASES 368, 253 Wis. 294, 34
N.W. (2d) 123 (1948); Klosse v. American Indemnity Company et
al., 30 AUTOMOBILE CASES 716, 253 Wis. 476, 34 N.W. (2d)
816 (1948).
The State of MISSISSIPPI has had a comparative negligence
statute for 44 years. In 1910 the legislature adopted such a statute
limited to personal injury and death cases. In 1920 it was amended
to include property damage cases. The statute, Section 1454,
Mississippi Code of 1942, presently in effect, -provides:
"In all actions hereafter brought for personal injuries, or
where such injuries have resulted in death, or for injury to
property, the fact that the person injured, or the owner of the
property, or person having control over the property may have
been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery,
but damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to
the amount of negligence attributable to the person injured,
or the owner of the property, or the person having control over
the property."
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Section 1455, Mississippi Code of 1942, originally Section 2 of
the above statute, provides:
"All questions of negligence and contributory negligence
shall be for the jury to determine."
Section 1454 is constitutional. Section 1455 does not confer
judicial power on the jury; the court may, and should, direct verdicts in proper cases. Natchez & Southern Railroad Company v.
Crawford, 99 Miss. 697, 55 So. 596 (1911).
The difference between the Mississippi statute and those of
the other four states mentioned become immediately apparent.
Thus, in Mississippi, if the defendant was guilty of any negligence
at all, however slight, causing or contributing to the plaintiff's
injury, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover no matter how gross
his own negligence might have been. The sole purpose of comparing the negligence of the plaintiff with that of the defendait
in Mississippi is not to resolve the issue of liability, which is one
of the purposes of the other four states, but to determine the percentage of his total damages that the plaintiff is entitled to recover.
Mathematical demonstration of how the Mississippi statute operates is well illustrated by Illinois Central Railroad Company v.
Humphreys (1935) 174 Miss. 459, 164 So. 22, 102 A.L.R. 549.
A comparison of the statutes from the five states mentioned
make it obvious that the statute of Wisconsin is the least obnoxious
to those who are found in the camp of the cons relative to the
doctrine of comparative negligence.
IV.

CONCLUSIONS

ON AND

REASONS AGAINST

THE ADOPTION OF A

COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE LAW IN NORTH DAKOTA

I have assumed all along that lawyers legitimately and ethically may advocate a law of comparative negligence, and I would
be among the first and last to champion their right to do so, but let
us have no maudlin pretention that sympathy for their clients
abides only in the breasts of those lawyers who, in admirable
sporting spirit and sometimes from sheer. benevolence, undertake
to prosecute the claims of stricken persons on a contingency basis.
Society may have sharp differences of opinion as to how the
sympathy we feel for persons in distress and need, whether victims
of accidents or not, can be expressed and made effective most
promptly, wisely and justly. Thus, for example, there are those
among us who believe and practice expressing their sympathy
with their own money, and there are others who uniformly advocate expressing their sympathy with other people's money. Oddly
enough, the former are nearly always labeled conservatives.
whereas the latter, whose approach is really quite ancient, always
regard themselves as liberals-indeed, they sincerely mean to be
liberal-but with other people's money.
From my very limited experience in the reading of cases and
articles written by other eminent authorities, one of whom is The
Honorable William J. Palmer, Judge of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, California, I have arrived at the following con-
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clusions and reasons, which, I submit, should persuade one to be
against the adoption of a comparative negligence law in North
Dakota:
(1)
Whereas, some self-serving interests have advanced the
high-sounding principle that inherent inequities exist in the contributory negligence doctrine and some action should be taken
to alleviate this situation, it appears almost conclusive from a
survey of the laws of those states which have attempted to correct
the situation that they have created collateral problems and inequities which are perhaps greater than those sought to be cured.
The very complex nature of the subject itself suggests that the
mechanisms of its operation must of consequence be complex.
(2) The adoption of comparative negligence lessens the
control of the courts over verdicts, throwing them still wider open
to effects of possible jury prejudices, sympathy and the -like. It
gets further away from any established rules of law applied by
the Court. It takes us one step further from the concept of the
constitutional guaranties and protection which we have heretofore
enjoyed. It takes us another step further on the road to a so-called
"people's court" making it that much easier for one to be mulcted
in damages on the grounds that a jury may not like the ancestry,
race or religion, the politics, the occupation or status of the de-fendant.
(3) Comparative negligence, as a general rule of law, has.
been tried before in states which do not now apply it. In Kansas,
for a considerable period of time in the 19th Century, a plaintiff
was permitted to recover if his negligence -was slight and the
defendant's was gross, or if his negligence was remote and the
defendant's direct. In other words, Kansas used a form of what
is now the Nebraska rule. The doctrine was found to be undesirable in application, and in 1883 it was abandoned in that state
and repeated efforts to revive it there have failed. The State of
Illinois adopted comparative negligence as a rule of court immediately after the Civil War. In that state, if the plaintiff's negligence was slight and defendant's gross, the plaintiff was permitted
to recover all his loss. Again, the rule was found to be unworkable
and unjust in application and in 1894 was abandoned. Strong efforts, continuing up to the present, to revive the rule in Illinois
have failed. Louisiana has had for many years a statute on its
books (Article 2323 of the La. Code) which seems to permit the
general application of the comparative negligence rule. Despite
the statute's existence, the Louisiana courts have consistently refused to adopt the rule in practice.
(4) The adoption of a comparative negligence act requires
a rather thorough review of the substantive and procedural codes
so as to determine whether such an act is in conflict with other
laws. Thus, some consideration must of necessity be given to the
law of joint and several liability, the right of contribution between
joint tortfeasors, the right of the defendant to counterclaim or
crosscomplain in the same action so as to prevent a circuity of
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actions. Moreover, the laws relating to the use of the general or
special verdict, as the case may be, along with the Guest Statute,
and any other laws which may appear to be in conflict or which,
in any event, may require revision in order to obtain the desired
results, must be reviewed.
(5) Under comparative negligence statutes, litigation is immediately invited and is increased, as the plaintiff has a definite advantage in being in the position of the plaintiff, for he can recover
in such cases if it can be shown that the defendant was negligent
at all.
(6) It is also possible under certain statutes for the defendant, after termination of the litigation against him, to file a completely new suit against the plaintiff and to recover for his damages,
diminished by that percentage of negligence which the defendant
contributed to the whole. This gives rise to double litigation,
double counsel fees, costs and double recovery, all of which must
be met by the parties litigant.
(7)
Application of the doctrine of comparative negligence
tends to place a nuisance value on practically every claim because
it destroys the otherwise effective argument, when true, that the
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, which is an absolute bar to his recovery. Thus, the operators of vehicles or their
insurers, must entertain more and more nuisance value settlements, the price of which tends to increase because of the better
opportunity the plaintiff has to prevail in a lawsuit. Society ultimately pays these claims in one way or another. Where the defendants are insured, a study of the rates of a typical insurance
company shows the following comparisons based on automobile
insurance and a private passenger car with basic limits of $5,000.00
and $10,000.00 personal injury coverage and $5,000.00 public liability. Thus, the rate in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, with a population
of approximately 587,000 is $41.50. This is 17 per cent above the
rate at Cleveland, Ohio, with a population of 878,000, and 22
per cent above the rate at Washington, D. C. with a population
of 663,000.
(8) The adoption of a comparative negligence law is believed to be one of the first steps toward the adoption of a general compensation law in negligence cases to be administered along
the lines of a Workmen's Compensation Act. An article entitled
"LET'S COMPENSATE -NOT
LITIGATE" is already to be
found in 80 N. Dak. L. Rev. 20.
(9)
There is another aspect of a comparative negligence
law which should be considered by members of the Bar. Your
clients are continually asking you for your opinion as to liability
in negligence cases. Under such a statute, the group of cases in
which the members of the Bar must confess that they can make
no prediction or give no assurance is greatly enlarged because you
have eliminated those cases where contributory negligence, as a
matter of law, is a defense. You must, therefore, more often tell
your client that, in your opinion, it would be a question of fact
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:for a jury, and, of course, no one can tell what a jury will do.
Such opinions do not usually satisfy clients, and they feel that they
are not getting the advice and information to which they are entitled. Let us not enlarge the field of speculation and conjecture
referred to.
(10)
In considering comparative negligence, one cannot
proceed upon the theory that we will change our basic law by
"passing a law" without giving exhaustive study to the problem.
Unfortunately, proponents of comparative negligence in many
states, including the State of California, have merely proceeded
upon the theory that the alleged inequities of the contributory
negligence doctrine can be quickly overcome by the passing of a
law. It is also unfortunate that many proponents of the doctrine
of comparative negligence have little understanding of it and have
given little or no time to the study of it. It is another example of
a little knowledge being worse than no knowledge at all, as the
acceptance of such a principle in our law must be preceded by a
great deal of caution, study and ultimate understanding. It appears
that such has not been the situation in some of the jurisdictions
which have already adopted a phase of comparative negligence,
and where it seems that the proponents of such a law have, in
effect, stampeded the legislature, with the ultimate objective in
mind of destroying the doctrine of contributory negligence for
pecuniary reasons of the advocates of comparative negligence.
(11)
The law of contributory negligence is one of several
rules that stem from a basic disciplinary policy, attitude and dignity of our jurisprudence. It is a policy that both reflects and
contributes to the moral fibre of a people, that provides disciplinary measures, without the necessity of criminal actions, for certain
wrong doing; that keeps in the foreground for the attention of
all concerned, standards of conduct known to be necessary to the
preservation of a decent civilization. For example, this juristic
policy says:
"If you, yourself, have broken a contract, one of your penalties is that you may not recover damages for a breach by
another. Even if we were able to compare the seriousness and
effect of your breach against that of the other party, we
would feel that our courts ought not to be burdened with
the claims of one contract breaker against another."
In other words, even the members of the NACCA are not advocating a comparative breach of contract law.
The same policy says that he who comes into equity must
come with clean hands. The same disciplinary principle announces
generally that a person may be estopped by his own conduct from
complaining of the conduct of another. And from this same underlying conception of social discipline came the law of contributory
negligence which says to a guilty plaintiff:
"You, too, violated the rules, and unnecessarily endangered
your own safety, and possibly that of others. We leave you
where we found you.
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(12)
If we are going to base the passage of a comparative
negligence law on humanitarian principles as distinct from moral
principles, then we must make ready for the ultimate intrusion of
another board or bureau to administer a general compensation law
in general negligence cases probably patterned after the workmen's Compensation Law.
Aside from the fact that such a law would undoubtedly be of
dubious constitutionality, I submit that the humitarian argument
of the proponents of comparative negligence rightly falls outside of
the field or realm of jurisprudence. In other words, comparative
negligence requires us to confront a question that lies within the
realm of personal sympathy and does not raise a question of
justice. Under what circumstances is it just that we should compel
one person to pay money to another, to whom the former has no
contractual obligation? When, in the field of jurisprudence, we
undertake to tell another person what he ought to do, we are
dealing, so far as he is concerned, with a question of justice, not
of sympathy, regardless of the amount of sympathy we may have
for the victim of his conduct and regardless of whether or not
we may be moved to temper justice with mercy. It is only when
we contemplate what we ourselves ought or wish to do that we
may give play to our personal sympathy and permit it to be a
factor of decision. In a nutshell, it is submitted that comparative
negligence gets into the field of sympathy or so-called humitarianism, which, as a matter of long historical precedent, is not a
proper subject for jurisprudence.
(18) As a general summary, I quote from the article entitled "LET US BE FRANK ABOUT COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE" by The Honorable William J. Palmer, Judue of the
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California, and found in
the November, 1952, issue of the Los Angeles Bar Bulletin as
follows:
"The argument for a mathematical apportionment of liability falsely assumes the possiblity of mathematical pro-rating
of blame. Sometimes the trier of fact, in good judgment and
conscience, after hearing the evidence in a negligence case,
can say: "Although both parties were at fault and both contributed in some degree to causing the accident, I am satisfied that the chief, major cause of the accident was the negligence of ...."
"And sometimes the trier, in equally good judgment and
conscience, can say: 'I am satisfied that both parties were
equally at fault, or virtually so, and that both must bear substantially the same blame for the accident.'
"But to go beyond such broad observations and to endeavor
to apportion in precise percentages the blame for an accident,
is to attempt to apply mathematics to a situation that does
not admit of mathematical division oil appraisal;it is to venture into a field of pure guesswork or into what is worse, a
field of caprice and arbitrariness.
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"Finally, the argument for a moral-mathematical proration
of liability overlooks the significant fact pointed out previously,
that in nearly all, if not all, true cases of contributory negligence, plaintiff would have avoided the accident if he had
exercised ordinary care.
"No one yet has expressed or even conceived a reason why
John Jones, who was chiefly to blame for an accident that
would not have happened if he had exercised only ordinary
care, should have a cause of action against anyone else involved in the accident."
V.

CONCLUSION

It is submitted, that while lawyers should always be openminded in assisting in the changing of laws that will be for the
betterment of the people, yet, as it relates to comparative negligence, it would seem better if both lawyers and courts would
strive to increase their skill in using the tools provided in our present basic law of negligence, rather than be everlastingly tinkering
with our substantive law that has proved workable over several
centuries.
In this connection it is noteworthy to call attention to the fact
that one of the prime proponents for a comparative negligence
law in California in writing admitted that over 95 per cent of all
negligence claims are being settled before a decision by a court
or a jury even under the contributory negligence doctrine and
without the aid of a comparative negligence law. (See the article
entitled "LET US ALL BE FRANK ABOUT COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE" written by Richard L. Oliver, a member of the
NACCA appearing in the January, 1953, issue of the Los Angeles
Bar Bulletin).
Let us note with fitting appreciation that the settlement of
95 per cent of all claims on an admittedly fair basis is, in itself, a
mighty achievement to the credit of the regime of the law of
general negligence and contributory negligence as it presently
exists in the great majority of states. And what about the remaining five per cent? Mr. Oliver answers that a comparative negligence law would bring no benefits to lawyers. If it would be of
no benefit to part-owners of the claims (being the lawyers; under
a contingent fee arrangement), it, of course, would present no
benefit to the sharing owners. In a considerable portion of that
remaining five per cent, certainly the defendant would not have
been negligent or his negligence would not have been a proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. In view of such admissions made
on the part of the prime movers toward the adoption of a comparative negligence law in California, I respectfully inquire why
should North Dakota upset the well established and workable
rules that have heretofore been in existence? Could it possibly be
attributed to the human interest that the members of the NACCA
apparently have in increasing their fees in personal injury cases?
If the counter contention is made by the members of the
NACCA that the writer himself has an ax to grind in that he
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represents large corporations and insurance companies, let it be
recalled that the doctrine of contributory negligence was long
prior thought good for the people before there were any large corporations or insurance companies operating in this area.
MR. BEEDE: You are on borrowed time.
MR. OEHLERT: Can I have two minutes of your time, Phil,
Mr. Vogel?
MR. VOGEL: No.
MR. BEEDE: I am satisfied now that we have right here
ir4 our state at least, I think, as good men as if we had invited
somebody from outside the state.
MR. LANIER: Gentlemen of the bar, I am not going to
take even the rest of my time. Primarily I do want to turn the
speaker's stand over to Mr. Comny. I will comment on what Mr.
Oehlert says. It is a funny thing. I have tried a lot of lawsuits
against him and I never thought he would treat a body of lawyers
in the same way he treats a jury. I notice this because he is very
effective as you gentlemen know, but I thought he was addressing
a jury.
He says, Number One, that we who are avowed champions
for the platform do it for self-serving interests. Members of the
bar, stop and analyze. Plaintiffs' attorneys who specialize, and I
will plead guilty to plaintiff work, will make more money under
the law of contributory negligence than we will after we have
the doctrine of comparative negligence, which we will eventually.
As long as we maintain the out-moded and out-dated doctrine
of contributory negligence it becomes a strong question in any
lawyer's mind whether he will or will not win a lawsuit. The average practitioner throughout the state knowing that and not being
constantly in court knows that he must join someone who is experienced and used to that particular type of trial work. A plaintiff's attorney is called in constantly in cases of contributory negligence. When you eliminate it, in the average practitioner's two or
three cases a year under comparative negligence he will be his
own counsel, his own settler, his own trial man, because he knows
he has a percentage to work on. We will constantly make more
money under contributory negligence than under comparative
negligence..
Lewis has used his little stiletto on the fine gentlemen of
the NACCA. He practically called them everything but subversive - the terrible Association of Claim and Compensation Attorneysl I am going to the convention in Boston next week. I claim
that these are all organized plaintiff's attorneys who have gotten
schools to educate themselves. You should see the lawyers for
the St. Paul and N. P. Railroad and see the beautiful black notebook
they have in which they have every last railroad case tried in
the United States. At long last the plaintiff's attorneys can be
equal and compete legally. It will be the platform of the NACCA
to investigate this kind of thing. That is, we should have this
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kind of thing -not
insurance company laws, not railroad laws.
So help me Hannah, you and I as lawyers on our legal side want
what is best for our clients and best for society. It is outmoded
and it is being replaced by this law going into effect. Of the
states that put it into effect and repealed it there are only twoonly two. He states I myself said seven states had it. One thing
I didn't bring up, except indirectly only, is that whenever the states
have passed the legislation-Louisiana, Wisconsin, Georgia Nebraska-the public itself has indicated that it was in favor of it.
The fact remains relative to insurance premiums in Louisiana
that not a single insurance premium has increased since the statute
has been on the books. The Wisconsin premiums for $5,000 to
$10,0000 liability averaged $41.00, and on $5,000 to $10,000, in her
neighboring state of Iowa, averaged $40.00. It hasn't worked out
that way.
Only one thing to decide before I turn this over to Mr.
Conmy. Only one thing- where is the best interest of the people
served? A doctrine which juries are applying anyway. You say
they will use 99% and 1%. No one wants that 99% and 1%.
They aren't going to vote for a statute like that. He has no business in court. On the other hand, you can't drop one drop of
ink and recover it and you can't recover one drop of bluing in
a gallon pail, and if the defendant's negligence represents only
one per cent of negligence he can't recover. That, members of the
bar, is fair. Adopt the doctrine of comparative negligence and
write a fair, sane and proper statute. If a plaintiff is more than
50% negligent I am sure he should not recover. I am opposed
to any statute where he could. Then he worries abut 49% and
51%. They will decide the difference between 90% and 10%.
It isn't going to be that fine a proposition. No, Mr. ConmyMR. BEEDE: I am afraid we will have to hold that the
time that was given to Mr. Lanier was his time only. We are
going to call on the other members of the committee. However,
we are going to allow ten minutes first to Mr. Vogel who will be
speaking against the adoption of the doctrine and last to Mr.
Conmy, who will be given ten minutes for the doctrine.
MR. VOGEL: Mr. Chairman and members of the Bar. I
submit that the doctrine of contributory negligence is not out-worn
or out-moded. For myself I can't see anything wrong with a rule
of law that says that if a man contributes to the happening
of an accident that causes injuries and damages he shall be denied
recovery. I can't trace the contributory negligence rule, as Mr.
Oehlert has, back to the 14th century. To the best of my knowledge
Lord Ellenborough laid down this rule in 1809, and shortly thereafter the courts modified it by promulgating the last clear chance
doctrine.
The judges recognized that it was wrong to deny recovery to
a negligent plaintiff, if the defendant had the last clear chance
to avoid the accident. There are many instances where our courts
have changed common law rulings from time to time, where it
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was humane to do so. The law with respect to imputed negligence
involving passengers in automobiles is only an example. My own
impression is that our common law of negligence, properly administered, is fair and just.
I was interested in listening to Mr. Lanier say that the states
which have the comparative negligence law show no increase as
far as insurance premiums are concerned. How can that be? If
you are going to increase the number of causes of action, you are
going to increase the costs as far as the insurance companies are
concerned. I saw some statistics a short time back showing that
in towns of comparative size in Wisconsin, Minnesota and Iowa,
the policy holder in Wisconsin had to pay 64% more for a liability
policy that the man who lived in Minnesota or Iowa. If the cost
of settling claims goes up, the premiums must go up. The insurance companies won't lose under those circumstances. Society
itself will pay the increased premiums, but if those premiums
become high enough, there will be a demand for some kind of
state monopoly in the writing of liability insurance. I don't think
that very many of the members of this bar want to see that. If the
state of North Dakota gets into the business of writing liability
insurance policies, it won't be long before we have no law of
negligence at all. Contributory negligence and comparative negligence will be completely thrown aside, and compensation will be
paid regardless of fault. I don't believe our society is in a position
to underwrite that kind of insurance program.
There are doubtless hard cases as far as the law of contributory negligence is concerned. But there is hardly a lawyer
in this room who has not known of hard cases with respect to
other phases of our law. Here and there great hardship may be
created by the best evidence rule, the parol evidence rule, the
STATUTE OF FRAUDS and a host of others. But when we find
cases like that we don't go running to the legislature asking for
changes in our basic laws. We know that if we did that, we would
be opening a Pandora's box that would bring us a hundred evils for
every one we try to cure. For myself, I believe that we are far
better off to leave the problems of negligence and contributory
negligence to the jury, guided as it must be by the instructions
of the trial court.
Last spring there was an article in the North Dakota Law
Review that reported that in 1951 comparative negligence statutes
were introduced in 16 different legislative assemblies. The important thing to me is, not that the statute was introduced in
these 16 state assemblies, but that it failed of passage in any
of them. I doubt if there has been a comparative negligence law
adopted anywhere in the last 10 years. Two of the southern states
have the rule and they have had it for many years. As a matter
of fact they had the rule long before they adopted workmen's
compensation statutes, and I suspect that that was the only reason they ever passed the comparative negligence law. For all of
these reasons I oppose the resolution and I shall vote against it.
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MR. CONMY: Let us see if we can clarify the change that
is being spoken of here. What is the doctrine of comparative
negligence? Let us state it this way, "The doctrine of apportionment of loss in case of mutual fault is the doctrine of comparative negligence."
So the doctrine which is taken into account is the relative
negligence of the plaintiff on the one hand and the defendant
on the other. It is a simple and reasonable rule for which
we speak. On the other hand, what is the doctrine of contributory negligence as enunciated and applied in North Dakota. That
is the doctrine that if the plaintiff has negligence on his part contributing in any degree, even the slightest, to cause his loss and
injury, then he may not recover. I think you will agree that rule
is a harsh one. That rule is not consistent with our ideals in regard
to our system of justice today. You know that when you are on
the defense side, and when I have been on the defense we always
request the instruction and usually quote the old Clark v. Feldman
case, that if the plaintiff's neglect has contributed to the loss in
any degree, even the slightest, then he may not recover.
That is a harsh rule and being a harsh rule it isn't entirely
good law and therefore we must admit logically we should entertain some ideas of change.
Regarding the history of comparative negligence and the
history of contributory negligence we find that comparative negligence is nothing novel. Back as far as 1811 it was set forth in
the Austrian civil code. It is now in force and effect, according
to an article in the 1953 California Law Review, virtually all over
Europe. England has abandoned the law, which Mr. Vogel mentioned was adopted by decision in the Butterfield case, as too
harsh. Most of the Canadian provinces, Quebec by its civil law,
others by statute, have adopted the comparative negligence law.
In this country, for instance, its harshness was recognized and we
have the Federal Employers Liability Act comparable with that
law. The Workmen's Compensation Act is not in question.
In Nebraska, South Dakota, Wisconsin, Mississippi and Virginia
there are various types of comparative negligence acts in operation. They are not all the same acts. Some seek to define the
degree of negligence. Some, as in Massachusetts and New Mexico,
are applied only in case of death. In Virginia it is applied to railroad crossing actions only.
Regarding the history of the last clear chance doctrine developed, as you know, from the Davies v. Mann case, an Enalish
decision; the trouble with the doctrine of last clear chance, when
analyzed, is that..it swings the pendulum too far to the other
side. In other words, we say on the one hand if a plaintiff's
negligence contributes in the slightest he cannot recover. The
thinking of this is that a man may recover if the other party has
the last clear chance to avoid injury. It swings the pendulum too
far the other way entirely. Under the doctrine of last clear chance,
you will recall, a man had left his ass upon the highway and even
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though he was originally negligent the party who ran into it had
the opportunity to avoid it. The last clear chance within some
states is different in its application.
I might say here that if Mr. Oehlert had left his fettered ass
upon the highway, I would recommend a last clear chance to
collide with it.
(Applause.)
In conclusion I want to say it has been urged here that those
who seek the comparative negligence law, (Mr. Oehlert sought to
prove that) have a self-serving motive. Really, we must have
enough self-respect to assume that we are acting today to accomplish justice. Yes, we must get paid if we are to live, but you
recognize and probably see that this is not our motive. We are
not pecuniary but logical. It is right -based on reason. I ask you,
could it be that self-interest on the part of the group interested
in the railroads and casualty companies makes them desire the
advantage they have with the contributory negligence law? Does
that appeal to you? It is more possible that a good motive ought
to be attributed to those who invoke the comparative negligence
doctrine.
MR. BEEDE: That concludes our debate proper. We bad
intended using the gentlemen perhaps as a panel and having questions from the floor and permitting members from the floor to
engage in the debate. Time will not permit this. It is getting
near 12:00 o'clock and other matters have to come up and we
have to turn the meeting back to President Johnson. If you care
to take further action along this line, that will come up in the
general business meeting of the open assembly. I thank you and
I thank every member of the committee for the intelligent and informative remarks they have given us regarding the doctrine of
comparative negligence. I know I, as a member of the legislature,
have taken a great interest in the remarks and probably will be
able to vote, if the matter comes up in the legislature, with a little
more information than before.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: What is your pleasure? Should we
continue the discussion with Mr. Beede for at least half an hour,
is there anybody who wants to be heard on it?
MR. HIGGINS: I would like to hear the discussion go on for
a little longer. Let's turn the meeting back to Mr. Beede. I realize most of you want to get away. I hope we can continue before
we adjourn, turn the meeting back to Mr. Beede to continue
further dicsussion on this matter.
MR. BEEDE: In throwing the meeting open to discussion
from the floor we've got to try to be fair and confine your remarks to a few minutes, and after having heard from one member speaking for the matter or against the matter, we should next
recognize someone for the opposing side.
Mr. Higgins, we will recognize you first, and you are speaking
for the doctrine.
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MR. HIGGINS: I think I can make myself heard by any of
you who are inclined to listen. I must say I have enjoyed this
very much. Here I am talking like Bill Lanier and that was all the
preparation I had. This has been very informative. I will contribute only this. In the first place, as you say it is difficult if
not impossible for a jury to determine between 49% and 51%.
Juries are not apt to do that. Any place you draw a line you
present that difficulty and you can avoid that by not drawing lines
and then they must be decided by someone. I don't think that
is a sound argument. It is very important that the bar stand well
with the people of the country. I certainly agree. I think that the
enactment of a sound comparative negligence law would improve
that relationship more than anything else. We say the juries take
these items into consideration all the time but there is no mention
of the fact that notwithstanding that the courts must set aside the
verdict of the jury because of a slight degree of negligence, the
court must say the plaintiff for personal injury cannot recover.
It seems the situation to me is this. It is true that no law can be
enacted that does not have its hard cases and we can't avoid this
by legislation because the statutes cannot become that involved.
In cases where the jury considers negligence it seems to me when
we permit a situation like this to continue we not only do great damage to the law and damage to the bench, but much greater damage
to the law itself which is the fundamental of our sound democracy,
much more important than the question of the amount of damages.
It is a most difficult sort of thing to have the jurors in a position
where in order to carry out what he feels is just to violate what
he has been taught is the law of the land. The basic conception
is wrong. As long as that kind of conflict exists it is not a surprise
to me that the people are suspicious of the law. Things in too
many instances are set up to protect and do protect the wealthy
and privileged against the under-privileged. I doubt that in the
long run attorneys for the plaintiff are going to get any advantage.
I am inclined to think the frequency with the counsel may offset to some degree that item so that it may be fairly in balance.
Most people have an interest in connection with corporate matters, etc. True, everyone is in a position to say the kettle is black,
but we should disregard that as far as we can.
But to me it does mean this, it is basically unsound to say as
many of the opponents do say, overlook the fact that the law is
there and the jury does take it into consideration. I recognize the
inequality of it and I must set it aside. The opponents have said
no one should profit by his own fault and that of course is basically
sound, logical and correct. The situation is where under comparative negligence he doesn't profit by his own fault. The way the
law is now he can't recover for his own fault and he can't recover
for his opponent's fauilt. That is the basic fault of the present
system.

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

MR. BEEDE: Now, we will have someone speaking against
the doctrine.
ED COMNY: The argument before this would receive a lot
of credit if a workman's compensation law were involved or a
condition to that effect.
Immediately after the last session of this Bar Association I
started a correspondence with various people in an effort to find
out something about this law. I got into correspondence with Judge
Palmer, also a North Dakota lawyer who lived in California. To
me from what I learned out of this contact the opposite effect will
come as far as California is concerned. In California as you have
been told, I think Mr. Lanier was in error, I know he was in error
when he said California has adopted a comparative negligence
law. A law was introduced after the Bar Association had gone
on record as favoring that doctrine.
Judge Palmer advises me that it was soundly defeated in the
legislature and lost in the legislation because it was told the principle condition was that it was a lawyer's bill. I say here it is a
plaintiff's lawyers deal, as this increases litigation and the record
is that it does increase it. Those who primarily defend the law
say that others will have just as much benefit from the law. We
don't share in the recovery but we do get paid for our time. We
don't get 50% of $50,000 but we do get paid.
Now, these men from California who talked to us - Jerry
Giesler and Eddy O'Connor - talked about lawyer's bills and
didn't confine it to plaintiff's laws. We do know it's a lawyer's
bill. The more lawsuits the more defense. They said the bill went
down because it was sponsored by the Bar Association in California. I value the good judgment of these men. I say in my opinioni
we talked about public relations trying to keep our standing with
the people. Any action on the part of this Bar Association favoring
such legislation I think is a mistake right or wrong because if
sponsored by the Bar Association, the lawyers are going to be
judged as acting upon a selfish lawyers' bill. They are supporting
it for their own benefit. It would increase litigation anad increase
those fees that go to plaintiffs' lawyers and defendants' lawyers.
Think about that.
I could go into a lot of features if I had time and I would
like to mention there are a lot of papers on this subject. You should
all read about it. I certainly am in no position to pass on the question, or the desirability of the thing. My point is we would be very,
very foolish if we took any action on this question. It will be and
would be branded as a lawyers' bill. I personally say we should
have the benefit of going to the legislative committee and that
is the place we ought to go. It should not, I submit, come out of
this Bar Association. We will rue the day we recommend a proposition of this kind as a Bar Association.
JOHN LORD: I might say about a portion of the last argument that if we are afraid to take the risk of backing what we
think is right because it might be called lawyers' litigation, either
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we are going to favor what is right and stand out for what is
right or we don't deserve to have a Bar Association. Now, as to
comparative negligence I have had experience under it in Wisconsin. At that time I did not have this infamous association with
the NACCA. I represented the Federal Land Bank of St. Paul
and Farm Credit Administration. I wasn't one of the most popular
people. I used to search the courtroom for weapons and I know if
some of them had had a gun they would have shot me. In personal injury suits where you have comparative negligence law is
to have a jury come in after you have defended as it has happened
to me. They found the plaintiff's damages would be $6,000 and I
almost fell back in my chair. The defendant's damages were nothing. They had set the plaintiff's negligence at 10% and the defendant's at 90 %. I had tried a good lawsuit.
The jury competent to do that is a jury which under proper
instructions can bring in a proper answer. They deserve some
sympathy from other considerations that enter into those matters
of personal injury but you know and these gentlemen know they
are legal and not properly done in a lot of cases. It could be done
in a conception of comparative negligence rather than from instructions to the jury the result of which are unjust decisions based
on those things they do not know. It takes a lot of things out of
conjecture in a jury room.
All this talk about increase in litigation cannot be justified.
It may increase in the beginning but will result in many more settlement cases. I believe it is a human doctrine, one in tune with
our times and it certainly contains much more justice and our conception of equal justice under law than the doctrines of contributory negligence or of the last clear chance.' However, we can go
in a lot of cases and see great injustice done that would not have
occurred if we had the doctrine of comparative negligence, and
I believe you should examine this as to whether or not you believe
that is a just and proper doctrine and then determine whether or
not to support it rather than any feeling that it would be branded
a lawyer's law. If it is right, it should be right. I personally believe
it is right. If it is wrong, make your decision accordingly.
MR. BEEDE: Anyone now who wishes to talk for a few
minutes against the doctrine.
If not, we will turn the meeting back to President Johnsonand before we do I will ask you to permit Mr. Lanier half a minute. He wants to make an explanation, I think.
MR. LANIER: I won't take your time. I have been misquoted. I never said California passed such a statute. I did state
I thought they would pass it. You say it was a lawyer's bill in
California and nobody but the Bar Association wanted it. By the
reports of the Senate Judiciary Committee of California it was
defeated by three votes. Dd you call this overwhelming? It will
be back before the legislature with the unanimous approval of the
Senate Judicial Committee.
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PRESIDENT JOHNSON: I want to thank Mr. Beede for
presiding and I thank each member of the panel.
MR. LANIER: I now move that this North Dakota State Bar
Association go on record in recommending to the North Dakota
state legislature the passage of the comparative negligence act.
J. 0. THORSON: I second the motion.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: You resolution is seconded. Your
resolution was already before the house.
MR. LANIER: If the resolution is still open, I will withdraw
the one I just made.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: The motion we have for consideration is the one made by Mr. Lanier, and can take it from there.
Any further questions?
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: The motion is lost.
SENATOR DAY: I would like to make just an observation.
I didn't vote on either side and Senator Duffy didn't. Our views
haven't always coincided.
I do want to correct an impression some of you may have
made by one remark. I don'1 know what the situation as to the
Bar Association in California may be. I do know that if you will
examine the record in recent years in North Dakota and if you will
notice what a high percentage of the recommendations made by the
Bar Association have become law, you will realize that the legislature of North Dakota has a very high regard for the views of the
Bar Association of the State of North Dakota.
(Applause.)
REPORT OF INDIAN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
MR. PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF THE NORTH DAKOTA
BAR ASSOCIATION:
Your Committee of Indian Affairs submits the following report:
Several informal meetings of various members of the Committee have been held. A meeting was held by a majority of the
Committee on July 24, 1954, at Devils Lake, and one was held
in Grand Forks on August 5, 1954. The Committee has coordinated
its activities with those of a similar sub-committee composed of
Hon. Albert Lundberg, Chairman, Hon. George Thom, Jr., and
Frank Jestrab, set up within the Judicial Council. The sub-committee submitted reports to the Judicial Council on December 5,
1952 and May 18, 1954, which reports are by reference incorporated
as a part of this Committee's report.
There being so many ramifications of the problems of the
Indians in the state of North Dakota, it was the consensus of opinion of the Committee that for the present at least, we should restrict our attention largely to the question of jurisdiction over the
Indians. The question is one not easily answered and one on
which the Committee cannot even approach unanimous agreement.
There are four reservations in North Dakota, to-wit: Stand-

BENCH AND BAR

ing Rock, Devils Lake Sioux (Fort Totten), Turtle Mountain, and
Fort Berthold. The Indian population totals about 15,000, with
the majority of them living upon some one million acres of largely
unproductive land. On three of the reservations in the state, viz.,
Standing Rock, Turtle Mountain, and Fort Berthold, jurisdiction
is assumed in varying degrees by the Federal Courts and Indian
Tribal Courts. On the Devils Lake Sioux Indian Reservation,
jurisdiction is exercised by the Federal Courts over the major
crimes, and the State Courts over all other crimes. The Committee
is agreed that on the three reservations first mentioned above, the
State Courts do not have jurisdiction over crimes committee thereon where the parties involved Indians.
In 1946 by act of Congress, concurrent criminal jurisdiction
over the Devils Lake Sioux Indian Reservation was conferred
upon our State Courts. The state of North Dakota has never
affirmatively consented to accept jurisdiction, although Benson
County has been exercising jurisdiction over this reservation. By
virtue of the provision of our state's Enabling Act and its Constitution recognizing the exclusive jurisdiction of Federal Courts
over Indian Reservations, there is considerable doubt as to whether
or not our State Courts have jurisdiction on this reservation. It was
the opinion of the Committee that this question should be judicially
determined, not merely to clarify the situation on this reservation,
but also to set a pattern as to the requisites necessary in case state
jurisdiction should be assumed over the other reservations in the
state. A case involving a crime committed by an Indian on the
Devils Lake Sioux Indian Reservation has accordingly been commenced and the Committee hopes to have the case presented to
our Supreme Court in the near future. The question of State Jurisdiction over the Turtle Mountain Reservation has been presented
to the District Court of Rollette County in a case involving the
crime of non-support allegedly committed by an Indian residing on
the reservation. The Committee has also been informed that a
case arising in McLean County involving the question of jurisdiction over Indians is already before the Supreme Court.
It is the recommendation of the Committee, however, that the
next legislature take steps toward amending the state Constitution
to provide that jurisdiction over the reservations may be assumed
by the consent of the legislature at such time and under such
conditions as it may deem fit.
Confusion in the overlapping of authority on Federal and
local levels is present not only in the matter of criminal jurisdiction,
but also in the administration of agricultural, welfare, medical,
public health, and educational services to Indians. Historically,
the providing of these services has been the responsibility of the
Federal Government, and it is the thought of the Committee that
until such time as the Indians are freed from Federal regiilation
and control and the reservations abolished, that it is primarily the
responsibility of the Federal Government to finance these services.
We would recommend that the administration of these services be
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transferred from the Federal Government to the state and local
levels, with Federal financial assistance until such time as the
Indians themselves have gained economic independence.
Generally speaking, economic conditions on the reservations
are very poor, with little opportunity for employment or means of
getting a livelihood, thereby resulting in a general lowering of the
social and moral conditions. Although our profession cannot accept responsibility for these conditions, the public undoubtedly
feels that it is an obligation of our profession to have settled the
questions concerning the confused status of jurisdiction and do
everything in our power to better existing conditions on the reservations. We feel that the subject merits the interest and consideration of each and every one of our members.
We recommend that an Indian Affairs Committe of the Bar
Association be continued for another year.
Respectfully submitted,
Frank Jestrab
Judge Burt Salisbury
Carlyle Onsrud
John Hart
J. Howard Stormon
Judge Albert Lundberg
Harry Lashowitz
Clyde Duffy
Hilton Higgins
Melvin Christianson, Chairman
JURISDICTION OF STATE COURTS ON INDIAN
RESERVATIONS:
This problem was made the subject of some discussion at the
meeting of the Judicial Council on November 25th, 1952, and a
Committee consisting of Judge Thom and Broderick, together with
the undersigned, was appointed to look into the matter further.
At the Council meeting I mentioned having received considerable material from Mr. John B. Hart of Rolla, North Dakota,
and particularly the 1951 Montana case of State vs. Pipion, et al,
230 Pac, 2nd, 961. This case is referred to in pocket part of 42
C.J.S. "Indians" for P. 796, n. 60. Beginning on p. 794. (Sec. 79),
and continuing for several pages, it is a discussion of the matter of
jurisdiction that seems to indicate that in the absence of Federal
legislation conferring jurisdiction, State Courts are without such
jurisdiction. If we turn to 27 Am. Jur. "Indians", Section 50-53
we find substantially the same authorities. There are indications
that, in earlier times, State Courts claimed and exercised jurisdiction particularly in criminal matters - - - 21 L. R. A. 169 et seq.
Reference was made at the council meeting to a letter written May 24, 1945, by, Asst. U.S. Atty. Harry Lashkowitz to the
late Jansonius expressing the view that our Juvenile Courts had
jurisdiction over children on the Reservations. The opinion seems
to be based on the fact that Sec. 27-7608 says the Court shall have
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jurisdiction over "any child . . . within the county" . . . etc., and

that Sec. 27-1610 speaks of "all children" etc. Also, it is intimated
that juvenile delinquency cases of Indian children must, of course,
be referred to State authority because Congress had not passed
any juvenile delinquency laws! I must say the reasons advanced
do not impress me greatly.
Quite different conclusions are reach by Atty. Gen. Vernon W.
Thompson of Wisconsin in an opinion to the Dept. of Public Welfare of the State under date of June 14, 1951 - - - a copy of which

has been furnished me by Mr. Hart. The opinion refers to U. S.
vs. Rogers (1845) 4 Howard 567; Cohen, Handbook of Federal
Indian Law, 2-5. The case of Ex Parte Fero, 99 Fed. 2nd 28,
31-32, is quoted from, and the Wisconsir case of State vs. Rufus,
237 N.W. 67 is referred to. The conclusion is reached that the
Juvenile Court of the State is without jurisdiction for acts of delinquency committed on the Reservation, but does have jurisdiction
for acts committed off the Reservation. Such conclusions seem to
be in keeping with the reasoning expressed in authorities cited in
the second paragraph above.
It appears to me that Legislative, Judicial and Administrative
action is going to be required to clarify the situation. As things
stand at present, it seems that Federal Bureaus are bent on "pushing off" on the States as much responsibility as possible. Administrative agencies in the States naturally push the other way. At
least, that is the impression I receive after an admittedly brief and
superficial survey of the problem. The weight of authority certainly seems to be against State Courts having jurisdiction over
crimes committed by Indians on Reservation. Indeed, until Congress was roused by the "Crow Dog" case (109 U.S. 556) and
established Federal jurisdiction over "Ten Major Crimes" (murder,
manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary, larceny, robbery, incest and assault with a dangerous weapon), the tribal jurisdiction seems to have been exclusive! Whether concurrent
power has been granted to certain States and Reservations (Ft.
Totten among them) I have not been able to determine. As for
crimes other than "major" . . . and our Code must have at least
a couple of dozen . . . jurisdiction over them would seem to be

in the "Tribe". And see 24 Minn. L. Rev. 145-200. Source of Federal power seems to be Const. Art. 1, Sec. 8, "regulates commerce
. . . with Indian Tribes"

...

and War and Treaty-making power,

etc.
This is not a subject to be exhausted by the limited attention
I have been able to give it, and the indicated conclusiohs are
very tentative. But, while our discussion was reasonably fresh I
wanted to give to members of the Committee and others interested
a summary of "what it looks like to me". I am certainly receptive
to further enlightenment.
Grafton, North Dakota, December 5th, 1952.
Albert Lundberg
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COMMITTEE REPORT ON INDIAN JURISDICTION
Mr. Chief Justice James Morris
Chairman, North Dakota Judicial Council
Bismarck, North Dakota
On the occasion of the Judicial Council Meeting on May 10,
1954, your Committee for Study of Jurisdiction of State Courts over
Indians on Indian Reservations in North Dakota, made an oral
report which was adopted with the understanding that the same
would be reduced to writing and filed. This written report is
accordingly made in conformity with such arrangements.
Reference is made to the contents of the previous report made
herein, dated October 6, 1953, which sets forth the conclusions
of the Committee at that time. Since that report, the writer had
the benefit of a conference with Mr. Clyde Duffy of Devils Lake
who raised certain questions which the writer undertook to answer
in communication with Mr. Duffy under date of October 20, 1953.
As the points involved are in the nature of a continuing study of
the subject under consideration, we submit herewith quotations
from the letter to Mr. Duffy as bearing on the situation.
"Now I do not doubt or question but that there was a time
in North Dakota when state courts exercised criminal jurisdiction over Indians or Indian Reservations (at least over
the Indians who had received "Allotments") and that such
jurisdiction was given recognition by the United States Court
in North Dakota. You referred me to holdings by Judge
Amidon in the case of United States vs. Kiya (1903), 126 Fed.
879 and in a later case (1920) involving the Indian named Wicibdega. The doctrines advanced in the 1897 case of State vs.
Denoyer, 6 N.D. 586, 72 N.W. 1014, were given recognition
by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1906 case of Matter v. Heff,
197. U.S. 488, which held that allottee Indians were subject
to the Kansas laws. Also I am aware that the Denoyer case
was followed as to many of its theories by) State v. Montrail
County (1914) 28 N.D. 389, 149 N.W. 121 and in Swift v.
Leach (1920) 45 N.D. 437, 178 N.W. 437; and Duke v.
Melni, 45 N.D. 349, 177 N.W. 676. I am also aware that some
of the views expressed in the Enoyer case are agreed to in the
1940 S.D. case of Anderson v. Brule County, 292 N.W. 429.
"I also think that there has been a re-assumption of reassertion of Federal authority over Indians on Reservations,
both those who have received allotments and others, which
has completely changed this picture and that the present
state of the law is reflected in such holdings as in the 1951
Montana case of State v. Pepion, 230 Pac. 2nd 961 and a later
Montana case of State v. District Court, 239 Pac. 2d 272.
There is also the 1945 Minnesota case of State ex rel Default
v. Utech, 19 N.W. 2d' 706; 161 A.L.R. 1316, which refers to
an earlier Minnesota case-State v. Jackson (1944) 16 N.W.
2d 957, which goes into the question quite fully and also refers
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to the Oregon case of Loy vs. Hopkins 212 U.S. 542. I think
that the language found on Page 797 of 42 C.J.S. in section 72-73
& 74 indicates recognition of this changing viewpoint and in
42 C.J.S. p. 777, note 90, the plenary power of Congress to
treat Indians as wards even after the grant of citizenship to
them is recognized and discussed in Creek County v. Saber
1943) 318 U.S. 705. Something of the same reasoning is found
in 314 U. S.951 which reversed the same case of Federal Land
Bank v. Bismarck Lbr. Co. 70 N.D. 607, 297 N.W. 42. Not
much attention is paid to these earlier doctrines on Indian jurisdiction in such places, 27 Am. Jur. "Indians" Secs. 50-53 and
42 C.J.S. p. 794, and I suppose that is natural as these works
are concerned with stating what the prevailing law is at the
time of publication rather than noting changes. If you find
time to look at some of those references I would appreciate
knowing whether your viewpoint is changed as a result of
such examination. If you are interested, more of the history
of the change appears to have grown out of the Dakota
Territory case of ex parte Crow Dog (1883) 109 U.S. 556,
which held that' not even the U.S. laws operated on an Indian
Reservation. As a result of this holding Congress started in
1885 with what was called the "7 Crimes" Act which in 1909
seems to have changed to "10 Major Crimes" Act, and which
again expanded in 1932 (USCA Sec. 548). Some of the history of this movement is in U.S. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375,
which held the Crimes Act constitutional and noted that it
was a further step in the growing disposition of the Federal
Government to exercise jurisdiction over Indians within ther

state.
We are indebted to Mr. John Hart of Rolla, North Dakota,
the Executive Director of the North Dakota Indian Affairs Commission for a mimeographed compilation of some of the important
State and Federal decisions bearing upon this question of Indian
jurisdiction. The trend appears to be strongly towards a recognition that State Courts are without jurisdiction. We would particularly call attention to the 1946 U. S. Supreme Court decision
in the case of Williams vs. U. S., 327 U. S.711, 69 Sup. Ct. 778,
which contains an excellent summary of the develoment of law
in this field and the excellent footnotes providing the necessary
historical and legal background. We would also call attention
to the case of U. S. v. Jacobs, decided on June 25, 1953, by the U. S.
District Court of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, found in 11a
Federal Supplement 203. Beginning on page 205 the decision of
the Court has a long review of the historical and legislative backgrounds of this field of law.
We would also call attention to certain provisions of the
Federal Statutes which seem to indicate complete Federal control
in this field, to-wit:
18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1151---"Indian Country" defined:
"(a) All land within the limits of any Indian Reservation
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under the jurisdiction of the U. S. Government notwithstanding the issuance of any patent - - (b) All dependent indian communities - - - in or out of
the State - - (c) All Indian allotments, the Indian title to which have
not been extinguished - including right of way - June 25,
1948. Ch. 645, 62 Stats. 757, amended May 24, 1949, Ch.
139, Sec. 25, 63 Stats. 94.
18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1152-"Except as otherwise expressly
provided by law, the general laws of the U. S. as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole
and exclusive jurisdiction of the U. S., except the Dist. of
Columbia, shall extend to the Indian Country (Does not
extend to Indians punished by Tribal Court.).
June 25, 1948 Ch. 645, 62 Stats 757.
18 U.S.C.A., Sec. 468, is the so-called "Assimilated Crimes
Act" which adopts the penal laws of the states and the punishment provided by state 'laws which were in force on February 1,
1940. It would accordingly appear that there are few, if any,
criminal offenses that now are not cognizable by the Federal
Courts. In this connection we think it proper to call attention to
the provisions of Sec. 1 of Section 12-0602, 1943 Code, which sets
forth the persons punishable under the laws of North Dakota as
being the following:
"All persons who commit, in the whole or in part, any
crime within this State except when such crime is cognizable
by law exclusively in the Court of the United States." (underscoring ours)
All of this appears to confirm the view heretofore expressed
that the state courts are without jurisdiction over crimes committed on Indian Reservations. The extent of civil jurisdiction
or the jurisdicition in quasi-civil proceedings as to the establishment
of paternity and the support of families is a matter still under
study and no opinion is expressed, although the jurisdiction would
seem to be doubtful at the best. The same is, of course, true to an
even greater extent in juvenile offenses.
At the conclusion of our previous report, dated October 6,
1953, your committee made certain recommendations. The first
of these - - filling the vacancy on the committees occasioned by
the death of Judge Broderick, has been taken care of by the appointment of Mr. Frank F. Jestrab of Williston. The Indian
recommendation regarding the clearing of the way for ultimate
exemption of jurisdiction by the State we still think is desirable
and we anticipate that much assistance is to be derived from a
parallel committee appointed by the North Dakota Bar Association to study this same question. Mr. Melvin Christianson of Minnewaukan, North Dakota, is Chairman of this Bar Association
Committee and we propose to work with this new committee in
seeking further clarification of the problems here involved.
In that connection it may be well to consider the provisions of
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Public Law No. 28-83rd Congress, Chapter 505-1st Session, H. R.
1063, approved August 15, 1953. Section 6 and 7 of which reads
as follows:
Sec. 6. "Notwithstanding the provisions of any Enabling Act
for the admission of a State, the consent of the United States
is hereby given to the people of any State to amend, where
necessary, their State constitution or existing statutes, as the
case may be, to remove any legal impediment to the assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction in accordance with the
provisions of this act: PROVIDED, That the provisions of
this Act shall not become effective with respect to such assumption of jurisdiction by any such State until the people
thereof have appropriately amended their State constitutions
or statutes as the case may be.
Section 7. "The consent of the United States is hereby
given to any other State not having jurisdiction with respect
to criminal offenses or civil causes of action, or with respect
to both, as provided for in this Act, to assume jurisdiction at
such time and in such manner as the people of the State shall
by affirmative legislative action, obligate and bind the State
to assumption thereof."
It is, of course, of extreme importance that the amendment of
Sub-division "Second" of Section 203 should be in such form that
the impediments to the assumption of jurisdiction by the State
would be removed, that such assumption would not be made except with express legislative approval after suitable agreements
governing a period of transition. In that connection we believe
that the language of the above quoted Section 7 of Public Law 280
is re-assuring but the whole matter should be given further careful
study.
On this matter of a transition period, we think that certain
quotations approved by the North Dakota Indian Affairs commission in their report, may be of value: "It is the thought of the Commission that jurisdiction over
crimes committed by Indians on Indian Reservations should
be transferred by the Federal Government to the State of North
Dakota with adequate reimbursement provisions being made
until such time as these Indian lands are taxed. The Federal
Government should reimburse the counties one hundred percent for any expenses resulting from law enforcement in these
areas. This procedure would result in the Indian people's becoming more closely associated with the non-Indian people of
the community in which they live. It would go a long way
toward the ultimate goal of assimilating the Indian people into
the citizenry of the State on an equal basis with other citizens."
Quoting further from the report of the Committee on Indian
Affairs to the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch
of the Government, October, 1948, page 139, we continue: "Law and Order
The system of law and order on Indian Reservations is un-
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satisfactory today. The following steps are needed and should
be taken as part of the area-program covering each reservation.
"1. By act of Congress the states should be given concurrent criminal jurisdiction on Indian Reservations.
"2. As part of each area-program administrative responsibility for maintaining law and order should be transferred to
state and county authorities under an agreed plan as rapidly
as satisfactory plans can be made. In many areas it will be
appropriate to employ Indian personnel as law officers and
magistrates in extending state responsibility to the reservations.
"3. Federal aid should be given to the authorities assuming responsibility until the trust status of Indian land is ended.
The amount of aid should be adjusted to the needs and costs
in each case." "Section 4. The Secretary of the Interior is
authorized to enter into agreement with the several States, the
counties thereof, in which Indian reservations are located, to
pay to such states or counties such amounts as he may deem to
be proper to defray the expenses of the enforcement of the
criminal laws of such states and such reservations.
It may also be of interest to note that there is apparently a
case on the way to the Supreme Court of North Dakota involving
this question of jurisdiction over crimes committed on Indian Reservations, an appeal being taken from the District Court of McLean
County, and we attach to this report a mimeographed copy of an
opinion of Attorney General Arnold H. Olsen of Montana given in
1953 on the subject of Indian Jurisdiction in connection with a
murder committed in Valley County, Montana, on April 17, 1953.
Your Committee will conclude this report by making the following recommendations:
1. That the committee continue its studies, particularly in
conjunction with the parallel committee appointed by the Bar
Association;
2. That the possibility of conferences of two committees
with the U. S. District Attorney for North Dakota and if possible, the U. S. District Judge, be explored with the view of
clarifying the jurisdictional situation and also with the view of
increasing the activity of Federal Agencies in the field of law
enforcement on Indian reservations;
3. That we urge that there be an increase of money made
available to the Federal agencies so that they can better perform the duties which we are satisfied have been imposed upon
them by Federal law in this field;
4. That we repeat the recommendations concluding our
previous report of October 6, 1953 insofar as they are applicable, and we desire to express our appreciation to Mr. John
B. Hart who has been of such great help to us in this matter
and to whom we are indebted for figures showing that North
Dakota expended a total of $222,239.00 in 1952 for the relief
in one form or another to Indians ...not including law enforcement costs. It is therefore evident that the State of North
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Dakota has a definite financial interest in seeing that conditions
are improved and that an orderly and effective handling of
these matters take the place of the present confusion and uncertainty.
Dated May 18, 1954.
George Thom Jr.,
Frank F. Jestrab,
Albert Lundberg, Chairman.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: We have the report of the Committee on Judicial District Bar Associations of which Theodore F.
Kessel is the Chairman. This committee has been most active and
is getting more active each year. The principal reason is that we
have a president for two years.
This report will be accepted and filed.
The report in full reads as follows:
As Chairman of the committee on Judicial District Bar Associations, I now make a report on behalf of the committee and on
the District Bar Association activities during the past year.
On January 9, 1954, at the Gardner Hotel in Fargo, North Dakota, this committee, consisting of all Judicial District Presidents,
met and there were present the following members:
Mr. Franklin J. Van Osdel, First Judicial District,
Mr. Melvin M. Christianson, Second Judicial District,
Mr. Theodore F. Kessel, Third Judicial District,
Mr. J. Oliver Thorson, Fourth Judicial District,
Mr. Ralph W. Bekken, Fifth Judicial District,
Mr. Norbert J. Muggli, Sixth Judicial District;
also present at said meeting was the President of the North Dakota
State Bar Association, Mr. Vernon Johnson.
After considerable discussion, it was the concensus of opinion
that a four-point program be put into effect in each Judicial District, which program is as follows: (1) That each District have at
least two meetings a year, (2) That local talent be used for the
program if at all possible, (3) That the ladies be invited and entertained, (4) That there must be active District meetings in order
to stimulate interest in the North Dakota State Bar Association.
That this program stimulated the District Bar Association into action
is evidenced by the following reports from District Presidents.
Mr. Van Osdel, from the First Judicial District, reports and I
quote from his letter to me dated July 12, 1954: "Please be advised that, as President of the First Judicial District Bar, we have
had one meeting and we intend to have another one at the time of
the State Bar Meeting in Grand Forks. The meeting of the Cass
County Bar for the month of May here in Fargo, was held in conjunction with the meeting of the First Judicial Bar and it went
along fine."
Mr. Melvin M. Christianson, from the Second Judicial District,
reports and I quote from-his letter dated July 12, 1954: "We are
having a meeting on the 24th in Devils Lake. We have made
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arrangements for Mr. Ruemmele to lead a discussion on Title
Standards, and have also made arrangements to secure the attendance of as many of the wives as is possible. We will have a business
meeting in the afternoon and a banquet at the Country Club in the
evening. The President of the Bar Association, I understand, has
agreed to be the banquet speaker."
Mr. Kessel of the Third Judicial District reports as follows:
An income tax institute was held at LaMoure on the 19th day of
December, 1953, which institute was in charge of two representatives from the office of the Internal Revenue of Fargo. It was attended by approximately fifteen attorneys and a like number of
others who do income tax work. This has been an annual affair
and is well received by many of the lawyers of this District.
The annual meeting of the Third Judicial District Bar Association was held at LaMoure on the 12th day of June, 1954 and was
attended by twenty-two lawyers from the District. A short business meeting was held at 11:00 o'clock which was followed by a
banquet at 12:30 p. in., attended by the twenty-two lawyers and
twenty-three ladies, which attendance -shows a great interest in the
Bar meetings by the ladies. At the banquet the President of the
State Bar Association, Mr. Vernon Johnson, was the main speaker,
and memorial services were held for two deceased members of our
District Bar Association, Mr. F. J. Graham of Ellendale and Mr.
Charles Coventry of Linton, who had died during the past year.
The ladies spent the afternoon at a social gathering while the
members of the Bar reconvened at 2:00 o'clock for another two
hour discussion of the following questions: (1)
Frank Knox of
Fargo led a discussion on the comparative negligence doctrine and
which discussion became lengthy but, nevertheless, interesting. (2)
Another subject receiving considerable thought was our Guest
Statute and the Association went on record advocating its repeal.
(3) The next topic was evidence in negligence cases and the Association passed a resolution favoring legislation making it proper to
bring out all facts, including insurance, in the evidence in such
cases without prejudice to either party. (4) Another motion was
passed that it be recommended to the State Bar Association that a
committee be created or assigned to a study of the Norh Dakota
Administrative Boards and their proceedings for the purpose of
improving upon the same.
It was urged that these recommendations be presented to the
Executive Committee and that definite action be taken upon the
same.
Mr. Thorson of the Fourth Judicial District reports and I quote
from his letter dated July 10, 1954: "As to the activities of the
4th Judicial Bar Ass'n. during the past year, meetings were held in
August, October and May, 1954. The August meeting was in connection with the State Bar Ass'n. It was a breakfast meeting attended by about 15 men. Resolutions were prepared for presentation to the Resolutions Committee of the State Bar Ass'n. The
October meeting was held in McClusky and included entertainment
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for the ladies attending, who were asked to come to the meeting.
The meeting was held, after a get-together and luncheon, at the
Court House and a speaker from Minnesota addressed us on the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Procedure in that state, it's effect
on the local practice, and the reaction of the local bar to it. Lunch
was served after the meeting. Some went hunting on the way.
The Ma , meeting was in Bismarck and was well attended. We
opened with a noon luncheon and then remained in our places for
the meeting in the Petroleum Room of the Prince Hotel. We had
Mr. J. F. X. Conmy lead us in discussing "Comparative Negligence"
and it was voted to go on record to favor it. Other things were
brought up and discussed including the change of a court date in
one of the counties and fees for defending lawyers in contested
divorce actions. No ladies were invited to this meeting. We were
thru by 3:00 p. m. Some committee activity took place too."
Mr. Muggli of the Sixth Judicial District reports and I quote
from his letter to me dated July 14, 1954: "On the activities of the
District Bar during the last year, I can report that we had our
regular District Meeting in May. It was quite well attended and
we arranged to have Mr. Paul McCann of Bismarck lead a discussion on some of the practical aspects of the Federal Tax Laws.
Mr. McCann is a C. P. A. and is admitted to practice law in this
State. He spent several years with the Bureau of Internal Revenue
and was well qualified. We asked that he keep his discussion on
a practical basis rather than some technical point, and it was well
received by all of the attorneys. We arranged for the annual banquet in the evening with the visiting attorneys and their wives
attending. During the afternoon, while we had our meeting and
discussion, we arranged for the visiting ladies to attend a tea at
one of the homes here in Dickinson."
No report has been received from Mr. Bekken, and therefore,
I cannot report on the activities of the Fifth Judicial Bar Association.
In closing, the Chairman of this committee feels that Mr.
Vernon Johnson, the President of the North Dakota State Bar Association, should be commended for his foresight in setting up this
particular committee, as this report shows it is evident that many
important issues were brought up and discussed at the various
District Bar Meetings and as these District Bar Associations become more and more active, the results will be a more interesting
State Bar Association.
Respectfully submitted,
Theodore F. Kessel, Chairman.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: We also have the report of the
Committe on Unauthorized Practice of Law.
JOHN ZUGER: I move that the report be accepted and filed.
K. S. PETERSON: I second the motion.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Motion is carried.
(The report in full reads as follows:)
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ANNUAL REPORT- UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
OF LAW COMMITTEE
Mr. President, members of the North Dakota Bar Association;
During the past year your committee on unauthorized practice of
law has held three committee meetings and has conducted six investigations on the unauthorized practice of law by laymen in
North Dakota.
We wish to report that there are no cases at present before
the committee for investigation. I do not wish to insinuate, however, that there is no work left for this committee to do. The committee feels that there is much work that can be done along this line.
As to the investigations completed this past year, they include
cases at Washburn, Mohall, Jamestown, Williston, New England,
Medina and Fargo. In all instances when the member of the committee contacted the person who was engaging in the unauthorized
practice of law, he or she immediately upon explanation of the law
and position of the State Bar Association in the matter, stated that
it would be completely discontinued in the future if no prosecution
or other relief was taken by our group.
The main complaints have all been of the same character in
which warranty deeds, contracts for deeds, mortgages, notes and
such small instruments were prepared for laymen by the offending
individuals. In several cases this work was being charged for.
After the law and the position of the State Bar Association was
brought to their attention, as was stated before, they agreed to desist and to cooperate with the members of the local bar group in
seeing that proper advice in legal affairs was given only by attorneys.
Investigation also showed that these individuals were counseling laymen in matters of probate and sometimes in matters concerning joint tenancy and tenancy in common, which might have
been correct, but which most probably was not correct.
Some of the reasons for this activity learned of by the committee was due to no attorney being in the town or if in a County
seat, which was the case in several instances, where the attorneys
did not seem to get along well with the individuals who were giving
the legal advice, or making up the deeds and other instruments.
Such would indicate that there might be a need in certain communities for a better working relationship between County officers,
especially Register of Deeds Officers and personnel and the local bar
group.
Work that the committee did in regards to unauthorized practice of law, was the preparation of a pamphlet which is proposed by
the committee to be sent to reported offenders by the Executive
Director of the State Bar Association. This pamphlet will be sent
with a letter, stating generally that it has been learned that the person it is sent to, has been in the past, engaged in counseling on
legal matters, or preparation of legal instruments which are contrary to law. The offender would then be asked to desist from
further activities along this line and if no further activity is reported,
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the matter would then be dropped. However, if the individual is
subsequently reported to be engaged in the unauthorized practice
of law an investigation will be made by the committee and further
steps taken as the committee deems necessary, to cope with the
situation.
The committee in all of its investigations this year, could have
brought criminal action or asked for injunctive relief against the
individuals investigated in each instance. It was the thinking of
the committee that if the end could be accomplished thru explanation and negotiation with the offending individual, it would be a
much nicer way of handling the matter and the committee has proceeded on that theory in performing its tasks. The amount of investigation is not within the duties of the committee, however, if it
becomes burdensome to the committee. The committee members
cannot take the time away from their practice to perform these
investigations as each investigation will take nearly a full days time
if much travel is involved. The committee suggests that an individual in the state, who has the time to make the investigations
be employed by the State Bar Association to carry out any investigations deemed advisable by the committee and that he be given
per diem as well as travel expense for such work.
Respectfully submitted,
R. G. Manly,
C. W. Burnham, Jr.,
Samuel H. Dolve,
J. 0. Thorson, Chairman.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: The Audit Committee. The Committee certified the records to be in good condition and in proper
balance. We checked all receipts, cancelled checks and vouchers.
The cash in the bank as of 6-30-53 was:
$16,417.51
as of 6-30-54:
$13,744.26.
MR. LORD: I move the adoption of the report.
MR. ZUGER: I second the motion.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Motion carried.
The Report of the Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform.
ROY A. PLOYHAR: I move the report be accepted and filed.
JUDGE LUNDBERG: I second the motion.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Motion carried.
(The report of said committee reads in full, as follows:)
REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON JURISPRUDENCE AND
LAW REFORM'
To the Honorable Vernon M. Johnson, President of the North
Dakota Bar Association, and Fellow Members of the Bar:
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In our last annual report we made definite recommendations
for further study by the Association and possible recommendations
of legislation providing for submitting the charge to the jury before final argument, allowing the trial court to grant a partial new
trial where in the judgment the issues are separable, and the possible repeal or modification of our so-called "dead man's statute."
Through the courtesy and cooperation of Dean Thormodsgard
there were published in the April 1954 issue of the North Dakota
Law Review three articles on subjects recommended by our committee for study and review. These articles are very comprehensive in their scope and in our opinion have already produced some
valuable and constructive thought on those subjects.
Among other things, your committee has recommended for
several years the further study of the Doctrine of Comparative
Negligence, which is to be discussed and debated at this meeting
of the Association. We are heartily in accord with the matter of
discussion and debate, providing that the members have some
advance information on the subject to be debated. We therefore
wholeheartedly recommend further efforts on the part of the North
Dakota Law Review to continue its fine work in presenting these
questions to the Bar as a whole.
It has always been the policy of this committee not to make
too many recommendations at one time, so that its recommendations
receive full and fair consideration. We are gratified with the results that have been produced so far. We still feel that our prior
recommendations should receive further consideration; and we
particularly recommend that these be made a matter of debate before a general session of the Association, such as is being done in
connection with the Doctrine of Comparative Negligence.
We would suggest that the incoming president provide for a
similar debate next year on the so-called "dead man's" statute, and
the matter of submitting the charge to the jury before the final
argument. We would also recommend to the incoming president:
that these recommendations be assigned to a special committee for
the purpose of arranging debate and discussion, as above suggested.
May we again express our appreciation to Dean Thormodsgard and the staff of the North Dakota Law Review for their
wonderful cooperation in preparing articles on these important
questions, and may we humbly request that we receive like cooperation in the future.
Respectfully submitted,
Albert Lundberg,
Judge of the District Court,
A. G. Porter,
Judge of the District Court,
Burton L. Green,
Theodore Kessel,
L. A. W. Stephan,
Roy A. Ployhar, Chairman.

BENCH AND BAR

PRESIDENT JOHNSON: The Resolutions Committee Report:
JOHN STORMON: One resolution will be read:
RESOLUTION
WHEREAS the North Dakota State Bar Association Convention at Grand Forks, North Dakota, has been favored by addresses
of outstanding merit by Jerry Giesler, Esquire and by Brigadier
General A. M. Kuhfeld, Assistant Advocate General of the United
States Air Force,
NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that we express to
our distinguished speakers our sincere appreciation for honoring us
with their presence and enlightening us with their masterful presentations.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED THAT Jerry Giesler and General A. M. Kuhfeld be elected Honorary Members of this Association.
The next one is one that we are adopting to be presented to
Major General Harmon, Judge Advocate General of the United
States Air Force.
RESOLUTION
WHEREAS by authority of Major General R. C. Harmon,
Judge Advocate General of the United States Air Force, the North
Dakota State Bar Association has been privileged to learn of the
operations of military justice in the air force through a most informative address by Brigadier General A. M. Kuhfeld, Assistant Judge
Advocate General of the Air Force.
NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED by the North Dakota
State Bar Association in its annual convention assembled that we
express our appreciation for the splendid cooperation of the Judge
Advocate General's office in bringing to the members of this association a fuller understanding and appreciation of the problems
involved in military justice and of the highly commendable efforts
of the Air Force to make the administration of military justice
responsible to the need for discipline and rehabilitation of the
members of the Air Force.
We also have a resolution expressing appreciation to the Governor of North Dakota in making judicial appointments according
to the plebiscites of this convention and a copy of this will be sent
to the Governor.
RESOLUTION
WHEREAS during the past year the North Dakota State Bar
Association has inaugurated a system of plebiscites for the purpose
of recommending candidates for appointment to judicial vacancies,
and
WHEREAS the Honorable Norman Brunsdale, Governor of
North Dakota, has cooperated to the fullest extent in this effort
to assure the appointment of qualified judges,
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NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the North Dakota
State Bar Association in annual convention assembled at Grand
Forks, North Dakota, that we express our appreciation for the cooperation of the Governor, his understanding of the problems involved and the quality of the judicial appointments made by him.
The next one is one to the law publishers for the door prizes
that are being awarded and expressing our appreciation for their
cooperation.
RESOLUTION
WHEREAS a number of law publishers have shown a decided
interest in the affairs of the North Dakota State Bar Association and
have contributed greatly to the success of the Association's Annual
Meeting by presenting books and publications to be presented to
the members of the Bar,
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the North Dakota
Bar Association that it express its thanks and appreciation to each
of the donors for the interest shown in the welfare of the North
Dakota Bar Association.
The next one I believe I will read.
RESOLUTION
BE IT RESOLVED by the North Dakota State Bar Association
in its annual convention assembled that the members of this association congratulate their ladies for organizing a Women's Auxiliary
to the State Bar Association. It is our feeling that this new organization wilt not only prove to be of great value in itself, but
that it will also give the members of the Bar more life, inspiration
and a greater desire to attend our annual conventions.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED by the North Dakota State
Bar Association that it express its thanks and appreciation to the
ladies' entertainment committee of the Grand Forks County Bar
Association for a splendid job in entertaining the ladies, thus making our convention a greater success.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that we express our special
appreciation to Mrs. Fred Saefke, Mrs. J. F. X. Conmy, Mrs. John
Gunness, Mrs. A. C. Bakken, Mrs. Roy Winchester and Mrs. R. W.
Wheeler, and to John Gunness for the entertainment provided at
the Annual Banquet.
The next resolution is one expressing appreciation to our
President, Executive Director, to all officers of the Executive Committee and all members and officers of the various committees.
RESOLUTION
BE IT RESOLVED by the North Dakota State Bar Association in convention assembled that we express to Vernon M. Johnson, President, and Ronald N. Davies, Executive Director, Robert
A. Alphson, Secretary, and all of the members and officers of the
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executive committee, and the various committees who have served
during the past year, our sincere appreciation for a highly successful and profitable year.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, we express our appreciation
to the Committee on Sectional Meetings and to the leaders of the
various sections for arranging for and conducting outstanding legal
clinics.
RESOLUTION
BE IT RESOLVED by the North Dakota State Bar Association
in its annual convention assembled that the members of this association express to our hosts, the Grand Forks County Bar Association,
and the members thereof, our appreciation and sincere thanks for
the splendid arrangements made for the enjoyment and edification
of the members of the association at this annual convention.
I move that these resolutions that have been filed, be adopted
by the Association.
L. R. NOSTDAL: I second the motion.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Motion carried.
MR. STORMON: The following resolution has been filed and
submitted to you without acceptance or recommendation of the
Committee:
BE IT RESOLVED,
That the Congress of the United States be memorialized to
enact a law governing Federal procedure in the selection of jurors
containing the following provisions:
That at least ten days prior to the convening of a jury term
of court the Clerk of Federal Court mail a list of the jurors, containing their names and postoffice addresses, to all attorneys having cases pending for trial at such term, and if special talesmen are
called as jurors, to serve during the pendency of a term of court,
that the Clerk of said court mail or deliver to such attorneys a list
of such jurors at least five days before the case is called for trial, in
which case such special talesmen are liable to be called to serve as
jurors.
That a copy of this resolution be sent to the American Bar
Association and to all the members of the House of Representatives
and to the two Senators from North Dakota.
MR. OEHLERT: I move the resolution be laid on the table.
Any resolution involving a matter of Federal procedure as on anything of this kind would require considerable study. ,Federal
authorities don't want that kind of jury selection method to be
adopted.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Do you have any objection to
make that motion that the incoming President refer this to the
proper standing committee.
MR. OEHLERT: I withdraw my motion and move to that
effect.

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

JOE STEVENS: I second the motion.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Motion carried.
Mr. Sperry, Chairman of the Committee on Continued Legal
Education, has consented his report to be filed and printed and so
moves.
JOHN HJELLUM: I second the motion.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Motion carried.
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CONTINUED
LEGAL EDUCATION
Mr. President, and all members of the North Dakota State Bar
Association:
This committee met a number of times since the last convention
and arranged for the holding of two institutes. The first of these
institutes was held at Bismark and extended over the last three
days of the month of October. Seven out-of-state speakers appeared upon this program, six of whom spoke on gas and oil
questions, and the seventh covered general income tax problems.
These speakers included Professor Charles J. Meyers, visiting Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota, Professor Howard R.
Williams, of Columbia University, Earl Brown, Jr., Division Counsel
of the Socony Vacuum Oil Company, of Billings, Montana, Willis
L. Lea, Jr., General Counsel of the Southern Union Gas Company
in Dallas, Texas, John Paul Jackson of Dallas, Texas, Roger S.
Randolph, from Tulsa, Oklahoma, and Jack R. Miller from Sioux
City, Iowa. The lectures given at this Institute by Professors
Meyers and Williams appeared in the January, 1954, issue of the
Minnesota Law Review. Also appearing on this program was Attorney Clifford Jansonius, of the firm of Strutz, Jansionius & Fleet,
who presented a fine paper on Mineral Reservations in Deeds and
Patents, and there was also discussion by the Attorney General on
the Application of the State Securities and Exchange Commission
Act to the Sale of Minerals.
Without question this first Institute was the most extensive
ever undertaken by this committee. The subject matter was
thoroughly covered, excellent papers were prepared for it, and the
material was very well presented. The attendance was somewhat
disappointing, though a number of out-of-state lawyers attended, in
addition to people other than lawyers interested in oil and gas law
and in tax maters, there being only approximately 35 North Dakota
attorneys in attendance. Altogether the Institute was sufficiently
well attended to cover the expenses of conducting it.
In December of 1953, after this first Institute had been held,
the members of this committee met at Bismarck at which time we
discussed in detail the matter of having additional Institutes. It
was finally agreed that a trial demonstration, involving a jury trial
of a personal injury action should be put on in Fargo and later at
Bismarck. This program was carried out as far as the Fargo
demonstration was concerned, and through the work of member
John Hjellum a very fine panel was arranged for that Institute.
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We were fortunate in obtaining the services of Francis Murphy,
who acted as the presiding trial judge, Attorney E. T. Conmy, Sr.,
who acted as defending counsel, and Attorney Phil B. Vogel acting
as Attorney for the Plaintiff. Other members of the Cass County
Bar Association completed the cast for this demonstration. The
jury was principally made up of students from the University Law
School who had been especially invited to attend. This was a full
dressed trial and it was worked out to include a number of the more
controversial questions which generally arise in the trial of a personal injury action. The participants did an excellent job and this
work was most favorably received.
Following this demonstration a round-table discussion was
had and it was decided that a similar demonstration should be put
on in Bismarck in September or October of 1954, and that it should
provide, in the course of the trial, for the following:
1. An opportunity should be made available for all attending
to discuss the various questions of law raised during the progress,
of the trial, as they arise.
2. The matter of laying a foundation for appealing should also,
be discussed at certain intervals in the trial.
3. There should be a discussion at the close of the trial, of the
various points involved, as was done following the Fargo demonstration.
4. It was recommended that a letter should be sent out to the,
members of the Bar, in advance, setting forth the points to be
stressed in the pleadings and in the trial of the action.
The Fargo meeting was attended by approximately 75 lawyers
and 10 law students from the University of North Dakota. This
demonstration was put on at the expense of the Association, no,
charge having been made for it, the principal purpose being to encourage attendance at meetings of this kind and to experiment with
this particular type of a program, undertaken for the first time in
this State.
In addition to the above trial institutes, we have also arranged
for the regular Fall Tax Institute, which will be held at one or more
places in the State at a time to be announced later. This will likely
be in October or November and will bring us up to date upon the
numerous changes in the basic law and in the practice under the
new Internal Revenue Act of 1954.
The tax program will cover general tax problems common to
all taxpayers, partnership questions, with considerable emphasis on
farm tax problems and those of small businesses. This program
will also include a discussion of procedure in tax cases especially
considering any new changes that have taken place.
At either the trial demonstration to be held at Bismarck or at
the time of holding the Tax Institute, there will be a special lecture
on Securities and Exchange Regulations on Minerals and Leases
and the handling of the same. This later arrangement has been
made because of a special interest and demand.
Generally, we would like to say that the trial demonstration
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type of an Institute has been carried on in other states and has
been found to be very popular and has contributed to increasing
attendance at these meetings. It has the advantage, of course, of
making it possible to hold such an Institute, through the use of
local members of the Bar. The National Committee of the American Bar Association, however, has a number of qualified lawyers
who have participated in conducting such Institutes in a number of
other states, to assist, should that be desired. We have attempted
in North Dakota to increase the number of Institutes and to make
them more worthwhile, in keeping step with the progress of this
work in other states.
We would like to observe that the National Committee, which
has cooperated with us in this work has participated in similar
programs in forty-five states. Up to now these projects have been
of a basic level "how to do it" nature. The interest and demand
for continuing legal education for lawyers has now led to the offering of training on a more advanced level. This work is to be commenced at Ohio State University this fall and it is hoped that it will
soon be extended to some six or eight geographically distributed
law schools. These seminars will be conducted principally for
practicing lawyers who desire to specialize in particular fields of law.
During the last year the individual members of this committee have been very active, Vice President, John Zuger having
contributed many suggestions, from his observations of similar work
conducted in other states, and which he had attended. Like contributions were made by President Vernon Johnson, and Attorney
John Hjellum has been especially active in promoting the work of
the Institute held in the eastern part of the state. Our Executive
Director, R. N. Davies, has done excellent work in preparing the
material for these Institutes, without which the duties of this committee would be most difficult.
As progress is made, it is hoped that it will be possible to carry
out more of the suggestions of the individual members of the Bar,
with reference to this work, and that such programs can be conducted in more localities.
In concluding this report we wish to add that especially by
taking active part in the work and in sending us your suggestions,
the cooperation given to the members of this committe has been
highly appreciated.
Respectfully submitted,
COMMITTEE ON CONTINUED LEGAL EDUCATION.
John Hjellum,
John Zuger,
Floyd B. Sperry, Chairman.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: There is one other matter, the
last official matter, and that is the action of the Executive Committee which recommended in conjunction with the Bar Board
that the license fee for attorneys be increased from $10.00 to $15.00
and the division to be the same as at present if such action be taken.
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MR. HIGGINS: I so move.
W. L. ECKES: I second the motion.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Motion carried.
NORBERT L. MUGGLI: We have the report on the Retirement Fund Committee.
R. N. DAVIES: It was called up on the 5th and in the absence
of the members of the committe, it was read and filed.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: I will ask Mr. Paletz to address us.
He is the President of the Grand Forks County Bar Association.
I will say for each and every one of us that we are deeply grateful
to him and to the members of the Grand Forks Bar and to the folks
out at the University for the marvelous time we have had at Grand
Forks.
(Whereupon Mr. Samuel E. Paletz addressed the convention
briefly.)
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: We have just received a telegram
from L. M. Carlson and A. J. Thomas of Williston inviting the
North Dakota State Bar Association to hold their next convention
at Williston.
Now, Mr. James Lamb of Grand Forks will come up here. He
is going to give the books away.
MR. LAMB: There are seven sets of books to be given out.
Mr. Johnson will consent to draw seven names:
(Whereupon the books were given away as follows:)
Dick Gallagher, Mandan, N. Dak.
Jones on Evidence - Bencroft
Sam Silverman, Grand Forks, N. Dak.
Set of United States Code
Given by Milton R. Young
Harold J. Fischer, Williston, N. Dak.
Balentine Law Dictionary
Milton Moskau, Grand Forks, N. Dak.
Clark's Summary of American Law
Lawyer's Coop. Publishing Co.
R. J. Bleodau, Glen Ulin, N. Dak.
Sherpard's Citations One Year's
Subscription to North Dakota Citations
A. W. Shupienis, Fargo, N. Dak.
Merit on Merit - West Publishing Company
Patrick Milloy, Wahpeton, N. Dak.
The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modem Times
PRESIDENT JOHNSON: I will now turn the meeting over to
John Zuger.
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MR. ZUGER: I have a certificate to be given to our Past
President certifying he has served with honor and distinction during the past year. He has done an excellent job. Let's give Vernon
a hand for a darn good year.
MR. ZUGER: The Executive Committee will meet immediately after adjournment at the Ryan Hotel. I invite any or all of
you to write to me if you can within the next week or ten days
indicating what committee assignment you would be interested in.
I think any of us can do a much better job if we are put on something we are interested in. Pass the word along as I want to know
where you want to start in.
RONALD N. DAVIES: I move that we adjourn.
SENATOR DUFFY: I second.
(Question put and motion carried.)
Whereupon, the 1954 Annual Convention of the State Bar
Association of North Dakota was adjourned.

